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Scottish government, with parliament at its centre, was reconstructed 
in this period in a more centralized, absolutist mould. This led to a 
rejuvenation of parliament, which had been declining in the early 
sixteenth century. However, it also led to the growth of a 
parliamentary opposition that increasingly hampered the government. 
Parliament was a forum for the governing class to make policy, and for 
lobbying by interest groups, especially the three traditional estates. 
Burgesses, nobility and church all had their own assemblies feeding 
demands into parliament. Lairds (who entered parliament in 1587) and 
lawyers also developed lobbying mechanisms. Lobbying meant that 
private and public acts of parliament became inextricably interlinked. 
Administration and implementation of laws depended more on central 
institutions, bureaucratic and professional, like the emerging exchequer; 
these often conflicted with traditional local agencies of government. 
Statute law superseded the old medieval law codes; attempts to codify 
the latter failed. 
Inflation, and social trends like feuing, defeated attempts to reverse 
the decline in the crown's landed income. Parliamentary taxation 
became regular and far heavier, but attempts to revise the outdated 
assessment system failed, leaving tax rates hopelessly unequal. An 
increasing proportion of crown revenue was drawn from the commercial 
classes. Fiscal crises became regular and crown indebtedness 
desperate; the crown exploited a newly-emergent financial sector. 
Intervention in the economy continued to shore up the regulated, open 
market. Most laws regulated producers and merchants in the interests 
of the ruling class as consumers, focusing on an export licensing 
system; but there were moves (in policy on debt and usury, for 
instance) to encourage production and commerce. 
Social control was maintained, in a society increasingly divided 
ideologically, by official propaganda and new forms of censorship. 
Military policy was oriented towards suppressing internal dissent. A 
standing army was beyond the state's means, but with the decline of the 
old 'common army' there was an active quest for alternatives. 
Parliamentary action highlighted the periods shifting class divisions. 
With growing poverty and unemployment, the social threat of large-scale 
vagrancy led to the enactment of a poor law which, though ineffective 
in many ways, did allow the urban vagrancy problem to be tackled. 
However, despite parliament's ambivalence about the feuing that was 
undermining the feudal property structure, nothing effective was done 
to curb the resulting evictions or rent rises. The nobility's 
financial problems were alleviated by crown pensions, though they found 
it hard to abandon their traditional semi-independent status; but 
these pensions rested on the insecure basis of parliamentary taxation. 
Government was increasingly active - but increasingly unpopular. 
1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: PARLIAMENT AHD THE POLITICAL SYSTBJ( 
Sir yea have seng ane sarva1ous thing, 
Ca our Judgeaent; 
The thrie estaits of this regioun, 
Ar cuaiand backvart, throw this tourt, 
To the Pariaaant, ' 
This is not a history of parliament; that has already been done. 
Rait modestly described his Parliaments of Scotland as a 'pioneer work', 
calling for further research; in fact, he had achieved a monumental 
summary of a large body of knowledge which he and other historians, 
led by Hannay, had developed about the workings of the Scottish 
constitution? Rait's work has endured, and we simply do not need to 
re-invent the wheel - or the distinction between parliament and general 
council. 
Nor is this a 'History of Parliament': a work on the agglomerate- 
biography plan pioneered by lazier for the eighteenth century, and 
adopted by Neale for the Elizabethan parliament. ' At the time of 
writing, the publication of a Scottish work on the same lines is 
awaited. This will be invaluable in telling us who parliament was; it 
1, Lindsay, 'thrum estaitis', 227, 
2, R. S. Rait, The parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow, 1924), 
3, rho history of parliament, the twjo of commons, FSS8-FS03,3 vols., ed, 
P, il, Hasler (London, 1921); J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and her parliaments, 2 
vols, (London, 1953-57). 
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may also help us to understand what parliament was, a question that is 
addressed from another angle in this chapter by way of introduction; 
what it will not tell us is what parliament did, and that is my overall 
theme. ' 
What parliament did, clearly, was to pass laws. Yet the parliamentary 
statutes themselves have remained surprisingly neglected. This, then, 
is a study of those statutes; of government; of policy-making and its 
implementation in a changing society. This is an approach which has 
been responsible for some of the best work on Scottish history - that 
on religion, and in particular on the polity of the church, that area of 
religion with which the government was most actively concerned .2 
Education has also been well served by this approach. ' But there are 
many similar topics to investigate; what role did the central 
legislative assembly play in the evolution of other areas of policy? 
Then more needs to be done on the role of parliament in the 
governmental process as a whole. A final point, obvious but often 
overlooked: government has also to be considered from the point of 
view of the governed. 
What was parliament? It was not a thing. True, well-developed 
institutions do seem to take on a life of their own: the history of 
i, Cf, G. R. Elton, 'Studying the history of parliasent', British Studies H niter, 
2, eo, 2 (1971), 4-14, for an approach to the question with which this study has 
such in coaeon - as yell as sose significant differences, See also 
3, H, Hexter, 'Parliasent under the lens; reflections on 6, R, Elton's 'Studying 
the history of parliasent ", British Studies Manitor, 3, no, i (1972), 4-15, 
2,6, Donaldson, The Scottish Refornatioii (Ca'bridga, 1960). 
3, J. Scotland, The history of Scottish Mecatiar, i (London, 1969). 
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France would have been very different if the magistrates of the 
parlement of Paris had been less tenacious of their institutional 
privileges. ' But even if Scotland had been a fully integrated kingdom; 
even if its government had been centralized; even if its 
administration had taken a firm grip an the nation's life; even if 
political activity had been carried on within a well-defined 
constitutional framework, and had had law-making as its chief purpose; 
even if a parliamentary majority had been an essential attribute of 
government: even then, parliament would not have been a thing, but a 
meeting-place. As it was, the Scottish parliament was a somewhat ill- 
defined crossroads where certain leading members of the ruling class 
gathered to transact a variety of business. At its best the Namierite 
approach can highlight this, by bringing out the social status and the 
vested interests which members of parliament brought to the assembly 
from outside. Rait, meanwhile, shows how parliament acted in da a 
constitutional sense: how it as an institution related to other 
institutions. I would like to show parliament, not as subject or 
object, but as channel. If the following chapters serve any purpose, 
they will show the Scottish governing classes using parliament as their 
chosen forum in which to confront a variety of social and economic 
problems, and hammering out agreed solutions which we see as they 
emerge in the form of legislation. 
If Scotland's leaders continued to find a use for the forum they called 
parliament, this in itself is remarkable. The sixteenth century was 
i, 3, H, Shennan, rho parlaseat of Faris (Landon, 1968), 
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an unprecedentedly bad time for parliaments. Many nations in western 
Europe were dispensing with their medieval assemblies; a parliament of 
growing importance was an unusual phenomenon. ' Why did parliament 
flourish? 
This question is linked with the well-known phenomenon of 'new 
monarchies' in western Europe, which were often able to govern without 
representative assemblies. In Scotland, the beginning of 'new 
monarchy' has been identified in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
century (in the reign of James IV2), in the late sixteenth century (in 
the reign of James VI=A), and in the early seventeenth century (in the 
successful 'pen government' which followed the union of crowns°). 
These differing perspectives can in fact be reconciled. The reign of 
James IV is significant for establishing the political harmony which 
was an essential precondition for successful government (to many 
political historians, political harmony equals successful government, 
but not in these pages). & The reign saw politics increasingly 
centralized at court, and focused on a new-style privy council and the 
person of the monarch - aided by the king's willingness to travel and 
bring the court to the localities. The foundations for a more fully 
integrated kingdom were laid by smashing the semi-independent lordship 
1, A. R. Myers, Parliaments and estates in £yr , to 17,09 (London, 1976), 
2. R, Nicholson, Scotland; t1w later siedle ages (Edinburgh, 1974), 539-41, 
3,6, Donaldson, Srotlani; Janas V- leeres 4'11 (Edinburgh, 1965), 155, 
4, A, 6, R, Smith (ed. ), The reign of James Vl and I (London, 1973), 1. 
5, N, Macdougall, "The glory of all princely governing': the kingship of 
Janas IV', History Today, 34, no, 11 (November 1984), 30-36. 
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of the Isles, though nothing was as yet put in its place. The state's 
military and naval power, independent of the magnates, was promoted. 
And finally - the key point for our purposes - parliament faded away 
rapidly. The fifteenth century had seen parliament meet more or less 
annually, but while 13 parliaments met between 1486 and 1495 there 
were only three between 1496 and 1505, and only four (plus a general 
council) in the following decade. Attendances were down too: 
fifteenth-century parliaments could have over 100 members, but after 
1490 none exceeded 60. The nadir was reached in 1527, when only 27 
turned up. ' This really was the period when, in Lindsay's words, 'the 
thrie estaits gangs all backwart'. 2 
None of this was unusual: over much of western Europe, medieval 
assemblies were going out with the tide, and more effective means of 
political consultation and political integration were emerging at royal 
courts. The French estates general, beset by provincial rivals, 
succumbed early to the pressure; new-style monarchy no longer needed 
it .3 The English monarchy was finding its parliament less and less 
useful in the early sixteenth century, and the declining frequency of 
the English parliament mirrors the Scottish situation closely., ' 
1, Figures on parliaaents are froa APS, ii-iv, passis. Counting parliaaents is 
not straightforward: when does a reconvened asseably becoae a new one? Al! 
such 'continued' parliaaents are counted as two, no satter how aany tines they 
reconvened, See also Appendix A for parliasents between 1560 and 1603, 
2, Lindsay, 'Thrie estaitis', 237, 
3, P, S, Levis, 'The failure of the French aedieval estates', Fast and Present, 23 
(Noveaber 1962), 3-24, 
4, C, Russell, The crisis of pariie ants; English history, 1509-1660 (Oxford, 
1971), 39-40, 
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England, unlike France, developed a new role for parliament at the time 
of its break with Rome, though even here there were pressures to 
develop alternative forms of legislation - the statute of 
proclamations - which would have made parliament disposable. ' 
Scotland's parliament initially owed its survival not to new 
constitutional developments, but to an enforced reversion to old ones. 
At Flodden, much of the achievement of Janes IV's reign perished: its 
complex, glittering court centred on the royal household, its political 
harmony and its state-directed military programme. Renewed political 
instability meant more work for parliament in finding agreed solutions 
for a variety of problems concerning the regency and the succession. 
In the 1530s there was once again some reason to think that parliament 
might have outlived its usefulness: the court of session emerged to 
take over much of its legal business .2 But the crisis of the Scottish 
parliament was over, and in fact the 1530s saw slowly increasing 
attendances and a temporary recovery almost to annual parliaments. 
Possibly this had something to do with the need to define the country's 
religious orientation - conservatively, as it happened - in response to 
the Reformation challenge. 3 It has also been pointed out that 
J, Hurstfieid, 'Was there a Tudor despotism after all? ', frs s, rarraIOtiM and 
goverment in Elizabethan England (London, 1973), 33-40, Elton disagrees: 
6, R, Elton, 'The rule of law in sixteenth-century England', Studies in Tudor and 
Stuart politics and quverneent, i (Cambridge, 1973), 271-74, Both vriters 
dramatize 'despotism' sore than vould be necessary in the Scottish context, 
Elton does not alloy that there vould still have been a 'rule of law' even if 
proclamations had been allowed to supersede statute; but Louis XIV ruled 
according to the iav, 
2, P. J. Haailton-6rierson, 'The judicial couuittees of the Scottish parliarent, 
1369-70 to 1544', S&c'22 (1425), 12. 
3, J, Yorsald, Cirirt, kirk and raa+wnitr; Scotland, UU70-162S (London, 1981), 22, 
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medieval a einblies were more likely to survive in small countries 
where their members were more familiar with one another and had no 
alternative regional forums. ' 
Not that the reign of James IV was unique: his adult successors all 
had royal households of much the same type, with the potential to 
replace parliament in the political system. The most frequent 
parliaments thereafter were in the periods of the most extreme 
government weakness, with no court to focus on and a nobility 
scrabbling for political solutions - the early minority of Nary, and 
the 1570-73 civil war. Conversely, something very different was 
happening by the end of the sixteenth century: only six parliaments in 
the 18 years 1586-1603. Clearly there was no longer much pressure to 
hold parliaments for political or judicial reasons. Sir James Melville 
in the 1534s even held that over-frequent parliaments could give rise 
to grievance, an unlikely complaint in earlier times: most likely he 
associated frequent parliaments with the political tribulations which 
he felt should now be a thing of the past .2 
Medieval parliaments had been frequent as a matter of course. In 
1399, there was a demand for annual parliaments, so that the lieges 
might be 'servit of the law'. 3 Such parliaments thus had a judicial 
basis - government was a matter for adjudicating among conflicting 
V, 6, Kiernan, State and society in Europa, 1SSO-F65 (Oxford, 1980), 4. 
i, Melville, Hea, fr3,378, 
3, A, Brant, lap arr ace amt satiolW&ed: Scotlar7, ! i''ßä-JASS (London, 1984), 150, 
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claims to power and property rather than for what was going to be done 
with that power: 
The principall point, sir, of ane kings office, 
is for to do to everilk san Justice, ' 
But by now parliament had a new role: as a legislative tool. Given 
time, James IV might have developed non-parliamentary methods of 
legislation, but now it was too late. Parliament had proved its 
continued usefulness in a difficult period, there was no constitutional 
alternative to parliamentary legislation in eight, and the need for 
legislation was growing. From the 1580s, the Scottish parliament 
becomes almost a different assembly. Medieval parliaments had often 
passed no legislation, and no parliament before 1579 enacted as many 
as 50 statutes; but after that date, few enacted less, and many 
exceeded 100. This was what Rait meant when he pointed out that the 
medieval record of doing everything in the name of parliament could 
allow parliament to emerge as an essential component of an assertive, 
centralizing government .2 It seems that we are back with 'new 
monarchy' after a long period of political tribulation. 
It is tine to define this 'new monarchy'. The concept has been 
cavalierly lumped with discredited ideas about the taming of an 
uncivilized, over-mighty baronage; 3 but a tool of some kind is needed 
I. Lindsay, 'Thrie estaitis', 187, 
2. Rafft, Parliaments, 46-47, 
3, J, Yarsald, Lords aid men in Scotl. and; bonds of aanrant, 144''-1603 (Edinburgh, 
1985), 4, 
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to measure the pressure for development that was clearly building up in 
the Scottish governmental system. The monarchy coped remarkably well 
with royal minorities, external war and internal political turmoil; but 
these were undeniably barriers to governmental expansion. As soon as 
these barriers were lifted, things would start to change. How? 
'New monarchy' may be imprecise, but it can be equated with the first 
stirrings of what has been described as absolutism -a concept which 
has been developed with considerable sophistication by Anderson. ' 
Beginning in the fifteenth century but not seen at the same time 
everywhere, absolutism reordered the relationship between the feudal 
nobility and the crown in the nation-states of western Europe. From 
being the greatest among many feudal landlords, the crown was 
transformed into the head of a national bureaucracy with a relationship 
to the people that was both direct and mediated through the nobility in 
their new roles as government ministers and estate managers. 
It was Anderson's own belief that Scotland did not reach the stage of 
absolutism i2 But why should Scotland, very much in the mainstream of 
other western European developments, have avoided this one? James IV 
was clearly heading in that direction. So was James VI - and not just 
because he believed in the divine right of kings, characteristic though 
that was. His government - and his parliaments - began to do more 
1, P. Anderson, LIn gi'; of tho absolutist stale (London, 1974), 22 and passia, 
2, Anderson, Absolutist state, 137,141, Anderson's argusents on Scotland are not 
central to his overall theory, which is sore applicable to Scotland than he 
hiasalf suggests. A critique of Anderson, which however esploys a confused 
definition of absolutiss, is in T. Dickson (ad, ), Scottish capitalism (London, 
1980), 2£-27, 
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and more. The nobles had their feuds submitted to royal justice, and 
the law was profess ionalized. I Military action became the exclusive 
preserve of the state .2 The crown lands, wh ich had made the king a 
feudal magnate in his own right, evaporated; parliamentary taxation 
grew into a major branch of government revenue. " Legislation expanded 
into new areas like social welfare., ' The central bureaucracy of 
government expanded and spread its influence into local communities; 
there was more government, and more of it was central government. 
Meanwhile, attendances at parliament slowly increased until by the 
early seventeenth century there could be over 170 people packed into 
the Edinburgh tolbooth. 6 Vas parliament the handmaid of absolutism? 
Yes and no. 
One of the political roles that parliament played has survived with 
little change down to modern times: it was an organ for constant 
reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the government and governing class 
of the day. Political leaders have always needed a stage on which to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of their actions. Other members of 
political classes have always been concerned to ascertain what actions 
by political leaders are legitimate. The result is a probing of the 
i, K. H. Brown, Sloodf Al In ScollaaJ, 157H-1635 (Edinburgh, 1986), ch, 9. 
3, Chapter 7. 
3, for crown lands, sae chapter 4; for taxation, sae chapter S, 
4, Chapter S. 
S. R. K. Hannay 8 6, P, H, Watson, 'The building of the parliament house', BOEC 13 
(1924), 11, 
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boundaries of political legitimacy in order to define it. Governments 
today tend to acquire an organized and self-defined opposition, often 
presenting itself as an alternative government, to focus attention on 
this frontier region; much political debate (nowadays conducted 
through communications media, but then a matter for direct 
participation) has always in effect been concerned with drawing and 
redrawing a line showing the limits of acceptable government action. 
The nature of the opposition in sixteenth-century Scotland was more 
diffuse than it is now, but its function was much the same: to provide 
a safety-valve indicating when the government was in danger of 
crossing the boundaries of what the political community regarded as 
lawful authority. Tracing these boundaries is as useful to historians 
as it was to contemporaries, and the best guide to the terrain is the 
changing function of the political opposition. 
Questions of legitimacy are bound up with the nature of monarchy. The 
monarch as ultimate symbol of political legitimacy still had a long 
future in the sixteenth century. Especially with Scotland's long royal 
minorities, the symbol might almost as well have been an inanimate 
object, like the conch shell in Golding's Lord of the files. Indeed, 
when political differences became so severe, in 1570-73, that the 
factions could not even agree on the ultimate source of authority, it is 
hard to say which faction had the more impressive symbol: the queen's 
party, whose parliaments were held with the correct regalia and who 
could refer to an adult monarch even if she was unfortunately absent, 
or the king's party, who could produce an infant but no regalia. ' 
1.6, Donaldson, 411 the SR's oen (London, 1983), 121. 
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It was usual for the contending factions to agree about the monarch, 
however, which is why extra-parliamentary opposition so often took the 
form of the loyal rebellion. ' The last successful exponents of this 
technique in its pristine form, the 1582 Ruthven Raiders, protested 
undying loyalty to the king as they kidnapped him. Their quarrel, 
they averred, was merely with the duke of Lennox and his crypto- 
Catholic adherents. Such 'evil counsellors' act as a lightning- 
conductor in all monarchies, allowing opposition (even if violent) to 
reach its target without wrecking the entire structure. -- It happened 
that the long run of royal minorities ended in the 1580s, and 
kidnapping an adult monarch was rarely successful; Mary in 1567 had 
to be deposed before the opposition faction could rule, and the earl of 
Bothwell's impotence with the king in his hands in 1593 is striking. 
The state's growing monopoly of political violence also reduced the 
scope for such derring-do, but noble opposition was never short of 
extra-parliamentary outlets - dissatisfied nobles could always take 
their grievances to the king at court. After all, daily government 
was not channelled through parliament, and the command of a 
parliamentary majority was still only a by-product of a power game 
carried on elsewhere. Scotland was not unusual in this. In England, 
parliament was central to the rise of Thomas Cromwell; but when 
events at court caused his downfall, parliament dutifully attainted him. 
Similarly, parliament played almost no part in the tooth-and-nail 
struggle between Essex and Cecil in the 1590s. So when we find the 
Scottish parliament forfeiting the Gordons in 1563, and four years 
1. Brown, Bioodfeud, ch, S. 
2, L. flair, friaitiv' ggvernoeQi (Hariondsworth, 1962), 143, 
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later obediently agreeing that 'sic spott may be takin fro thane' after 
some legalistic hair-splitting over the form of the original summons, 
we need feel no surprise. ' 
The Gordons' restoration shows that parliament had a role to play even 
in violent political convulsions - but only after the event. It needed 
no parliament to start the 1570-73 civil war, but only parliament could 
patch things up again at the end. To be sure, parliament was only 
ratifying a settlement, the pacification of Perth, negotiated 
elsewhere - but is the parliament chamber a normal venue for such 
negotiations in any age? Parliamentary protection was a vital matter 
for the queen's party, who had been branded as traitors and could not 
afford to lay down their arms without high-quality guarantees .2 An 
even more significant reconciliation statute - gold-plated because it 
benefited the winning side - was the act of oblivion of 1560. =' At 
first it covered only named individuals, like the pacification of Perth, 
but in 1563 it was made general and a standing commission was 
appointed to administer it. 4 Once a prudential time had elapsed, 
rebels would usually return to find a buyer's market for parliamentary 
restorations - though it is true that we do not know the actual price 
they paid. 
i, APS, ii, 573, c, 23, 
2, Appendix A, no, 32, 
3, R. Keith, Hfsiory of ! ha affairs Of rlwrrh and state in Scotland, i, ed. 
J, P. Lawson (Spottisvoode Society, 1844), 325; Leslie, Historic, ii, 448, 
4, APS, ii, 535-36, c, l; 536-37, c, 2; acts of the lords interpreters of the act 
of oblivion, 1563-69, SRO, PA9/1, 
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However, since the axe, gibbet and stake regularly testified to the 
price exacted for opposition in England, Scotland's opposition factions 
could count themselves lucky. Parliament was not there to wreak 
vengeance, but (within certain limits) to let bygones be bygones. In 
short, parliament was a forum for limiting violent opposition, but also 
for regulating it - and therefore necessarily for legitimizing it. 
This is because a rebellion was essentially a feud writ large. There 
was no clear dividing line between large feuds and small rebellions; 
wrangles over the local organs of a decentralized government apparatus 
could draw the government into feuds, as when in 1585 the Maxwell- 
Johnstone feud became by degrees a Maxwell rebellion. ' All Highland 
rebellions began as feuds. The absence of government machinery in the 
Highlands meant that any opponent of a government-backed clan like the 
Campbells was liable to be branded a rebel . 22 No other form of 
rebellion was possible, for there was nothing else there to rebel 
against. The point is that the bloodfeud, under certain circumstances, 
carried its own legitimacy: it was deprecated, but also tolerated; 
people shook their heads when one was started, but they understood that 
it had to be done; while prosecuting the feud, they searched for ways 
of patching it up, of bringing it to a peaceful end with honour intact 
all round. 3 It was thus with rebellions also - and the patching up 
was done in parliament. 
i, K, M, Brown, 'The sakfn8 of a politi ; the counter Reforsatfon and the 
regional politics of John, eighth Lord Maxwell', W66 (1987), 156-57, 
2, T, C, Siout, d history of the Scottish people, JSSO-l8 O (London, 1969), 106, 
3, Brown, Bloodfaiol, ch, 2, 
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One view of parliament's place in the arbitration of political disputes 
and resolution of civil strife is to be found in Buchanan's De jure 
regni, written in the aftermath of a successful rebellion. Buchanan, 
of course, favoured any opposition by temperament, and this opposition 
(now government) in particular; but his words reflect the essence of 
parliamentary restorations, which was to favour former rebels by 
reconciling rather than punishing them. Buchanan aimed to restrict 
the king's right to punish: 'I would give the people the right to 
prescribe the limits of the authority that they have vested in him, and 
I would ask that he, as king, should abide by these limits... what 
affects the joint safety of all should have the backing of an open 
general council acting with the king'. It was parliament, with its 
diverse representation from different estates, that he had in mind: 
'roughly in accordance with our standing practice, selected people of 
all classes should assemble to advise the king'. Buchanan was, 
however, an Athenian democrat at heart: 'Then when they have agreed on 
a measure, it should be referred to the people for approval'. ' 
By 'the people' Buchanan undoubtedly meant (as in Athens) nothing more 
subversive than the entire political nation - the ruling class, in fact. 
Even so, it was a point that would have stuck in the throat of his 
royal pupil. Otherwise, however, James VI had a quite similar view of 
the ultimate outcome of political conflict. True, conflict implied 
rebellion, which was 'unlawfull' even against a tyrant; but it was also 
understandable and even no more than a tyrant should expect. 
1. Buchanan, De Jura r'gni, 11. 
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Crucially, 'the fact will remain as allowed by the law'. ' Considering 
the 'facts' that the Scottish parliament allowed to remain after 
rebellions, this came close to saying that parliament was entitled to 
sanction rebellion. 
The political opposition could only turn to violence so long as the 
nobility retained the capacity for military action independent of the 
state. By the close of the sixteenth century, this was coming to an 
end. The rebellion of the Catholic earls in the 1590s met with the 
traditional response from parliament -a crescendo of threats and 
forfeitures, followed by a diminuendo of reconciliation ? why this 
should have been the last is beyond the scope of this study, but it 
was. Even before then, there are good reasons why we can detect 
stirrings of a specifically parliamentary opposition. 
The turning-point was perhaps in the aid-1580s. 3 The last royal 
minority was drawing to an end, and 1584 ushered in an aggressive, 
proto-absolutist regime headed by the earl of Arran -a regime which, 
with the Black Acts, wielded statutes against its adversaries in a new 
way. Opposition came from the newly-established presbyteries which 
claimed an authority independent of the state: the reply was an act 
which confirmed the royal power over 'all static alsweill spirituall as 
, King Janas VI, 8aiilicon diron, i, ed, J. Craigie (STS, 1944), 57-59. 
2, APS, iv, 4-5; 55-61; 124-30, c, 1, 
Cf. R. Lee, John Maitland of Thirinstarv and the foundation of the Stewart 
Wpotisa in Scotland (Princeton, 1959), 
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temporall'. 1 Those who had been 'curiouslie travelling to have 
introduceit sum innovatioun' in parliament (by changing the clerical 
representation to get rid of bishops) were reproved .2 All 
jurisdictions and assemblies (presbyteries were not actually specified) 
were banned unless specifically approved by parliament? ' Arran made 
a bid for the moral high ground of the debate by asserting the power 
of the king (through bishops and commissioners) to deprive ministers 
for offences ranging from heresy to simony; 4 had not the ministers 
themselves asked for a statute on 'depositioun of ministers' in 1581? 8 
All this was preceded by a measure which the presbyterians must have 
found insufferable: an act guaranteeing liberty of preaching according 
to the 1560 confession of faith. G 
The Arran regime took a new and distinctively authoritarian attitude to 
parliamentary procedure. The acts were rushed through with the 
minimum of debate: the lords of the articles (the committee that 
prepared, and eventually came to dominate, parliamentary business) were 
elected on 19 Ray, and the 49 acts of the parliament were voted and 
passed on 22 May. 7 Some of the royal guard were provocatively 
stationed 'within the bar of the tolbuith', drawing a protest from the 
i, APS, iii, 292-93, c, 2, 
2. APS, iii, 293, c, 3, 
3. +9PS, iii, 293, c, 4, 
4. WS, iii, 293-94, c, 5. 
5, Catdervood, History, iii, 522, 
6, WS, iii, 292, c, 1, 
7, ! 1oysie, Awlrs, 60, 
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Earl Karischal who claimed the hereditary right to regulate this 
sensitive area. ' The lords of the articles were sworn to secrecy, and 
the English news service learned what had happened only when the 
leading opposition ministers fled to Berwick .2 In August 1584 Arran 
held another parliament, in which all his proposed acts were railroaded 
through by reading and voting on them as a block - there were 
protests, but in vain. 3 Arran himself was toppled through lack of a 
broad political base, but the Black Acts survived his fall; the 
ministers tried to get them repealed in the parliament of December 
1585, but failed. '' The act on royal supremacy was being reissued as 
late as 1598-97. s 
The next few years saw the construction of a wider political consensus 
on the lines Arran had laid down. An active parliament had proved its 
usefulness, and continued to be an integral part of the government. 
This, indeed, is part of the explanation of why parliament survived 
after 1584: when the time came to reconstruct the Scottish polity with 
an adult king at its head, the trend was towards increasing rather than 
reducing the breadth of the political consensus. Arran had clearly 
feared parliamentary opposition, even though he did not hesitate to use 
parliament; after his fall, a broadly-based administration succeeded in 
marginalizing the opposition to remove even this residual fear of 
1, APS, iii, 291. 
2, Ca Warwood, History, iv, 62-63; Vittias Davison to Francis Qalsinghaa, 27 May 
1584, CSP Scot vii, 155-57, 
3, Davison to Vatsinghas, 24 August 1584, CSP Scot,, vii, 290, 
t, Melville, Diary, 229-44. 
S. 4PS, iv, 103; 106-07, 
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summoning parliament. Harmony prevailed. 
Harmony between an absolutist crown and its assembled parliament was 
no more than the crown expected. Henry VIII famously boasted that 'we 
at no time stand so highly in our estate royal as in time of 
parliament, wherein we as head and you as members are conjoined and 
knit together in one body politic'. ' S imilarly Jean Bodin, the great 
theorist of absolutism: 
The sovereignty of a sonarch is no Way altered or disinishad by the existence of 
Estates; on the contrary, his aaiesty is the greater and sort illustrious when 
his people acknowledge his as sovereign, even if in such asseablies princes, not 
wanting to antagonize their subjects, grant and persit "any things to which they 
would not have consented without the requests, prayers and lust coeplaints of 
their people. 2 
Thus, the fifteenth-century French monarchy had been seen as weak 
because it lacked a strong estates general. ' Thus, too, James VI could 
confidently promise in 1587 to treat parliament more respectfully than 
Arran had done: he would not 'prejuge the libertie of frie voiting and 
rem oning of the saidis estaitis'. 4 The last thing he expected was 
that the estates' free discussion might lead to conclusions different 
from his own. 
In fact the political consensus proved less enduring than, in the late 
1580s, there had briefly been reason to hope. The government's role 
t, 6, R, Elton (ed, ), The Tuir constitution Und edn,, Casbrid, 2e, 1982), 277, 
2, Quoted in Anderson, Absolutist state, 50-51, 
3, Lewis, 'Failure of the French sedieval estates', 3, 
A. APS, iii, 443, t, 16, 
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was expanding, and a state of a new type was being constructed: this 
could not be done without strains, and strains led to the emergence of 
a new kind of opposition. ' For the political system, the implication 
of government expansion was that policy questions, rather than 
patronage ones, became relatively more prominent: it was less a matter 
of who was in power, more a matter of what they did with It. And 
what they did, they increasingly did through parliament. They were 
probing the boundaries of governmental legitimacy, not just through the 
question of whether such a noble should be thrown off the gravy train 
(though gravy train politics continued to be important), but of whether 
such a task should be carried out by government agencies. And if the 
opposition were going to object, they had ultimately to object in 
parliament. It might almost be said that a parliamentary opposition 
had to emerge before parliamentary government. 
It is true that in the fifteenth and even fourteenth centuries there 
were well-attended parliaments to which the opposition did come - and 
were able to use parliament successfully as a weapon against the 
government. This happened in 1472 and 1473, when parliamentary 
critics were able to frustrate the king's grandiose and potentially 
costly foreign policy schemes-' The crown already possessed some 
absolutist potential in the fifteenth century. But relatively little 
opposition was about government policies of this kind; the political 
programme of most medieval opposition groups began and ended with the 
belief that they, not those currently in power, should be on the gravy 
i, C. Tilly, 'Reflections on the history of European state-eaktng', The formattoll 
of national states i, vestern Eurem, ed, C. Tilly (Princeton, 1975), 
2, N, Macdougall, Janes III; a political study (Edinburgh, 1982), 93-97, 
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train. The Home family did not care what James III intended to do 
with their Coldingham priory revenues when they resisted his attempts 
to annex the priory. ' Besides, medieval politics was more 
decentralized; less of it took place at court. Even when the 
overlordship of the Sinclair earldom of Orkney was being transferred to 
Scotland and the crown was taking unusual and direct initiatives to 
obtain the earldom for itself, political events were still to a large 
extent dominated by rivalries between different branches of the 
Sinclair family? 
The large parliamentary attendances of the fifteenth century, as well 
as the direct evidence, suggest that parliament was accepted as the 
place where government supporters and opponents both met to define the 
limits of legitimate government policy. There was a particularly 
large turnout in 1472, for instance. - When parliamentary attendances 
declined in the early sixteenth century, this was partly a general loss 
of interest in parliament, but probably government supporters continued 
to came. If the government was in good odour, there might be a good 
turnout; if it was no better thought of than it deserved, there might 
not. Opposition operated through court intrigue, or failing that 
military action. It was when opposition nobles boycotted parliament, 
in the hope of denying recognition to the government's actions (or of 
saving their awn skins), that parliament was in jeopardy. The 
N. Macdougall, 'Crown vvrims nobility: the struggle for the priory of 
Cotdinghae, 1472-88', Fssayi on the mobility of ai'dieval Scotl. ani, ed. 
K, J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1985), 
2, B, E, Crawford, 'Villiaa Sinclair, earl of Orkney, and his faaily: a study in 
the politics of survival', A4Wliiy of . lava! Scutla, d, ad, Stringer, 243, 
3, Mcdougall, Jasoo IIl, 93. 
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parliament of 1566 was to be the forum for forfeiture of a group of 
exiled nobles; their sympathizers had no hope of blocking this through 
the normal political process, and instead turned to conspiracy even 
before the parliament met. ' The extreme examples of small parliaments 
wielded by a faction are the partisan parliaments of the 1570-73 civil 
war: one parliament of the queen's party, which forfeited two hundred 
of its opponents, was attended by only three nobles .2 
That was the last gasp of the old ways. The 1579 parliament which 
savaged the Hamilton was perhaps the weapon of a faction, but it was 
attended by a wide range of nobles and carried out some broadening of 
the political spectrum by restoring many former Karians; the 1584 
parliaments were the same. From the 1570s, and still more after 
1584-87, parliament was normally the forum for reconciliation of rival 
parties, and this breathed new life into parliament itself as the forum 
for normal politics to be carried on. Once more, a single assembly 
gathered within itself all shades of ruling-class political opinion. 
But times had changed since that had last happened, the strains of 
new-style government were taking their tall, and new ways for the 
government to interact with the opposition had to develop. Without an 
official parliamentary Journal or unofficial diaries, we cannot hope to 
trace the evolution of habits of opposition precisely. However, a 
range of opposition strategies can be identified. All of them focused 
on government policy, not an patronage; all accepted that parliament 
was the legitimate and supreme political forum. 
J. Goodare, 'Queen Mary's Catholic interlude', Nary Stewrt; drawn in ihres 
kirrgas, ed. M. Lynch (Oxford, 1988), 166. 
2, Appendix A, no, 26, 
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The most striking way of expressing opposition while acknowledging 
parliament's right to legislate was perhaps to lobby for the complete 
cancellation of a planned parliament, as the small barons did 
successfully in a convention of March 1595. ' It is not clear what 
they objected to: it was probably taxation. Acting as they did 
within the framework of a convention, this clearly accepted the 
legitimacy of such forums, in contrast to the conspirators of 1588. 
It was unusual, then as now, for the opposition to be able to use 
parliament so successfully as to be able to secure the passage of its 
own legislation. But it happened. In 1579, two acts restricted the 
right of /crown to interfere in the 
/` 
business and membership of the 
court of session? Appointments to the court were the subject of an 
even more stringent opposition measure in 1592. -' Even this success, 
however, is overshadowed by the achievement in the same parliament of 
two acts in favour of presbyteries, particularly the Golden Act which 
recognized the presbyterian system for the first time. 4 A number of 
other ecclesiastical acts in the parliament probably represent 
concessions to the appacition. Li 
Yhat the opposition usually aimed at was the blocking of official 
measures they did not like. And mostly what they did not like was 
1, John Colville to John Carey, 18 March 1595, CSP Scot,, xi, 553, 
2, APS, iii, 152-53, c, 37; 153, c, 38, 
3. A'S, iii, 569, c, 50, 
4.4PS, iii, 541-42, c. 8; 542-43, c, 9, 
S. E. g. ,1S, iii, 543-44, c, 11; 544, c, 13; 548, c, 17; 553-54, c, 27; 582, c, 82; 
586-87, c, 89, 
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taxation. Revision of the outdated tax assessment machinery was a 
vital matter for the government, but this was shipwrecked by a series 
of determined conventions of estates in 1599-1800. ' Thereafter, 
government officials trembled to introduce taxation proposals: lord 
advocate Thomas Hamilton was highly relieved in 1806 to get the tax 
through Just the lords of the articles, even though the king's list of 
nominees to the articles had been accepted in its entirety? What is 
particularly significant is the ability for concerted organization that 
the opponents of taxation displayed. 
When an act could not be stopped in its tracks, there was still the 
possibility of disabling it. The radical commission which prepared 
legislation for the December 1567 parliament intended that its ban on 
Catholic office-holders should include heritable posts; parliament 
would have none of it. ' A convention of 1583 cut a proposed tax from 
1100,000 to £20,000 an the grounds that the attendance was 
insufficient. 4 In 1606 the process began among the hand-picked lords 
of the articles themselves. The act on episcopacy had to be watered 
down with what the king was assured were 'verse few verse tolerabill 
exceptions', less than had been feared. R In 1612 a tax of 1800,000 
i, For opposition to taxation, see chapter S. 
2, Privy council to Jaaes, 6 July 1606, MeIros papers, i, ed, J. Hope (Abbotsford 
Club, 1837), 19-20, 
3.4PS, iii, 38; 24, c, 9, 
4. APS, iii, 328-30; Roger Aston to the earl of Leicester, 19 April 1583, C$P 
Scot,, vi, 400, 
S. Privy council to Jim, 4 July 1606, Nalros papers, 1,16, 
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was demanded, but parliament would grant only £240,000. ' The 
parliamentary opposition was able to take full advantage of the ethos 
of negotiation and compromise embedded in the political culture. 
But after about 1587 the stakes were higher for both sides. 
Domination of parliament was crucial to the government's drive towards 
absolutism - neither side could ignore or bypass it. Kuch of the 
opposition was stifled, finding it far harder to score points freely 
than its medieval counterpart had done. From the 1590s, English 
ambassadors' reports carry the unmistakable flavour of 'court' versus 
'country' with which they were also beginning to be familiar at home. 
One such report of government unpopularity was made in February 1600 .2 
Vithin months the central pillar of the government's policy - tax 
assessment reform - had been demolished by an organized opposition. ' 
This was achieved largely without active noble leadership (though the 
role of the earl of Gowrie is thought-provoking - seemingly the only 
noble who had an ideological commitment to the principles of 
opposition). Such a success was rare, though; parliament was not 
sufficiently in control of its own business to bargain with the 
government, making supply dependent on redress of grievances. So 
there were no addled parliaments, as in England, with government and 
opposition permanently deadlocked and neither able to take a 
legislative initiative. The occasional opposition victories - in 1579, 
1592 and 1600, for instance - were portents for the future, but usually 
i. Caldarv d, Hisii7ry, vii, 165; 4PS, iv, 475-76, c, 12, 
2, ßaurge Nicolson to Robert Cecil, 6 February 1600, CSP Spot,, xlti, 621, 
3. Chapter S. 
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the government would force its measures through however controversial. 
Xany historians have taken this stifling of opposition to mean that 
parliament was weak. Raft began it. ' He wrote, of course, at a time 
when a hundred English constitutional histories sang in a swelling 
chorus of how the rise of the Commons had tamed a would-be autocratic 
crown, and he felt compelled to apologize for the Scottish parliament's 
failure to seize the initiative in the same way .2 Even Vormald, 
otherwise hostile to any suggestion of a weak parliament, has largely 
accepted the Rait interpretation of parliament's subservience to the 
crown after 1587.4 
But were the English and Scottish parliaments so very different? In 
both countries, parliament was the place where the opposition asserted 
itself and decisive political struggles took place. Rait's perception 
that the English parliament had been successful in its opposition, 
whereas the Scottish one had failed, was misleading. With hindsight 
we can see that absolutism was doomed to defeat in England, and that 
its enemies would use parliament as a weapon in their victory; but in 
the 1630s it looked as if the crown, having lost the struggle to 
control parliament, might well succeed in extinguishing it. Scotland 
experienced the same struggle. It never came to the point where a 
decision to suppress parliament had to be taken -a higher priority 
i, R, S, Raft, The Scittish parlilaent before the union of the crowns (London, 
1901); for an early dissentient voice, sea J. A. Lovat-Fraser, The 
constitutional position of the Scottish sonarch prior to the union', Lay 
Quarterly Review, 17 (1901), 252-62; Rait, Parliaments, 46-47. 
2, Cl, AS, Pollard, The CvilutiOI of parlfasent (2nd edn London, 1926). 
3. J, Voraald, 'Jasas VI and I: two kings or one? ', History, 68 (1983), 195-96, 
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was to suppress the general assembly - but the crown was moving in 
that direction. In 1630, calling a parliament was automatically 
considered something that the government should avoid if possible. ' 
Parliament was the opposition's natural forum: the crown was never 
comfortable with it after the honeymoon of 1587; and the opposition, 
organized through parliament and newly-created committees of 
parliament, eventually took control of the state. Before the collapse 
of absolutism in 1637-38, the government had usually succeeded in 
controlling parliament and choking off the opposition through that 
series of manipulative expedients chronicled so despondently by Rait 
but only just. In England, the lid blew off the pressure cooker in 
1610-14; it was scarcely possible to summon parliament thereafter 
without intolerable challenges to the royal prerogative. In Scotland, 
it was not impossible for an absolutist regime to summon parliament - 
it was merely difficult. The lid was still on, but the political 
system was increasingly distorted from the build-up of identical 
pressures. The safety-valve of parliament had been interfered with, 
some time in the 1580s, with consequences that would prove 
catastrophic. 3 
Much of the English opposition drew ideological and constitutional 
sustenance from historical precedent - especially Magna Carta. It 
M. lea, The road to revolutiirr; Scotland unter Charles 1, U25-/637 (Urbana It 
Chicago, 198$), 99, 
2. Rait, Parliaaents, 367-74,390, 
3, R, Nitchison, Lord-hip to patronage; Scotland, 1503-NTWS (London, 1983), 31, 
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has been pointed out that there was no Magna Carta in Scotland. ' 
However, for our purposes that is not the end of the question, but the 
beginning. For one thing, there was no English Magna Carta either 
until the 1590s - if by Magna Carta we mean a 'liberty document' to 
which opponents of an absolutist crown appealed? Mackenzie did not 
have to search far in the Scottish records for Magna Carta lookalikes - 
principally the statute of 1579 (inspired by the opposition, as I have 
argued) ordering the court of session to do justice impartially and not 
to admit any 'privat writing, charge or command' (from king or privy 
council) to the contrary. *' Government encroachment in the 
administration of justice was a live question in this period, and 
parliament did not necessarily see things the government's way. 
Of course, the 1579 statute was just a statute, not a Proaethean 
liberator. But the English common lawyers saw the great charter 
simply as the statute 9 Henry 111.4 The Scots were not short of their 
own constitutional precedents, either: they could appeal to the whole 
sweep of their history as depicted by Boece. The pen of Buchanan 
developed this into a veritable pageant of tyrants and the just deserts 
which they inevitably received at their people's hands. $ Mackenzie 
also cited a medieval precedent: an act of 1372, ratifying an earlier 
i, V. D, H, Sollar, 'The couon law of Scotland and the cosson law of England', the 
British isles, 1/00-1500, ed, R, R, Davies (Edinburgh, 1988), 88, 
2, F. Thoapson, hagre Carta; its role in the , caking of the English constitution, 
1300-1629 (London, 1948), ch, 8, 
3, Mackenzie, Observations, 198; APS, iii, 152-53, c, 37, 
4, Thospson, /Xagna carta, 197, 
S. Buchanan, History, vols. i-ii. 
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one of David II, that no justiciar, sheriff or royal officer was to 
execute any royal warrant 'against the statutes or the form of the 
common law'. ' According to Innes, this was included in many 
collections of the old laws, but not in John Skene's edition of Region 
majastateffi 2 It was not in James Balfour's 'Practicks' either. This 
negative evidence suggests that it was either forgotten, or someone 
suppressed it; we know that Skene was capable of suppressing laws 
that derogated from the powers of the crown. -' 
When reflecting on their traditionally-guaranteed constitutional rights, 
what the Scots most frequently thought of was not a charter of liberty 
for all, but the liberty - or rather liberties - which they possessed 
as members of a definite estate in society. This, indeed, was the 
essence of the medieval parliament: an assembly of the privileged 
classes, defending the special local rights of their estate against both 
common people and crown. 4 In Scotland, the re-affirmation of such 
privileges was a regular parliamentary proceeding, a reminder if one 
were needed that the impact of Scottish statutes was enhanced by 
repetition. E Balfour cited no less than 23 statutes ratifying the 
liberties of the church. E 
i, AFS, 1,57, 
2, VS, i, 15; for sore on the old laws, see chapter 2, 
3, Thosas Hasilton to 3ases, 23 January 1607, Melros papers, 1,34-25, 
4, Kiernan, State ami society, 4, 
S. For a discussion of the repetition of statutes, see chapter 3. 
6, Balfour, Practitks, i, 23-2£. 
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These church liberties were never defined, which is perhaps why 
parliament ceased to ratify them after 1578; ' their vague generalities 
had become a liability. In April 1567, the ministers produced a 
shopping list of what they wanted in what they said was the customary 
act on church liberties: explicit ratification of Protestantism and of 
the act of oblivion, and statutory action on education, poor relief, 
fornication, adultery, incest and Sabbath-breaking 2 In December 1567, 
there was a ratification of the church's 'civile priviligeis', but these 
were simultaneously admitted to be debatable: another act set up a 
commission to investigate the jurisdiction that the church should 
have. 3 From the early 1580s, instead of the 'church liberties' formula 
we get acts reaffirming specific Protestant legislation: in 1581, no 
less than 31 such acts were confirmed., ' This fulfilled the same 
reassuring function but allowed the government to retain control of 
what it was ratifying. 
In a feudal age, the nobles had less need of sectional freedoms: the 
whole of society was their privileged playground. There was one act 
ratifying their 'privilegeis and liberteis', in December 156?, but it 
would be hard to say what it meant: if heritable jurisdictions were 
implied, they were not mentioned, and they could anyway be held by non- 
nobles .6 Balfour did not mention the act, though he cited the 
I. p'S, iii, 95, c. 3, 
2. Petition to the queen, April 1557, CSP Scot ii, 323, 
3. VS, iii, 32-33, c, 31; 24-25, c, 12, 
4. APS, 111, 210-11, c, I. 
5, WS, iit, 33, c. 32, 
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ratifications of church and burgh liberties which adjoined it in the 
parliamentary record. ' 
The function of the statutes guaranteeing burgh privileges is the 
clearest: the royal burghs were the most in need of protection, largely 
against crown encroachments .2 Unlike the nobles, the burgesses knew 
exactly what their privileges were - principally the monopoly of 
overseas trade, and the right to elect their own burgh officers .3 They 
persuaded parliament to ratify their liberties nine times between 1583 
and 1594.4 This endlessly-repeated act was so much part of 
parliament's routine business that it must have been slightly worrying 
if it failed to appear. There is no record of such a statute in 1580, 
although Edinburgh asked for one after having twice in 1559-60 had a 
burgh council foisted on it; s it is true, however, that the surviving 
statutes of this parliament appear to be incomplete .6 The burghs' 
privileges could be defended in detail, as when in 1592 they won from 
parliament a reduction in the powers of the admiral's court. 7 Various 
royal burghs, some new and some established, began to obtain individual 
I. Balfour, Practicks, i, 25,48; APS, M. 32-33, c, 31; 33, c, 33, 
2, n, Lynch, 'The crown and the burghs, 1500-1625', The early modern town in 
Scotland, ed, M. Lynch (London, 1987), 67-68, 
Chapter 6, 
4, APS, ii, 543-44, c, 24; iii, 33, c, 33; 59, c, 7; 102, c, ii; 145-46, c, 23; 
354, c, 14; 578, c. 74; iv, 28, c, 33; 71, c, 35, 
5, E01n, Roes,, iii, 70-71; M, Lynch, 'The two Edinburgh town councils of 
1669-601, SM 64 (1975), 132-33, 
6, Appendix A, no. l. 
7, APS, lii, 580, c. 79; for sort on this, see chapter 3. 
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ratifications in the 1590s. ' 
While the royal burghs were concerned to maintain their independence 
from the crown, they also sought privileges from parliament against 
non-burgess rivals .2 In 1581, for instance, the trading monopoly of 
the west-coast burghs was re-affirmed. 3 The wording of this act must 
have been disappointing, for in 1584 Glasgow and Dumbarton were co- 
operating (a remarkable fact in itself) an seeking out past statutes an 
the subject. 4 A crucial addition to the 1592 burgh liberties act 
provided for the escheat of the moveables of non-burgesses infringing 
the overseas trade monopoly. s The royal burghs immediately raised a 
tax to exploit this statute in the courts . 15 
All this illustrates the continuing vigour of the medieval conception of 
society as separate estates. ' But while the institutional vigour of 
the estates was great, the social reality they were expected to embody 
was shifting. It has been argued that the estates represented the 
1, £. g, APS, iv, 79, c, 55, 
2, Cf, M. P. Raaseboos, rho Scottish staple in the Netherlands (The Hague, 1910), 
49, 
3, APS, iii, 224-25, c, 27, 
4,61aspe Rare i, 114, 
S. APS, iii, 578, c, 74, 
6. RCRB, 1,371-72, 
7, flyers, parliaments and estates, 9. 
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political nation, not sectional interests; ' if this had been true in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was so na langer, as the 
search for privileges which by their nature were exclusive suggests. 
The institutional, not individual, identity for members of parliament 
was very strong; it was common for the estates to hold separate 
meetings during a parliament-' When the small barons were added to 
parliament, they came in as another estate - though in their case we 
shall see that it was only the outward form that was traditional. 
Distinctions between estates - particularly those between burghs and 
barons - were actually less definite than they once had been. In 1587 
it had to be enacted that each member should occupy only one estate, 
that 'quhairin he commounlie professes him selff to leif and quhairof 
he takis his styll'. 3 Some wealthier merchants were beginning to move 
into the countryside, buying estates-4 There is also evidence of 
lairds encroaching on the smaller burghs' parliamentary 
representation. 6 This was happening in England too, on a larger 
scale, perhaps because of the stronger institutional link that the 
Commons provided. 6 
1, Grant, 10rr RCe arts rratiorrh i, 169. 
2, Raft, Parliaseiitc, 402-04. 
3. AP5, iii, 443, c. 16, 
J. J. Brawn, 'The social, political and econosic influences of the Edinburgh 
aarchant elite, 1600-1638' (Edinburgh PhD, 1985), ch, 7, 
5, R. S. Rait, 'Parliasentary representation in Scotland', SM 12 (1916), 123, 
6, J. E. Neale, The Elizabethan hause of c uo, i, (2nd edn,, London, 1963), ch, 7, 
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If the institutional strength of the separate estates was so great, did 
this reflect adversely on their strength when brought together in 
parliament? Were they, in fact, rivals to parliament? ' Each of the 
three traditional estates took an organized form which might have been 
inimical to parliament: the convention of royal burghs, the conventions 
of the nobility, and (as a truer representative of the church than the 
clerical estate in parliament) the general assembly. 
However, though these forums could be alternatives to parliament, it is 
rarely useful to see them as rivalling it; they might do so, but 
usually they were complementary institutions. They could be helpful 
in sorting out certain matters without bothering parliament - resolving 
internal disputes, and making rules (which might or night not be 
subordinate legislation) for the conduct of their own business and 
allocation of their own resources. All these forums (even, usually, 
the general assembly) knew their place: they were willing to submit 
serious internal disputes to the supreme court of parliament. 
Moreover, they sought parliamentary legislation to protect themselves 
against other interest groups in society, thus recognizing parliament's 
function as the supreme arbiter of the political system. Instead of 
seeking to cut itself free of parliament, each estate aimed to develop 
channels through which it could lobby parliament for what it wanted. 
The sophisticated lobbying of the convention of royal burghs is 
notorious. The parliamentary representation of the burgess estate was 
unquestioned, and if it was regulated this was done by the convention 
i, Rait, Parliaaerrts, 9-19. 
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itself. Indeed, in this period the convention of royal burghs 
increasingly was the burgess estate. ' As a result the burghs had a 
direct input even to the lords of the articles: in 1597 the convention 
of royal burghs instructed the burgesses on the articles in their 
negotiations with the other lords on bullion import regulations. -- The 
convention of royal burghs tended to meet before parliament to agree on 
a concerted lobbying strategy, and many lists of requests to parliament 
are recorded. The burghs were even ordered not to give in articles 
to parliament other than through the convention, and burghs that 
refused to toe the agreed line in parliament could be disciplined. 4 
The burghs, as we have seen, regularly sought parliamentary legislation 
to protect their institutional privileges. There were also internal 
disputes which the convention of royal burghs could not handle. The 
long-running precedence dispute between Perth and Dundee is a good 
example of a hot potato which the convention tried to get rid of - even 
though parliament was just as reluctant to make a decision. In the 
end, it seems, the court of session was landed with the question. 5 
Then there was the Edinburgh struggle between merchants and crafts for 
representation on the burgh council: the decreet-arbitral which 
resolved this in 1583 was eventually ratified by parliament (though not 
J. D. Mackie A 6. S, Pryde, The estate of the burgesses in the Sots pirliaaent 
acrd its relation to Me coaveiitiurr of royal burghs (St Andrava, 1923), 
2, SCR8, ii, 21-22, 
3. E, $, WS, i, 75-77,397,240-41, t£8; ii, 89, 
4, RCSB, i, 1£9; bait, 'Parliaaentary representation', 123-24, 
5, Appendix E. 
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in the earliest possible parliament, that of May 1584), ' 
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The burgesses' elaborate lobbying shows that they stood outside the 
corridors of power. The estate most at home there was the nobility. 
If the nobles stood little in need of acts confirming sectional 
privileges, no more did they need a sophisticated institution to gain 
access to governmental structures. Just as there were conventions of 
the royal burghs, however, there were conventions of the nobility. 
They are normally invisible as a constitutionally-defined sectional 
interest, for in a feudal society the crown's authority was bound up 
with the nobility (and not with the burghs, however much the latter 
felt that they ought to be taken seriously as tenants in chief); but 
conventions of the nobility can be identified by looking carefully at 
the records of conventions. 
The earl of Mar claimed, in order to defeat a 1598 scheme for regular 
twice-yearly conventions, that conventions were parliaments in all but 
the ceremonies .2 If he meant the formal conventions of estates, he 
was certainly right. But Craig, considering conventions at the same 
date, was doubtful about their powers: he suggested that their acts 
had once had the validity and authority of statutes, but no longer did. 3 
He perceived conventions and parliaments to be divergent - and he, too, 
was right. 
#, APS, iii, 360-64; cf, N, Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation (Edinburgh, 
1981), 63-64, 
2, Nicolson to Cecil, 16 Decesber 1538, CSP Scot xiii, 353-54. 
3, Craig, Jug foale, 1,6,10. 
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The solution to this paradox is the emerging, if never clear-cut, 
distinction between ordinary conventions and conventions of estates. 
Conventions of estates, which evolved in the mid-sixteenth century, 
were the only bodies that shared with parliament the right to impose 
taxation, and to decide an war and peace. ' They could legislate, up to 
a point, but tended not to; taxation formed a growing proportion of 
their limited business2 But there were more and more conventions 
that lacked one or more estates and were never intended to be 
conventions of estates. We have seen that parliament declined in 
frequency as its legislative importance increased; the reverse 
happened with conventions. In the 28 years from 1560 to 1587 there 
were 31 conventions; in the next 15 years there were 49.11 Of the 25 
of the latter with recorded sederunts, only three had more than ten 
burgesses present, and these were definitely conventions of estates 
with agendas of direct commercial interest: one, in 1594, voted a tax, 
and the other two, in 1597, imposed customs on imports. For our 
purposes it is more significant that the average burgess attendance for 
the others was less than four, and that seven had no burgesses at all. 
Xoreover, nine had no bishops, and none more than three. The bishops 
had been eclipsed; the monastic commendators had been assimilated to 
the peerage as actual or prospective lords of erection; a handful of 
burgesses might turn up through personal involvement in the politics of 
the day; it is clear that these conventions were really conventions of 
the nobility. 
APSE it, 543, c. 20, 
2, R, K, Hannay, 'General council and convention of estates', SW 20 (1923), 110-11, 
3, Appendix A. 
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The nobility were summoned, not to legislate, not to tax, not to take 
legal decisions, but to discuss politics - mostly gravy train politics. 
The nucleus was usually the privy council; not always, but the 
indefinite constitutional form is less important here than the concrete 
political function. In April 1593 a convention met, 'gathered of fege 
chosen persons at th'apetytes of the present courtiers'. ' Its main 
business was day-today political questions, and it also discussed in 
outline some of the matters to be brought before parliament in June. 
Another example comes from November 1598, when a proclamation referred 
to the 'ardour tape at the Conventioun at Falkland upoun the xii day of 
August last, and thaireftir ratifeit be ane uther Conventioun of the 
Esteatis, at Dunfermling the penult day of September last bipast'2 At 
the August meeting, which was thus distinguished from a convention of 
estates, there had been 11 nobles present. The act it issued was in 
the name of 'the kingis majestie and lordis of his secreit counsaill', 
speaking of the king as 'haveing at lenth ressonit and conferrit with 
the saidis lordis of his secreit counsale and sindrie of his nobilitie, 
and with sum of the ministerie, being alsua personalie present'. ' 
These ministers had been invited, but with them came the uninvited and 
unwelcome Andrew Melville, who took this opportunity to call the king 
'God's sillie vassall'. 4 The proceedings combined informality and 
exclusiveness (though the latter failed on this occasion); the nobles 
wanted unrestricted access to the king for themselves, and this sort of 
1, Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 19 April 1593, CSP Scot,, xi, 84, 
2, RPC, v, 328, 
3, RFC, v, 310-11, 
4, Melville, Diary, 359-71, 
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relaxed convention suited them exactly. 
Conventions like this fulfilled many of the functions of the medieval 
parliament - elite political contact to sort out routine problems. 
They were a kind of annual general meeting for the feudal ruling class. 
They made few laws - if they wanted a law they would get the next 
parliament to enact it; and they had no need of formal lobbying. The 
conventions were just like those of the burghs in the way they dealt 
with internal disputes among their members. - in the nobility's case, 
these disputes were of course feuds. Reconciling feuds involved wide- 
ranging negotiations, and from the 1590s the king took an active part. ' 
Kany of the discussions must have taken place at the frequent 
conventions of these years, and at least one convention (in July 1802) 
was held specifically to negotiate the ending of a single feud . -2 
The general assembly is slightly anomalous in this discussion of 
estates, but it has to be included here as the church's alleged 
institutional rival to parliament .3 Its membership, unlike that of the 
convention of royal burghs, was not that of the parallel estate in 
parliament - the clerical estate had little to do with the assembly, or 
indeed the church. The assembly was dominated by ministers who kept 
a distance from parliament, and backed up by nobles, barons and burgh 
representatives who were often the mainstay of parliament. 
1, Brown, 81o fft. q, 21£-18. 
2, Nicolson to Cecil, 4 July 1602, C$P $rvt,, xiii, 1014-16; Brown, Bluudffad, 
171. 
3, Cf, E, E, MacQue n, 'The general asseably of the kirk as a rival of the Scottish 
partiaaent, 1560-1618' (St Andrew PhD, 1927). 
Pariiasa, t and the political systes 40 
The general assembly has been described as a court parallel to, and of 
equal status with, parliament: however, the evidence cited (that there 
was no appeal from general assembly to parliament) does not support 
this. ' There was no appeal from the court of session or the privy 
council either; the idea of an appeal an a point of law was alien to 
sixteenth-century legal practice .2 Arguably the general assembly did 
start life technically independent of (if not parallel to) parliament; 
all the church courts operated, as in medieval times, without 
parliamentary sanction. 3 But this did not last. The 1560/87 act 
abrogating the pope's authority was a negative sanction against an 
alternative jurisdiction, and in 1567 parliament gave the church powers 
over admission to benefices. ' In 1584 the Black Acts positively 
asserted crown authority over the church. Still more decisive, because 
the church generally accepted its legitimacy, was the Golden Act of 
1592. From then on, whenever the general assembly met, whenever 
church courts admitted and deprived ministers, or imposed penances and 
excommunication for breaches of moral discipline, they did so by a 
right conferred by parliament. " The Golden Act, welcome as it was at 
the time, merely transferred the royal supremacy from episcopacy to 
i, D, Shaw, The general assaablies of the church of Scolland, 1660-100 (Edinburgh, 
1964), 20, 
2, Inlru action to Scottish legal history, cd, 6, C, H, Paton (Stair Society, 1958), 
22, For exaeple, see the peraissible grounds for advocation of an action fro" 
the sheriff court to the court of session (such as the sheriff's kinship to the 
pursuer): Balfour, Praclicks, it, 340-42, 
3. Apart froe the regular statutes ratifying the liberties of the church; see 
above, p, 29, There were statutes on doctrine floe 1560, and earlier ones 
against heresy (which is, perhaps, not quite the saee thing) and on barratry, 
t. APS, it, 534-35, c, 2; iii, 14, c, 3; 23, c, 7, 
S. WS, iii, 541-42, c, 8; 542-43, c, 9, 
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presbytery. ' When the general assembly later developed a procedure 
for ministers and readers to use for the settlement of disputes among 
themselves, this was explicitly arbitration rather than legal process .2 
What would happen when there was a conflict between the jurisdiction of 
the assembly and that of parliament? The assembly could not win such 
a conflict on strictly legal grounds, but the political consensus on the 
legitimacy of this was limited. For the presbyterian radicals 
responded to statutory encroachment by elaborating the doctrine that 
the church as a whole was independent of secular jurisdiction. This 
was essentially a political and ideological claim rather than a legal 
fact - though the distinction is of limited value when legal facts were 
so often established by political trials of strength between rival 
jurisdictions. Once the general assembly began to assert the explicit 
two-kingdoms doctrine (on specific issues, not as an overall 
programme), it could indeed rival parliament. 
The power of the assembly, in its own view, recognized few limits: 
take, for instance, an order of 1576 that salt pans and mills were not 
to work on the sabbath. -' This would have had to be backed up with 
excommunication, but would a secular court really have followed this 
with putting to the horn (outlawry) as statute required? ' In 1571 the 
order went out to excommunicate magistrates who failed to enforce the 
i, Donaldson, Scottish Reformation, 223, 
Y, sUK, iii, 815,861-62, 
3, off, 1,377, 
4, APS, iii, 763, c, 14, 
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morality statutes. ' What would have happened if a sheriff (the civil 
magistrate who was supposed to enforce excommunication2) had himself 
been excommunicated? Just possibly, if central government was also 
dissatisfied with the sheriff concerned, this would have been welcomed, 
but the excommunication of magistrates was a perilous issue. ' The 
government's reaction would have depended, not on the letter of the law, 
but on the political facts of the case. Here, as so often, the 
question of legality turned on the balance of power at a particular 
moment between a number of loosely-connected, ill-defined and sometimes 
competing jurisdictions. 
The progress of the Reformation could be hastened or retarded by a 
network of locally-entrenched vested interests; there was always 
tension between general assembly, parliament, and local courts. ' The 
excommunication question brings out the ill-defined boundaries of 
church-state jurisdiction. A statute of the Reformation parliament 
ordered church jurisdiction on excommunication to be transferred to a 
temporal court, no doubt the projected commissary court .0 This might 
have been a logical sequel to the jurisdiction of the official's court ciý 
1, Caldervood, History, iii, 37, 
2, Sheriff court book of fife, ISIS-1522 "d, V, C, Dickinson (SHS, 1928), p, xxxix, 
3, Balfour, Practlcks, ii, 5£5, 
4. H, Lynch, 'Frog privy kirk to burgh church: an alternative view of the process 
of Protestantisation', Church, politics and society, Scotland, 14M-1929, ad, 
K, Macdougall (Edinburgh, 1983), 93-94, 
b, Keith, History, 1,325, 
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on the question; ' but it seems not to have happened. On the knottier 
problem of secular enforcement of excommunication, a statute in 1573 
required horning by the civil magistrate (the court of session was 
specified: were sheriffs and burgh magistrates included or excluded? ) 
to follow excommunication within 40 days, as had been done before the 
Reformation .2 But the next parliament made 
horning for desertion of a 
spouse a necessary prelude to excommunication (which in turn preceded 
divorce). ' Local authorities had their own ideas about these 
jurisdictions, and the burgh council of Edinburgh had not waited for 
parliament: it ruled in 1571 that it would enforce excommunication 
with banishment-4 In rural areas, power to enforce excommunication 
was given in 1595 to crown commissioners in parishes - who existed 
largely on the drawing board, partly no doubt because they rivalled 
established jurisdictions. ` 
Faced with multiple jurisdictions which either overlapped or left 
yawning gaps, it is understandable that the general assembly often took 
its own initiatives rather than wait for the secular arm. Its orders 
were of no less penetrating efficacy if they bypassed the machinery of 
the law - the latter was often a broken reed. Sanctions like penance 
and excommunication, wielded by a powerful network of local church 
courts, could often achieve more than a parliamentary statute bristling 
i, S, Ollivant, The murrt of the official in pre-Rip fornation Scotland (Stair 
Society, 1982), 149-55, 
2, A"S, iii, 76S, c, it, 
3, WS, iii, 81-82, c, i, 
4, (din, Rens iii, 283, 
5, RPC, v, 200; for the parish cossissioners schale, see chapter 3, 
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with fearsome penalties but lacking effective means of enforcement. ' 
In practice the general assembly's tireless agitation could be a 
welcome support to the secular arm. Once the assembly had secured a 
statute banning pilgrimages in 1581, Stirling presbytery was still 
waiting for action eighteen months later against those visiting its 
local holy well. Lord Doune, steward of Xenteith, had a commission to 
implement the law but was doing nothing, and the presbytery's 
representations to him produced no effect. So they took action 
themselves, 'to the glorie of God and executioun of the kingis majesteis 
lawis'. A long series of pilgrims was hauled before the presbytery 
for breaking what the minutes later tended to describe as 'Goddis law' 
rather than the king's-1 If by doing this the church was rivalling 
parliament, it might have been embarrassing for the secular magistrate 
but surely parliament, which had passed the law, would have had to 
congratulate them. 
There is evidence of co-operation between parliament and assembly at 
the centre too. Not on the assembly's internal affairs: unlike the 
convention of royal burghs the assembly never sought parliamentary 
assistance on this, and there was an increasing tendency for the crown 
to intervene unasked to exploit the assembly's internal divisions-3 
But the assembly was keen to get parliament to follow its lead on all 
sorts of matters. It often tried to set a good example: the 
assembly's approach to the problem of feuding in the 1570s was a 
i. For sore on executive institutions, see chapter 3, 
2, Stirling presbytery records, 1551-1587, cd, J, Kirk (SHS, 1981), 115-15,120, 
130, 
3, V, R, Foster, The church before the Covenants (Edinburgh, 1975), 14-16, 
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combination of central petitions for government action and direct, 
local initiative with commissions to reconcile adversaries. ' The 
general assembly took lobbying seriously, arranging to meet before 
parliament so that proposals for statutes could be agreed, just like the 
convention of royal burghs. In October 1581, for instance, this is 
how the statute against pilgrimages was obtained. The assembly 
adopted the demands of the synod of Lothian, which also wanted: 
marriages to be unlawful without banns, parents' consent and due order 
of the church; the death penalty for all adultery, not just if it was 
'notour' (a notoriously amorphous definition); suppression of Sunday 
markets; and manses and glebes for ministers at abbey churches .2 It 
was said that these demands had all been rejected by parliament ;3 
certainly there was public friction between the Lennox regime and the 
church, but this is an overstatement. Among other acts favouring the 
church in this parliament, a commission to improve stipends was set 
up. 4 Parliament acceded to an earlier assembly's demand that patrons 
of parish churches should present qualified ministers. 8 It banned 
pilgrimages and superstition. 6 It attempted to clarify the law on 
adultery, though in a less bloodthirsty way than had been urged. ' 
These statutes are reasonably typical of the broad range of 
1. Brown, Bla fifer 
, 
185-CS, 
2, Caldervood, History, iii, 590, 
3. Occurrenti in Scotland, 24 Noveaber 1581, CSP Scot,, vi, 92-93, 
4. APS, iii, 211, c, 2, 
6, APS, iii, 212, c, 4; Caiderwood, History, iii, 466-66, 
6, APS, iii, 212-13, c, 6, 
7. APS, iii, 213, c, 7, 
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church-state co-operation on Reformed doctrine and social control. 
Rivalry between general assembly and parliament was nevertheless real 
enough. Or was it? As I have said, parliament was not a thing - 
and neither was the assembly. Parliament and general assembly were 
both divided bodies, containing supporters of government policy as well 
as opponents. The real rivalry was between those who backed the 
government's policies - in whatever forum - and those who resisted. 
The appearance of institutional rivalry is created because there was an 
effective opposition majority on many issues in the assembly and on 
few issues in parliament. 
So the royal supremacy was not a matter of specific statutes (like the 
Black Acts) legitimately passed or not passed; indeed it was not 
ultimately a concrete thing which did or did not exist. It was a 
shifting political quantity measured by the crown's current ability to 
get statutes passed even if a parliamentary opposition party emerged to 
contest them, and then get them obeyed in the teeth of the general 
assembly's opposition party. Both tasks could be difficult at times. 
But though there was vigorous resistance to some royal policies, 
objections to the principle of royal intervention were rare, as the 
Golden Act illustrates. Even the radical ministers found parliament 
useful in the many areas where there was consensus; if the policy was 
acceptable, it was usually acceptable for parliament to pass a law on 
it. There was never general agreement on the idea that parliament had 
no right to legislate for the church, and anything short of that meant 
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that there was a royal supremacy - if the government could make it 
stick. 
There were two strands to the knotted question of church government. 
Entangled with the struggle between Brastian royal-supremacists and 
Melvillian two-kingdoms theorists was the higher-profile contest 
between episcopalians and presbyterians (largely the same people). If 
the practical right of the government to make rules for the church was 
usually accepted by both parliament and assembly, this acceptance was 
much greater (especially in the assembly, but in parliament too) for 
certain specific policies - those, like the Golden Act, that promoted 
presbytery at the expense of episcopacy. The radical ministers, if 
they believed in the two-kingdoms theory, should have rejected the 
Golden Act; if on the whole they welcomed it, it was because their 
commitment to presbyterianism was stronger. This too needs to be 
investigated, because in practice the struggle over bishops was a 
struggle over mechanisms of lobbying and contact with government. 
Successive governments tried with greater or lesser success to promote 
an episcopalian church. Amid the torrents of ink spilt on the 
tribulations of presbyterianism, it is hard to pick out just why they 
should have held with such determination to the uphill task. For the 
pre-Reformation period, and up to 1587, the answer seems to be that it 
was the nobility who wanted bishops. ' The episcopal style of life 
blended harmoniously with that of the secular magnates, and when it 
ceased to be useful it could perform one last service by immolating 
i, O. G. Mullaa, Episcopacy in Scotland, the history of in ida, ! S£O-! ¬Sb 
(Edinburgh, 1986), 34-35, 
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itself decorously to the nobles' profit. But when the last feu, tack 
and pension had been squeezed out of the last tulchan bishop, and the 
act of annexation had gathered the skeletal superiorities to the crown, 
the authorities can no longer have been wooing episcopacy for its 
money; it must have possessed some other attraction. 
This seems to be that bishops were more suited to working with the 
grain of government. This is what old-style bishops had done: as 
magnates. But the post-1587 ones were different - because the 
government itself was different. They were ministers, and thus 
professional people rather than aristocrats. They were not 
particularly rich. ' They owed their position and authority to the 
crown, and not to any noble patron or church court (still less to any 
congregation). What the government wanted was loyal administrators, 
and the new bishops were heavily involved with central government, and 
central government's encroachment in traditional local jurisdictions: 
'the bishops became lords in parliament, counsell, checker, sessioun, 
lords of temporall lands and regaliteis, patrons of benefices, 
commissioners in the king's high commissioun'2 They had to work 
hard: hardest of all under Charles i. a Not surprisingly they were 
not loved by the nobles. ' They were the civil servants of absolutism. 
By contrast, the more radical ministers had lobbying problems. Their 
1, Mullin, Episcopacy in Srotlarw, 127, 
2, Catdervo, d, Nistury, vii, 90, 
3, Cf. , Lee, Road to r'vo1utiirr, 57, 
4, Foster, Church b'for' the Cos'vrra, ts, 32-39, 
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leaders relied on education, professionalism and ideological commitment 
for their status, all of which were alien to an aristocratic regime. ' 
Seither nobles nor crown had intrinsic sympathy for them, and they 
could be populist and confrontational; too much time spent campaigning 
in the streets could harm their prospects in the corridors of power. 
Their lists of demands were calibrated to be just a little too much for 
the government to accept; they were adept at exploiting rejection of 
their demands, and every list seems to contain one or two items (but 
no more) that were political non-starters. However, there were 
courtier ministers, and perhaps more attention should be paid to them: 
did they try to rein in this tendency in order to be taken seriously? 
Even James Xelville played the courtier for a while, though he kept his 
distance: 'I sought it nocht', he protested .2 
The insurgent regime of late 1587 might briefly have been an exception 
to this rule. It began with hopes that the radical ministers would 
take over the bishops' traditional role in the government. John Knox 
would come in from the wilderness to share power with a godly regent. 
Briefly, the very distinction between civil magistrate and church was 
blurred. In the excitement of 25 July, the day of the queen's enforced 
abdication, a convention met in the main tolbooth of Edinburgh, and a 
general assembly in the over tolbooth; the attendance is recorded only 
for the latter, but many of the 'nobilitie, prelattis, baronis, and 
commissaris of burrowis' in the convention must also have been among 
1, R. Mitchison, 'The social tape t of the clergy of the fiaforsed kirk of 
Scotland', Scotia, 6 (1902), 1-13, 
3, Melville, Diary, 338, 
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the 'nobilmen, baronis and utheris' in the assembly. ' The assembly 
met before the convention, for it adopted a set of demands which were 
then registered by the convention. In the preparations for the 
parliament of December 1567, which was expected to legislate thorough- 
going Protestantism for the first time, there was complex and deep 
co-operation between the ministers and the government .2 As yet there 
was no pressure for ministerial separatism - either lobbying still 
worked, or disillusion had not yet set in. 
But the potential for confrontation was later institutionalized when the 
opposition was able to win broad acceptance of the two-kingdoms 
doctrine in the general assembly - and not, unsurprisingly, in 
parliament. This demanded that the church maintain a distance from 
the civil magistrate, and reserved judgement on the latter's political 
legitimacy in a newly-ideological way. Radicals sometimes argued that 
the church was outside parliamentary Jurisdiction because outside the 
feudal property structure - the ministers, as well as the bishops, had 
come a long way since the Reformation. 3 But the two-kingdoms theory 
never gained government acceptance, although presbyterianism did; the 
relevant Black Acts continued in use. During the revolution of 1638, 
the National Covenant would rely overwhelmingly an statute. ' The two- 
kingdoms doctrine, as the ideology of the radical party in the church, 
survived to underpin the 1848 'second revolution' of the general 
i, RFC, 1,534-37; 8644; i, 100-110, 
2, flacQueen, '6aneral assaably', 137-41, 
3, A. H. Villiasson, Scottish national consciousness in the ag of James VI 
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assembly against parliament. 
Those, broadly, were the three medieval estates. With the expansion of 
government activity, they were no longer enough: a wider range of 
social groups was brought into direct contact with government, and they 
were enabled - or driven - to make their awn decisions on the 
government's legitimacy instead of following the lead of their 
superiors. A wider range of town-dwellers was taxed. Lawyers grew 
in numbers and status as the statute-based civil law expanded. ' 
Lairds, if feudal freeholders, actually entered parliament in 1587. 
Kirk sessions, many of whose members were not from the feudal classes, 
were expected to implement some statutes. Traditions of deference and 
hierarchy laid heavily on them, but in time they would cone to demand 
a say in the government commensurate with their social position. 
The two key social sectors which had to be drawn into a closer 
relationship with the government were the lawyers and the lairds. 
Lawyers were not exactly an estate - but they would have been in 
medieval times. They were in many ways the heirs of medieval church 
administrators, and some of them were used in similar roles by the 
government .2 The profession of civil law looked to the government to 
enhance its role, and it is no accident that the lawyers overwhelmingly 
1, For the growth of statute law, sae chapter 2, 
2, Cf, 6, Donaldson, 'The legal profession in Scottish society in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries', JR, new sir, 21 (1976), 7; J, Voreald, '3aaes VI: new 
sen for old? ', Scotia, 2 (1978), 73-74, 
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supported the winning side in the 1570-73 civil war. ' Their focus 
was the court of session. In 1593 and 1594 the members of the 
college of justice - who included advocates and writers to the signet 
as well as lords of session - obtained acts ratifying their 
institutional privileges, just as if they had been an estate .2 And 
while on the subject of lawyers and lairds, it is worth pointing out 
that the overwhelming majority of lords of session were from lairds' 
famiIies. -1 
The court of session, perhaps more than any other body, was entitled to 
pass subordinate legislation. Its acts of sederunt, though they were 
subordinate to statute, were increasingly recognized as having the 
force of law in areas where the law was unclear. ' There is an example 
of the senators suspending an act, restoring the earl of Bothwell to 
all his predecessors' lands in 1587, which by 'owersicht' overstepped 
property law by including lands held of other superiors than the crown. 
They removed the act from the parliamentary register, and presented it 
to the next parliament for permanent cancellation. & By act of 
sederunt in November 1599, the court ratified an act of convention 
passed in the previous July on setting up a register of sasines 6 No 
doubt the court of session had itself inspired this act, but it is 
I, Lynch, Edinburg, 133-34, 
2. +QPS, iv, 22, c, 24; 67, c. 21; Introduction tu Scottish legal history, 29, 
3, Donaldson, 'Legal profession', 9, 
4, Arts of sederunl of the 1urdi of council and session (Edinburgh, 1790), 
S. APS, iii, 595-95, c, 103, 
6, gets of s runt, 29-31; WS, iv, 184-85, 
Farliueeii and the political sysh' 53 
striking that an act of sederunt might add authority to an act of 
convention. It was more usual for acts of sederunt to become statutes 
later: Mackenzie listed a number of instances. ' In 1598, a convention 
asked the court not to take too literally the act of a previous 
convention which had granted the Lewis colonists a disturbingly wide 
immunity from prosecution? Balfour's 'Practicks' claimed that cases 
where the law was unclear had to be remitted to parliament, but this 
was no longer normal practice 
However, there were many general issues on which the court sought the 
support of parliament. As well as improvements to the substantive 
civil law (and here the lords of session probably lobbied for many or 
most of the statutes) there were statutes to enhance the authority of 
the session itself, and to bring the local courts under central control: 
matters like the sasines register. 4 Thus in 1563 the court secured 
from parliament control over the admission of notaries. 6 In 1569 it 
was to be consulted over the setting up of commissary courts 
nationally. E Sheriff courts and hornings gave the lords of session 
endless trouble, and in 1579 an earlier act of sederunt requiring 
registration of hornings by sheriffs was backed by a statute. ' In 
I. Mackenzie, Observations, 293-94, 
2, iPS, iv, 175-76, 
3. Balfour, Practlcks, i, 1-2. 
4, Chapter 3. 
S. APS, ti, 642, c, 17, 
6. RFC, ii, 6-7, 
7, APS, iii, 142-43, c, 13, 
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1597 the session gained from a convention the power to register 
hornings directly if the sheriff refused to act. ' On the whole the 
court sought to take over sheriff court business, but through a statute 
in 1587 it resisted being a court of first instance for molestation in 
property, as cases of this kind were holding back 'wechtie causes of 
heretage'2 In 1593, parliament ordered the session to back up the 
authority of presbyteries, an act which may well have been useful to 
the latter but which created a two-way relationship. ' 
Parliament and session usually co-operated. The court had been set up 
partly to take over judicial business from parliament, a process 
largely completed in the 1540s; ' cases arising in parliament and 
conventions continued to be referred to it. 6 This worked the other 
way too. Where law was inadequate the court might make an act of 
sederunt, but where laws were confused it occasionally referred cases 
to parliament. In 1593 the lords of session threw up their hands in 
despair at the tortuous finances of Jedburgh abbey, caused by the 
'multitude of the actis of parliament maid anent the saidis monkis 
portionis, superplus of benefices and annexatioun of temporall landis to 
the croun'; parliament cut the Gordian knot in this case, but left the 
law as it was. 6 No doubt the lords of the articles would have argued 
i, Ad's, iv, 116, 
4,4P$, iii, 445-47, c, 23, 
3. APS, iv, 16-17, c, 7, 
4. Hasilton-6rierson, 'Judicial cossittees of the Scottish pariiaient', 12, 
S, E, g. RPC, iv, 101, 
6, A'S, iv, 35-36, c, 50, 
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that any changes would have to be made with the advice of those who 
really understood the workings of property law - the session judges. 
The session witnessed a number of internal struggles, and parliament 
was often called in as supreme arbitrator. These were largely 
conflicts over the right to appoint senators to the college of Justice: 
this was formally an issue between the crown and the existing senators, 
but Hannay argues that the underlying struggle was between crown and 
nobility. ' Parliament invariably took the side of the latter - another 
instance of parliamentary opposition in action. Thus in 1579 the 
senators came to parliament complaining that some of the king's 
recently-appointed senators were neither old enough, experienced enough 
nor rich enough. The conflation of these three complaints obscures 
the issue: the first two might be the objections of professionals, but 
the third is clearly inspired by the landlords who wanted a voice in 
the appointment of the people who judged their lands. The upshot was 
that existing senators were allowed a veto on appointments -a defeat 
for the crown. -- In 1592 the senators returned to the attack, this 
time apparently obtaining the king's surrender before parliament meta, 
The resulting statute conceded that all new lords of session should be 
over 25, with a yearly income of 1,000 merke or 20 chalders victual; 
recent appointees not meeting this standard were to be dismissed. -' 
The power of the senators even in adversity was demonstrated at a June 
1, R, K, Hannay, The college of Jsisiice (Edinburgh I filasgov, 1933), 117, 
3, APS, iii, 153, c, 38, 
3, 'Clerk register's opinion anent acts passed in June 1592', SRO, FA7/1/42, 
4,4PS, iii, 569, c, 54, 
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1590 convention where, amid mutual accusations of 'bryberie and 
kneavrie' between two of their number, 'the lordis of sessioun wer 
intendit to be altered'. ' (Perhaps the complaints of corruption 
related to senators and advocates buying land currently subject to 
court cases, a practice banned in 1594.2) Their spokesman John 
Lindsay deflected a bid to remove the senatorial veto by suggesting a 
commission of 12 from the nobility, barons, burghs and church to make 
appointments. 3 
The excellent lobbying ability which the court of session demonstrated 
must have depended partly on its most influential members - the 
'extraordinary', non-professional lords who were often nobles or privy 
councillors. Extraordinary lords seem on the surface like an abuse 
perpetrated by the crown, but they were not; the magnates wanted 
them .4 on one occasion the lords of session were to assist a 
parliamentary commission considering a number of articles which 
parliament itself had been unable to deal with. 6 During a 
parliamentary session, when inferior courts did not sit, the senators 
could even be drafted in to assist the lords of the articles - the 
lobbyist's dream. G 
Ptoyste, #kwirs, 84, 
2, APS, iv, £E, t, 2£, 
3, Earl of Worcester to Burghley, 15 June 1590, CSP Scot,, x, 325, 
4, R. K. Hannay, 'On the foundation of the college of Justice', SM 15 (1918), 45, 
5,4'S, iii, 314-15, c, 9, 
5, RFC, fy, 194-95, 
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It was not just over the appointments question that parliament flexed 
its muscles against the crown. Together with the statute of October 
1575 an appointments came another (mentioned earlier) discharging 
crown and privy council interference with the court; the context in 
which it appeared adds weight to the idea that it was a miniature 
Magna Carta. ' It had been preceded, in February, by the privy 
council's grudging promise - clearly not kept - that 'the kingis 
majestie sould not writ to the lordis of his hienes counsale and 
sessioun in furtherance or hinderance of any particular personis 
actionis and causis'2 The court of session as an institution never 
came into the open as a focus for a wider political opposition, as its 
cousin the parlement of Paris often did. -4 But there was regular 
friction with the government, particularly over the order of business. 4 
In 1583 the privy council ordered that the backlog of poor people's 
cases should be cleared . r, On the same issue in 1584, Nary had sat in 
the court herself to stop the cases of the rich taking priority. 6 The 
clerk register's interference in 1585, setting up a system which called 
cases by region and lot rather than influence, called forth some bitter 
i, APS, iii, 152-53, c, 37, 
2. RFC, iii, 48, 
3, Shennan, Parlawiit of Paris, chs, 6,7, 
4, McNeill argues that the privy council could not interfere with the court of 
session because the two were parallel, suprese judicatories; this is clearly 
correct in law, but does not consider the evidence presented here; 
P, 6, B, McNeill, 'Interference with the court of session by the privy council', 
JR, new ser, 6 (1961), 253-55, 
5, RPC, iii, 610-11, 
6, Thosas Randolph to Uillias Cecil, 8 March 1564, CSP Scot,, ii, 51, 
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memoranda. ' In November 1590 the king and privy council wanted major 
reforms in the system of central courts, mainly to expand the 
jurisdiction of the exchequer. Among the proposals was one that would 
have allowed the exchequer to take over all criminal cases on the 
grounds that they concerned crown revenue. The court of session 
apparently joined the chamber faction (who were unhappy that the 
scheme would restrict access to the king) to defeat the plan .2 
The admission of the shire commissioners to parliament was an event of 
seismic significance. Parliament had derived its authority from 
ancient tradition; as late as 1584, a forceful government had beaten 
down resistance to its initiatives with 'the auctoritie of (the] supreme 
court of parliament continewit past all memorie of man unto thir 
dayis'. 3 But now, despite the claim to be reviving a stillborn and 
long-forgotten act of 1428, the representation in parliament would be 
based on a manifest innovation. Tampering with parliament's 
immemorial three estates to add a fourth could hardly fail to shake 
conservative beliefs about the well-springs of parliamentary authority, 
helping people to think of government as looking to the future as well 
as to the past. 
They clearly needed some help, as they tacitly admitted by their 
overwhelming failure to refer to the 'four estates' after 1587. The 
i, BL, Add. MS 33,531, foi, 195r, -2%£v, 
2. Coves to Burghley, 7 Novesber 1590, CSP Scot,, x, 416, 
3, WS, iii, 293, c, 3, 
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silence on this is deafening: people were deeply reluctant to abandon 
the traditional, mystically-significant number for the sake of mere 
arithmetical accuracy. The idea of three estates derived from the 
three medieval orders of society: those who worked, fought and 
prayed. ' In England too, the phrase was always 'three estates' - even 
though in a bicameral parliament it was unclear what these might be 2 
The Scottish system of representation, however, made it obvious that 
there were now four estates, and people tried hard to avoid admitting 
it. An 'original act' (the copy used in its passage through 
parliament3) survives from 1592, the first parliament in which shire 
commissioners sat: comparison with the parliamentary record shows 
that the clerk who compiled the latter silently altered the traditional 
phrase 'thrie estaites' to the uneasily non-committal 'estaitis'. 4 The 
lairds' very presence in parliament was a continual, insistent reminder 
that times were a-changing. 
The shire commissioners` institutional story has been well told. c- 
However, the continuity of the lairds' attendance in parliaments and 
conventions between 1560 and 1587 needs to be stressed. It is well 
known that 101 lairds attended the Reformation parliament, but though 
this was significant it was not unique. Over 58 lairds attended a 
i, J. satiny, 'Des "trois fonctions' aux "trois itats"9" , irnia1es ESC, i0 (1963), 933-39, 
2, Pollard, £vWlutioa of parlia, aeat, 61, 
3, Cf, 6, R, Elton, The parliaaent of £ 1arrd, ISSF-J5ß (Casbridga, 1986), 6, 
4, SRO, PA7/l/43; 4P$, iii, 559, c, 32, 
6, Rait, Parlia. eants, 199-210; C. S. Terry, The Scottish parliasent; its 
rcnstitutluii afro procedure, I SAP-1707 (Glasgow, 1905), ch, 5, 
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convention in February 1570,34 attended another in July, and over 81 
came to a third in November 1572. ' At least 11 conventions between 
1560 and 1587 included lairds. Even in parliament, though 1560 could 
not establish a precedent, lairds were sometimes present. The Regent 
Moray set up a commission of lairds, burgesses and ministers to receive 
articles and frame legislation for the parliament of December 1567.2 
One of their proposals (which was not passed) was for baronial 
representation in parliament. 'Same lairds attended the August 1571 
parliament, recorded in a separate list headed 'Astiterunt'. 4 
Both 1560 and 1570-72 were controversial and decisive periods for the 
nation's political and religious orientation; the lairds sought and 
achieved an independent voice in these questions. They consolidated 
their position in national politics through the general assembly, which 
from the outset accepted lairds' participation. The proposal for 
parliamentary representation in December 1567 led to an attempted 
formalization of the assembly's own shire commissioners. 6 It has been 
argued that presbyteries also tried to influence parliament's shire 
commissioners after 1587. c, 
After the civil war, the lairds continued to press for parliamentary 
1, Appendix A, nos, 19,22,30, 
2, APS, iii, 35, 
3,4PS, iii, 40, Raft, in a rara slip, describes this proposal as a statute: 
Raft, Parliaaer7ls, 203, 
4, Appendix A, no. 30, 
5, I. S. Cowan, The Scottish Rafor. atiw7 (London, 1982), 126, 
6, ItacQueen, 'General assesbty', 124, 
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representation, petitioning for it in 1579; the privy council conceded 
their demand in principle, but was unwilling to make a major 
constitutional change during a royal minority. ' It has been shown 
that the lairds, not the crown, took the initiative in the 1585-87 
period when their demands bore fruit .2 
The lairds' representation was closely linked with the growth of 
regular taxation. 3 However, the small barons had always been liable 
for taxation on the same basis as nobles: if they would no longer 
tolerate taxation without representation, this suggests growth in their 
social status and independence from the magnates. There were strong 
reasons to limit representation to the forty-shilling freeholders - 
this allowed an appeal to precedent in the act of 1428, and the English 
practice on which that had been based; but the experience of taxation 
thereafter suggests that this marked no significant social divide, even 
though the elite may have hoped that it might become one. For all 
freeholders, however small, were liable for taxation. Even the non- 
freeholder lairds - the feuars of church land who were growing in 
wealth and numbers - began to find themselves having to pay taxes; 
and the regular demands and petitions of the barons in parliament, when 
they were not battling against heavier taxes for all, concentrated on 
attempts to limit the tax assessment of feuars of church land. True, 
the election of shire commissioners was planned by the 1587 act to 
Coves to Burghley, 22 October 1579, CSP Scot,, v, 358. Although the king had 
tonally accepted responsibility for the governsent in March 1578, he had stilt 
not reached 14, the norsal legal age of aatority, 
2, I. E. O'Brien, 'The Scottish partiasent in the 15th and 16th centuries' (Glasgow 
PhD, 1980), 78, 
3, For what follows on taxation, see chapter 5, 
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take place at a special meeting of the forty-shilling freeholders, 
rather than at the head court of the sheriffdom at which all 
freeholders might be present. ' This might have divided the 
freeholders, but it would also have undermined the feudal structure of 
the sheriffdom. Similarly, the forty-shilling freeholders had to be 
taxed regularly for their commissioners' expenses to parliament; if 
this divided them from those below, it also marked them off from the 
magnates above. The larger barons dropped anchor in parliament after 
a lengthy voyage which they could only have completed because they 
were buoyed up by those below them. 
Once safely ensconced in the estates, the barons could lobby 
successfully for the cancellation of a proposed parliament in Karch 
1595. -- This, and the regular lobbying on taxation, could hardly have 
been done without some kind of organized national or regional network. 
It was not formal enough to be an institution like the convention of 
royal burghs, but that was not for want of trying. In November 1599, 
a petition from the barons to the other estates made a number of 
demands, mainly for reduced taxes, but also for the right to hold their 
own twice-yearly convention like the royal burghs. 3 It is significant 
that the barons' political leaders thought in these terms, especially 
that they identified with the burghs with whom they were taking 
concerted action against taxation. But perhaps it is equally 
significant that such a convention was never set up. The destiny of 
i, uPS, iii, 509-10, c, 120, 
2, Colville to Carey, 38 March 1595, CSP Scot,, xi, 553, 
3, SRO, PA7/1/48, 
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the lairds was not to create another medieval institution, but to 
undermine existing ones by blurring distinctions of status like those 
between baron, feuar and burg. 
So parliament stood at the centre of a complex matrix of organizations, 
linking government to a range of social sectors and linking these 
sectors one with another; without them, government could not have been 
carried on. The time was not yet ripe for society to become an 
association of sovereign individuals, equal under the law; everyone who 
was anyone was part of a lobbying network with channels which might, 
if necessary, lead to parliament. Many of these institutions were 
certainly powerful; but it is time to look beyond the idea that 
parliament was weak because it had vigorous rivals. The historian of 
General Motors might well mention Ford only as a competitor; but a 
history of the US motor industry (probably a much more illuminating 
project) would have to consider the two firms as parallel, even 
complementary, businesses which shared a network of suppliers, which 
could both grow successfully, and between which competition played at 
best an incidental part. If parliament was weak because it had to 
share its fiscal privileges with conventions of estates, then by this 
argument conventions were strong, challenging parliament for 
supremacy. ' But there is no evidence that they were mutually 
antagonistic even to the level of Ford and GM - which is hardly 
surprising, since the same people came to both. If the governing 
elite wanted a formal, legislative assembly, they held a parliament; if 
For an exasple of this argusent, sea O'Brien, 'Scottish parliasent', ch, 5, 
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they wanted to pursue political intrigues, a convention of the nobility 
was more convenient. Similarly with the other estates' forums: when 
the general assembly was seen to be better at regulating religious 
matters than parliament would have been, parliament let them get on 
with it. Of course, the political elite sometimes had their 
differences over religious policy, differences which have been the 
staple fare of ecclesiastical historians; but even then it was less a 
matter of parliament versus general assembly than of government versus 
opposition in both parliament and assembly. The tendency of the 
opposition to be more successful in the assembly is very interesting, 
but should not allow the social and political realities to be obscured 
by an institutional superstructure. 
65 
Chapter 2 
PARLIAXBIT AND THE LAY 
Now saiaters ya sill heir incontinent, 
At great leyiour in your presence proclasit 
The nobill Acta of our parliaient, 
Of quhilks we neid nacht for to be aschasit, ' 
P 
More government: so more statutes. How did statutes operate? To 
answer this we first have to know the place of statute in Scots law. 
Having considered this question, this chapter goes on to discuss what 
statutes had the power to do, and than to consider some ways in which 
they can be categorized. Implementation of the laws could not be 
taken for granted, and often the most fundamental question that 
historians can ask about an act is., was it implemented, and if so how? 
Different statutes were designed to be operated in different ways. 
Finally, some acts benefited particular individuals: were any of these 
'private acts', and if so what did this mean? 
The late sixteenth century was a crucial period for reorientation of 
the law, and of attitudes to the law. The transition from locally- 
administered customary law to centrally-administered professional law 
had begun in the fifteenth century$' it was now accelerating. 
a, Lindsay, 'Thrte estattis', 347, 
2, J, J, Robertson, 'The development of the law', Scottish society in the filieen h 
century, ad, J, M, Brown (London, 1977), 137, 
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However, while contemporaries knew that law was in flux, they were 
uncertain about what type of law would or should emerge. The chief 
point of agreement was that Scotland was well supplied with ancient 
texts and collections of laws, most of which were, however, obscure and 
little understood. The conventional wisdom hoped for an updated and 
codified version of these, probably relying an the best-known text, 
Regsam zajestate.. ' In default of such a code, those who tried to 
define the basis of Scots law typically offered a combination of the 
'old laws' (Regsam and associated texts) and the statutes. Before the 
Reformation, a churchman might add the canon law 2 
How exactly the old laws and statutes fitted together was never 
conceptualized. The authority of the old laws stemmed from their 
virtually immemorial antiquity, usually having a legendary attribution 
to some famous ancient lawgiver like David I. This was based on the 
medieval view of society as fundamentally static; the best law was the 
oldest, and anything new was likely to be an innovation of doubtful 
authority. But where did this leave statute? - the best statute was 
surely the most recent. Could a statute contradict the old laws? If 
so, it was but a short step to the vertiginous suggestion that the old 
laws, because they were the oldest, were the least authoritative because 
least relevant to changing current conditions. The most logical way 
back from the brink of this conceptual abyss would have been to argue 
that statute could merely declare pre-existing law; but neither this 
nor any other theory seems to have been elaborated. There was no 
i, Raglan, 1-2. 
2, E. g. Leslie, Hljtoria, 1,119, 
FirliaAwftt 11W' ! ha Jaw 67 
need - not yet; for legislation had not expanded to test the 
boundaries of what statute might do, and there are no recorded debates 
about the competence of statute like those which the English 
Reformation prompted. ' 
This left statute potentially omnicompetent, and it is perhaps 
significant that nobody argued that the old laws were superior to 
statute. In practice, the old laws could be over-ridden even by lesser 
authorities like the convention of royal burghs, which in 1581 told 
Inverness that it had no right to levy an 'excyse boll' on burgesses, 
'nochtwithstanding the Lawes of the Majesty (i. e. Regsam majestatem]' 2 
Those who thought about the potential contradiction between statute and 
old laws perhaps recognized the limitations of the old laws in their 
current obscure form, using them when they could in specific cases, and 
hoping that the question would be made irrelevant by a code based on 
the old laws and approved by parliament. 
Demand for law codification was growing in the 1560s, perhaps spurred 
by Scotland's French connections (especially strong during the regency 
of Xary of Guise and the personal reign of Xary): 1581-87 was a key 
period for French law reform. ' A Scottish law reform commission of 
Kay 1566, the first of a long series, included three lawyers known to 
have studied in France among its key members: John Leslie, bishop of 
1, Elton (ed, ), TUdr constitution, 239, 
2, RCSB, 1,123, 
3. J, H M. Balton, Society in crisis; Prince in the sixteenth century (London, 
1975), 151-62; J, ourkan, 'the royal lectureships under Mary of Lorraine', 
ThS' 62 (1983), 74, 
Parii iiirt and thip law 68 
Ross (who initiated and chaired the commission), Edward Henryson, 
editor of the printed statutes that resulted, and David Chalmers, 
recently appointed a lord of session. ' Also important was James 
Balfour, recently appointed clerk register. 
According to Henryson, the commission planned to start with the past- 
1424 statutes, and then go on to codifying Scotland's old laws .2 The 
edition of the statutes was a highly significant piece of work, to 
which we will return. But, lawyers would have asked, what about the 
old laws? One member of the commission did produce a work using the 
Regiam and many other old laws - Chalmers' 'Dictionary of Scats law. 3 
This was a digest collection of old laws, statutes, and decisions of the 
court of session. Presented to the queen (according to the preface) 
in July 1568, the 'Dictionary' may have been a preliminary report on 
this second stage of the commission's work. However, it was far fram 
restricting itself to the old laws; perhaps it was an independent 
piece of work, an the strength of which Chalmers had been put an the 
commission. It could have been useful in its clear presentation -a 
chronological summary of significant laws arranged under alphabetical 
subject headings. But the 'Dictionary' was not a codified law, still 
less a codified version of the old laws. How could it have been, when 
the material Chalmers worked with was unsystematic? The old laws 
1, Antis and cinstit, tiounis of the realms of Scotland,, (Edinburgh, 1566), 
introduction; J. Durkan, 'The French connection in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries', Scotland and Europe, ! 200-18,5'0, ed, T. C. Scout 
(Edinburgh, 1986), 25; 6, Brunton 1 0, Haig, rin historical account of the 
senators of the college of justice (Edinburgh, 1832), 123, 
2, Qrtis and coil titutiounis a the realm of Scotland,,,, introduction. 
3, David Chalsars, 'Dictionary of Scots law', EL, Add, 1S 27,472, 
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needed more than diligent compilation. And Chalmers, like a medieval 
chronicler, was more diligent than critical - he included, indeed gave 
pride of place to, a large number of pseudo-laws taken from Boece's 
History. 
All this activity in her reign hardly Justified Chalmers' later 
congratulations to Mary for 'reducing to order' the laws. ' But 
something had been done, and the work continued in the 1570s. In 
March 1575, an act 'anent the sichting collectioun and reformatioun of 
the lawis of this realms' lamented 'the harms quhilk this commoun weill 
sustenis throw want of a perfyte writtin law', and appointed a 
commission to draft 'ane certain writtin law'. 2 The expected 
transition from 'lawis' to 'ane law' shows that codification was still 
intended. The central commissioners were James Balfour and John 
Skene; 3 what eventually emerged was Balfour's 'Practicks'. Balfour 
and Skene probably took the opportunity to obtain the commission 
because they were working on the project anyway. Official backing 
meant material support, like a house in Edinburgh and a pension for 
Skene. 4 
The 'Practicks' was compiled very much on the plan laid down by the 
act - from the 'bukis of the law' (principally Regiam majestatem), the 
'actis of parliament', and 'decisionis befoir the sessioun'. Balfour's 
1, David Chalsers, la recherche des si larltea plus resargwbiss roncerfaIrt 
! 'istat d`Erossa (Faris, 1579), introduction, 
3,4P$, iii, 69, 
3, Caldgrwoo , History, iii, 
575-76, 
4, £Via, Rees iv, 38; RSS, vii, n*, 1552, 
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work, like Chalmers', was not a code but a magpie-like collection of all 
the law he could find, the older the better; though it was somewhat 
less Jumbled, and much larger. Balfour probably began with a digest 
of the old laws, divided it roughly into subject headings, and like 
Chalmers added statutes and session decisions chronologically under 
each heading. ' The arrangement of his headings within larger themes 
seems more sophisticated to modern eyes, but it was not always 
appreciated at the time - some contemporary copyists of the 'Practicks' 
rearranged it alphabetically .2 
Nor was Balfour much more critical than Chalmers in his handling of 
the old laws. For instance, his prescription on usury ('ocker'), 
following the Regiam, specified that `na persoun may be accusit for 
ocker induring his lifetime: bot gif ony man deceis, beand suspect 
thairof, the king may tak inquisitioun be ane assise... gif the said 
persoun usit the crime of ocker immediatlie befoir the time of his 
deceis' and escheat his lands and goods if found guilty. Why could 
the accusation be made only after death? Because the usurer was not 
primarily a criminal, but a sinner: 'gif he, befoir his deceis, has 
desistit and ceissit to use the samin, and has dome repentance 
thairfoir', he could not be accused. -4 None of this bore any relation 
to the law when Balfour wrote. 4 
i, Balfour, Practidg, i, p, lviit, 
Y, Balfour, Practirt"s, i, pp, xxxv-xxxvfff, 
3, Balfour, Practicks, ii, 532; cf, RRgiiu, 163-64, 
R, For the law on usury, sea chapter 6, 
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Balfour did make some advances over Chalmers. Though his collection 
was still founded on the old laws, he tilted its balance towards recent 
times: its vast size arose from the inclusion of many more decisions 
of the court of session. He also relegated the luxuriant fantasies of 
Boece to an appendix where they could be safely ignored, instead of 
putting them proudly at the head of each chapter. He may have 
intended to incorporate them in the body of the text (he died in 1583 
with it unfinished), but even if so, he clearly had his doubts about his 
Boece. 
The first writers to apply critical standards to the old laws were 
Balfour's protege Skene, and Thomas Craig; and they reached different 
conclusions. Craig's Jrrs feudale, written about 1600 towards the end 
wo 6) e-L a 
of a long career as a, was professedly a 'commentary on 
feudal customs... a scientific formulation of our Scots law'. ' Its 
ingredients were not merely current practice in Scots law, but included 
history from classical times and much of the west European legal 
tradition. He erected feudal law into a system to answer a wide 
variety of legal questions, from the rights of third parties in debt 
cases to the succession to kingdoms. 
Craig, like Balfour, based his work on old laws, in his case the 
Capal#ngian 'Books of the feus'. But despite his own devotion to 
antiquity - or perhaps because of it - he repudiated the 12egiam without 
hesitation as `a blot an the Jurisprudence of our country... useless as 
1, Craig, As fa dale, i, p, xfi, 
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an aid to Judicial decision'. ' A rational humanist, he felt that his 
own feudal laws were important not because ages of use had given them 
authority (they were not, after all, any more Scottish than the 
English-derived Regiam), but because when looked at objectively they 
had something to offer the times in which he lived. Unhampered by 
Scotland's own mildewing medieval laws, he was free to serve up a fresh 
synthesis of law, derived from the most useful laws medieval Europe had 
to offer, for a seventeenth-century audience. This, however, distanced 
him from his Scottish contemporaries, and it is hard to assess his 
standing - is it more significant that the privy council praised the 
Jus feudale and recommended its printing, or that the recommendation 
was ignored? -- Craig eventually achieved a European reputation, but 
his chief impact on Scots law at the time was probably a negative one: 
to undermine the idea that a code of law based an Regten majastatem 
would be essential or even desirable. By contrast, Balfour and his 
colleagues were consciously concerned to adapt the law to the needs of 
a changing society, but they had not as yet developed the intellectual 
and critical tools to achieve this. 
In the later work of John Skene, some of these tools can be seen in the 
process of development. His De verborum significatione (1597) was not 
intended to be a synthesis of the old laws, merely a collection of 
pathways which he had discovered through some of their more overgrown 
and tangled thickets. - But it would have been an essential 
i, Craig, lag feudale, 1,8,11, 
3, Privy council to Jaw Vi, 14 April 1608, Neiros papers, t, 43-44, 
3, Skene, 01'S. 
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precondition for revival of the old laws - indeed, together with his 
edition of the Regis. m itself (1609), it was perhaps the most single- 
minded effort yet made. ' Skene showed particular interest in Highland 
laws, apparently with the idea that they might be integrated into any 
future system 2 It is ironic that he was one of the Octavians, who in 
their government treated the Highlanders merely as savages inhabiting a 
land ripe for colonization. -' 
Skene devoted himself to resisting the encroachment of Roman law into 
Scotland. ' The Reformation favoured Roman law; rather than continue 
the work of the 1566 commission on the old laws, the godly Koray 
regime proposed a new start, with a new commission to codify the law 
according to the 'fassoune of the law Romane". & There is no evidence 
that such a commission was set up, but it perhaps became more common 
to see the principles of Roman law being used to decide cases where 
the law was unclear. E Almost all Scottish advocates admitted in this 
period had qualified in civil and canon law in France, where a new 
emphasis was being given to Roman law. 7 William Velwood's Sea law of 
Scotland (1590), which after the statutes aas the first Scottish legal 
i, C¬, RRgiam, 18,20. 
2, For contemporary thinking on this subject, sae Villiauson, Scottish national 
ron; cixisness, ch, 6, 
3. Chapter 4, 
4. Introduction to Scottish Isgal history, 31, 
5,4PS, iii, 40, 
6, P. Stein, 'The influence of Ronan law on the law of Scotland', JR, new sar, 8 
(1963), 215-16, 
7, Durkan, 'French connection', 26; Durkan, 'Royal lectureships', 74, 
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work to be printed, was based on Roman law. ' This kind of thing was 
a useful adjunct to the collections of session decisions - 'gif any 
cummirsum or trubilsum cause fal out, as oft chances, quhilke can nocht 
be agriet be our cuntrey lawis, incontinent quhatevir is thocht 
necessar to pacifie this controversie is citet out of the Romane 
lawis' 2 
None of these legal texts could compete in prestige with the printed 
statutes. The simple fact of printing must have given then 
unparalleled circulation and impressiveness, and they were directly 
associated with current affairs - each parliament was followed by 
another printed pamphlet with more statutes. The latest parliamentary 
enactments were just as such news then as now, and we shall see that 
good care was taken to maintain interest in them. Alexander Guthrie, 
burgh clerk of Edinburgh, was even moved to versification in the 
flyleaf of his copy: 
Jupes be war, pretend na ignorance: 
Excuse is nage, the taxis ar to Vow knaxin. 
The aichty Lord, quha gevis governance, 
His law, his word, into your eir is blawin; 
The princis lawis befoir Vow heir is schavin, 
6if ye do wrang do nacht your self abuse; 
Heir is your reule, ye can have na excusa, 3 
Even as successive law commissions wrestled with the intractable old 
laws in vain, Scots law was being refined, updated and extended. No 
i, Valwood, 'Sea law', 
2, Leslie, Historie, i, 120, 
3, Artfis arW cinatitutiownis of the raalaa of Scotland,,,, copy in NLS, H, 33, c, 24, 
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single code of 'perpetuall laves' was produced, but every parliament 
passed statutes to solve the problems of some branch of law and extend 
the competence of statute over other branches which had previously 
relied on old laws or custom. ' By the seventeenth century, most 
criminal prosecutions were based on statute .2 The true law reformers 
were the drafters of the statutes - who no doubt counted Balfour, Skene 
and Craig among their numbers. 
The last chance for the old laws' survival was perhaps the 1609 
printing of Skene's bilingual Regt" iaajestatern, including a number of 
the subsidiary law texts also. Here at last was a scholarly (for its 
time) edition of the old laws: what jurists had been demanding for two 
generations. But was it? - it was still not a code. The old laws 
proved little more usable in published form than they had done before, 
and there were two further law reform commissions in the early 
seventeenth century. Neither produced the Code Bapoldon which by then 
was the only alternative to statute, and in 1681 Stair drove the last 
nail into the coffin of the codifiers. =' Skene had done his best with 
the Regsam; but the statutes he had helped to print (he brought out 
the second collected edition in 1597) made it irrelevant, and it came 
half a century too late. 
The process of superseding other laws with statute was not universally 
welcomed, nor did it go unopposed by those who distrusted central 
d, Cf, introductory survey of the sources and literature of Scots law, ed, 
H, McKechnie (Stair Society, 1936), 3. 
ý, Intr stiwn to Scottish leg il history, 41, 
3, Regier, 3-4. 
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government and preferred to leave things as they were. There is 
mention of opposition to the 1575 project to codify the law. ' The 
burghs were happy enough with the old burgh laws, which provided an 
untidy but reasonably complete set of rules enabling them to govern 
their own affairs. -- The extension of statute at the expense of local 
burgh privileges led to the quest for confirmations of the latter. " 
Edinburgh compiled a book of the old burgh laws for the convention of 
royal burghs in 1580-82.4 This was less a special predilection for 
old laws than a distrust of parliament; any other law which preserved 
burghs' independence would do. The burghs probably used Veiwood's sea 
laws, and they also drew up their own regulations in 1802s these were 
designed to supplement rather than to replace Veiwood, concentrating on 
details rather than principles - for instance the rule that 'na mariner 
sail dispyse, conteme, or lichtle the schipis wittuallis'. E6 
Though statute law now shone brightly while the lamp of the old laws 
burned dim, some other branches of native law were thriving. One 
forum for this growth was the commissary courts. Pre-Reformation 
family law had been canon law; this was partly superseded by the 
Reformers' statutes, and may also have suffered from an act against 
i, vfllfasson, Scottish national crnsciiwsness, 135, 
2, As well as the old taws on coaaercfal setters, burgh courts of course 
adsinfstered the taw of the reatat H. L. hacQueen 5 M. Windrag, 'Laws and 
courts in the burghs', T/ Scottish sediovai torn, ads, M, Lynch, M. Spearsan I 
6, Stell (Edinburgh, 1988), 214, 
3, Lynch, 'The crown and the burghs', 67-68. 
4, RCRB, 1,103-04,112,128-29, 
5, RCRB, ii, 132-45, 
Parliament and the law 77 
'canon, civile or municipals' laws contrary to Protestantism., 
Reformed practice in the commissary courts still used canon law, but a 
new body of decisions of the general assembly grew up on marriage and 
divorce .2 These were mainly in the 1560s and 1570s; later decisions 
on marriage tended to shift away from the law towards the conduct of 
the ceremony. Whether this was because the law was now defined and 
the commissary courts' expertise in it accepted, or because the 
commissaries resisted the assembly's interference, is not clear. 
The quiet, steady flow of statutes appeared more remote from the 
codification projects because Scottish statute drafters tended not to go 
in for vast, omnibus statutes like the Elizabethan statute of 
artificers. ' Such acts, beloved of English legislators, would repeal a 
battery of earlier statutes to replace them with what was supposed to 
be an all-embracing code on the subject. Scottish acts tended to be 
brief (or relatively so) and to cover one or two simple points; few 
repealed previous legislation at all. The concept of desuetude was not 
yet fully developed, however, and we shall see that laws could lie 
dormant and then revive. In the regency of Morton, there were one or 
two direct borrowings from the English statute book: the statute of 
1573 requiring holders of benefices to accept the Reformed confession 
of faith copied an English act of 1570, and an English act of 1572 was 
1, Cf. i?, D, H, Sa1lar, 'Leviticus XVIII, the forbidden dagraas and the law of incest 
in Scotland', Jnvish Laiv Anual, 1 (1978), 229-32; A PS, 111,548-49, c, 2, 
2, Off, i-iii, passia, 
3,5 Eliz, i, c, 4, 
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borrowed for the 1575 poor law. ' 
Balfour performed a most useful service to the professional izat ton of 
law in putting so many session decisions into circulation. It has 
been argued that what lawyers and the law really needed was evolution 
through constant use in a professional supreme court. 2 Neither 
Balfour nor anyone else formulated the idea at the time; Balfour even 
claimed that the session could not make law. But what was his 
authority for this? -a decision of the lords of session. ' Some of 
the manuscript versions of Balfour included only the session decisions, 
so important were they. 4 The proliferating manuscript collections of 
such decisions are eloquent testimony to the growth of judge-made law. 
And as we have seen, the court of session never challenged parliament. 
Its decisions accepted the primacy of statute, and its first instinct 
when confronted with a problem for which there was no clear answer was 
always to seek a new law from parliament. 
The eclipse of the old laws left statute supreme. Devotees of the old 
laws (or of the idea of reviving them in a usable form) would probably 
have argued that they were as authoritative as statute, if not more. 
In practice this proved an impossible position to sustain: Scots 
needed new laws, not a new version of the old ones. And that is what 
i, For the 1573 statute, see Donaldson, Scottish Reformation, 177, and appendix III 
where the two acts are printed in parallel, For the poor law, sat chapter 8, 
There had been a previous such borrowing with a sasines act of 1555; Seilar, 
'The cosson law of Scotland and the coaaon law of England', 92, 
2, T, h, Cooper, The dark age of Scottish legal history (Glasgow, 1952), 24, 
3, Balfour, Praciieks, 1,1-2, 
t, Balfour, Practfrks, i, p, xxxvi, 
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they got. No longer would the oldest law be the most authoritative; 
now it would be the newest statute. There was plenty of room for 
other laws - precedents, for instance - so long as they did not 
conflict with the new and fundamental rule that the law needed to 
evolve and that parliamentary statutes were the driving force. Scots 
law was becoming a three-tier system. First came the statutes; 
subordinate to them, filling in gaps, came precedents from the court of 
session; further subordinate, the principles of Roman law could be 
used to set further precedents in the remaining gaps. 
This brief survey of legal developments presents some striking 
contradictions. The medievalist Balfour was widely honoured; the 
modernizing Craig ignored. The diligent compilations of session 
decisions were made by lawyers who insisted that these could not be 
sources of law. Above all, the Jurists yearned for a universal code of 
law, expressed in regular commissions which built castles in Spain 
while the real code of law - the statute book - was being written all 
the time. ' if Scots law stood at a crossroads, it was so mistaken 
about the direction it was to take as to suggest that the ideas on 
which it drew were out of touch with emerging social realities. At 
the end of the barren labours of all the law commissions, it was more 
than ever possible to agree with Craig: 'it has to be frankly admitted 
that the Scots acts are practically the only written source of genuine 
native law we have'-2 Buchanan had put it more bluntly: the 
Cf. Introduction to Scottish legal history, 30-31 
2, Craig, Jars feudale, 1,8,12, 
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Scats 'have no laws but their acts of parliament'. ' 
Did parliamentary statutes have any limitations in their scope? In 
England, the crown attempted (with diminishing success) to demarcate 
areas which parliament was to keep out of. This was an important 
component of the royal prerogative: the crown's right to do things 
independently of parliament .2 
Parliament's powers were essentially unlimited, as in England, thought 
an English obeerver. 3 This report also believed that the crown had a 
veto, but there is no evidence of one being formally exercised in this 
period, and James VI later told his English parliament that in Scotland 
his negative voice came at the beginning, not the end, of the 
parliamentary process. ' There was however an innovation in 1584, 
when the acts were touched by the sceptre -a ceremony either new, or 
given new prominence by Arran. E 
The Scottish parliament legislated on a wider range of issues than the 
English, and a formal royal prerogative in the English sense scarcely 
existed. Even the word was used differently. When James VI in 1597 
i, Buchanan, History, ii, 447, 
%, Vilding & F, Laundy, rin encyclopaedia of parliasent (London, 1958), s, v, 
loyal pfavolatiiva, 
`R1lation of the sannst of tuditatores of Scotland`, n, d, 11567116431, EL, 
Cotton MSS, Caligula, 6, Y,, ffl, 372t, 
A. Rait, Parliaments, 509, 
S. hiit, Parliaments, 435, 
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referred in a statute to his own 'liberteis and prerogativis be the 
lawis of this realms and privelege of his crown and diadene', he meant 
in practice that the estates' sectional privileges (in this case the 
'allegit bipast immwnitie' of the merchants from paying customs on 
imparts) could not stand up against parliament. ' The first statute of 
the 1608 parliament, after James had succeeded to the English throne, 
was an 'act anent the kingis majesteis prerogative' in which the 
exuberance of the sycophantic verbiage was only matched by its 
meaninglessness --2 Turning from words to deeds, parliament regularly 
ratified the appointment of the privy council, sometimes adding 
regulations for its conduct. 3 Practical rather than constitutional 
questions were to the fare. An act of 1563 on church repairs 
delegated parliamentary powers to the privy council, allowing that any 
action the council took was to be 'of als greit strenth and effect as 
and the samin had bene expreslie contenit in this present act'. ' 
No royal official was immune from parliamentary intervention. Thus, 
parliamentary commissions for overseeing the expenditure of tax revenue 
were appointed in 1588 and 1597.6 In theory, only parliament could 
alienate crown property. 6 On one occasion the officers of state were 
1, RPS, iv, 136, c, 22, 
2,4PS, iv, 281, c, 1, 
3, APS, iii, 69, c, 24; 96-98, c, 4; 118-19; 150-51, c, 32; 228-29, c, 38; 378, 
c, 10; 444, c, 19; 562-63, c, 41; iv, 34, c, 45; 53; 177-78, 
4, APS, ii, 539-40,02, 
5,4PS, iii, 523; iv, 145-46, c, 48, 
6.4PS, ii1,89-90, 
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not to be dismissed without parliamentary approval., These powers 
fell well short of direct parliamentary control over the executive, of 
course. There was no procedure for the Scottish parliament to 
initiate independent investigations or punish crimes committed by crown 
officers. Such powers were relatively rare among European 
parliaments, being possessed only by the Aragonese cartes, the Polish 
sejmg and the English parliament? 
Queen Elizabeth, having had the Reformation settlement made by 
parliament, did her best to keep her house of commons away from 
religious matters thereafter. ' The Scottish Reformation, similarly, 
was legislated by parliament, but the crown had less incentive to curb 
parliamentary powers on this since these could usually be used on the 
crown's side against the general assembly, as with the Black Acts of 
1584 4 
Parliament had discussed war, peace and foreign policy in medieval 
times. r, The making of war and peace were recognized as matters for 
parliament and conventions of estates, though probably not to the 
exclusion of independent crown action. c, An embassy to Denmark on the 
1, O'S, iii, 340-01, c, 36, 
2, flyers, Parliaments and estatog, 33, 
3, Neat*, Elizabeth I and bar parliaments, i-ii, passt., 
4. Chapter 1, 
5, Lovat-Fraser, 'Constitutional position of the Scottish monarch', 254, 
£, iPS, ii, 543, c, 20, 
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Sound tolls was authorized by statute in 1583. ' Similarly, Archbishop 
James Beaton was restored in 1598 in order to act as ambassador in 
France (but not appointed - that must have been done by the crown). 2 
The 1585 league with England was ratified by parliament. 3 If 
parliament did not have complete control over foreign policy, neither 
did the government: if it was illegitimate for the Catholic earls to 
negotiate with Philip II, it was quite in order for the royal burghs to 
send their own embassy to France. ' Related to foreign policy are 
military matters. E Commanders were not answerable to parliament, but 
there were numerous statutes on the army. The summons of the common 
army (and thus, increasingly, a form of taxation) was a prerogative of 
the crown. E 
There were few more inflammable topics under Elizabeth than the 
succession to the throne and the sovereign's marriage. The succession 
was not discussed by the Scottish parliament in this period; however, 
when the duke of Lennox wanted a ratification of his right to the 
succession in 1581, this was too controversial for the politicians but 
parliament's right to make such a ratification was unquestioned. 7 
Royal marriages could be discussed by parliament if they raised 
1, WS, ii, 544-45, c, 27, 
3,4PS, iv, 169-70, 
3, AFS, iii, 380-81, c, 1&; 423-24, 
4, WS, iv, 46-48; RCRB, i, 127-28, 
5, Chapter 7. 
6, Chapter S. 
7, Occurrenti in Scotland, 24 P1ovetber 1581, CSP Scot,, vi, 92-93, 
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constitutional issues, as did that of Mary to Francis. ' 
The constitutional powers of parliament (or rather of conventions) over 
regencies were extensive but undefined, depending like so much else on 
power politics carried on elsewhere. The legal basis of the regency 
during James VI's minority was Mary's act of abdication, naming a 
council of seven governors plus Moray to whom the regency was 
offered .2 On Moray's death the procedure was unclear, and made more 
so by the limited recognition of Mary's abdication. A convention of 
the nobility discussed three alternative methods of electing a regent - 
by those in Mary's council, by all those who had attended the king's 
coronation, or by parliament; no agreement could be reached. ' 
Scotland was without a regent for six months until the English 
intervened to get Lennox elected. ' Thereupon two successive 
conventions elected regents in the same way, from among those in 
Mary's council, until by 1573 few of these were left: whereupon 
parliament enacted that any Protestant noble could be elected. 6 There 
was no official suggestion that the heir presumptive (Lennox or 
ChAteiherault, depending which view was taken of the royal genealogy) 
had the right to the regency without asking the estates. 6 
1, A PS, i i, 604-20, 
2, RPC, i, 538-41, 
3, Harries, Neaoirs, 123-24. 
A. Oirrrnal, 180, 
5, APS, iii, 74, c, 6, 
6, For a typology of regencies, see P, 6, B, McNeill, 'The Scottish regency', JR, new 
ser, 12 (1967), 127-48, 
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Only a convention, not parliament, could elect a regent. When Lennox 
was killed in 1571, parliament was actually in session; but a separate 
convention, with no doubt the same membership, had to be held to elect 
a new regent, Mar. ' The same parliament then reconvened, and by its 
first act confirmed Xar's election. 2 It is clear that parliament could 
not lawfully be held until a regent had been constituted to hold it. 3 
These wide powers were all very well in theory, but parliament's right 
to make laws was of little value unless they could be implemented. 
Herein lay, according to most older histories, the real weakness of the 
Scottish parliament: the fact that parliamentary statutes were often 
regularly repeated proves that they were not being observed. Or does 
it? Night not repetition of statutes prove rather that someone 
continued to think they were worthwhile, and in fact they were being 
implemented? ° Ruch of the evidence for either argument can be slotted 
neatly into the preconceptions on which the argument is based. For 
instance, in June 1595, Xark Acheson of Acheson's Haven in Bast Lothian 
was summoned for exporting grain, contrary to the 'actis of parliament 
and proclamatiounis for the retening of victuall within the cuntrie'. 
He had already been warned twice in 1594. But in 1597, he was 
summoned again - this time for deforcing a searcher for forbidden 
1, .? FS, iii, 65-£6, 
2, AFS, iii, 68, c, 3, 
3, McNeill, 'Scottish regency', 131-32, Rait claiss that a convention elected the 
regent because it as a 'sort popular asseably', vhich was true neither for this 
convention nor for conventions in general, as his own work sakes clear: Rafft, 
Parliaae, iis, 161, 
4, Ritt is more willing than cost to consider both views: fait, Par laments, 47, 
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goods. ' Kany historians might treat this as evidence that the laws 
are being entirely disregarded. Here is someone exporting grain with 
impunity, even repeating his offence - how many more must be getting 
away scot free! But others might argue that this case shows how 
difficult it is to export grain. Thus, it has to be done from a minor 
port, because the royal burghs are too well policed; and even here, a 
customs official manages to interfere, if not too successfully. 
Acheson's case does at least offer some kind of evidence for compliance 
or non-compliance with the law, even if it is hard to interpret. All 
too often, historians have failed to look beyond the statutes at all, 
and have tried to measure the success of laws by their own comments on 
the problem in hand. For instance, efforts to improve the process of 
putting criminals to the horn were common. One such law, in 1579, 
lamented that 'the disobedience of the proces of horning is sa greit 
and commoun that the personic denunceit rebellis takkis na feir 
thairof'2 This is familiar enough. But if we accept it at face 
value, what are we to make of the law of 1573 which said that people 
had 'greit fair and terrour... to incur the said process of horning'23 
The answer is that this act was tightening up on the penalties for 
benefice-holders at the horn, and needed to imply in its warding that 
this was worth doing: they would have the same 'fair and terrour' as 
laymen. This kind of excited remark was always included by the 
promoters of a law, to convince parliament (and themselves) that the 
1. TA, 1593-96, SRO, E21170, foi, 163v,, 97v,, 127r,; TA, 1596-97, SRO, E21/71, 
fo, 132v, 
2. APS, iii, 142-43, c, 13, 
3. At'S, itf, 74-75, c, 8, 
1 
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*he- law was worth having. Sixteenth-century statutes exaggerated the 
seriousness of the disease; they claimed that all previous laws had 
totally failed to cure it; and they prescribed an infallible remedy: 
this was no more than common form. Xore can be learned from the 
substance of the statutes than from their hypochondriac preambles; and 
in the case of horning, there is the law of 1598 which enjoined privy 
councillors to set a 'guid example of obedience' by not actually 
appearing at the council table while at the horn. ' 
Even the substance of the statutes can be of limited value. How zany 
laws were passed with resounding claims to universal, complete and 
permanent iaplesentationt Of course, this was unrealistic; but what 
other formula could have been used? Past histories have brimmed with 
sympathy for parliaments in their well-intentioned uphill struggle, or 
have rebuked them sternly for relying on futile scrape of paper. Both 
attitudes miss the point. Sixteenth-century legislators, despite the 
formulas in their statutes, did not think in terms of full, permanent 
implementation. 
The statutes can thus be divided up according to what kind of 
implementation was expected of them. These categories are not 
concrete or mutually exclusive; quite a number of laws fall into two 
or more groups. Rather, they are tendencies which can be found in the 
laws. 
The first two categories need not be discussed in any depth. In 1563, 
1, APS, iv, 378. 
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a law required an embassy to be sent to Denmark. ' The ambassador 
went, came back (empty-handed, as it happens), and that was the end of 
it. Continual effort for implementation was not required. Secondly, 
many laws, though permanent, were not of the kind which required 
government to be continually vigilant over their enforcement. Xuch 
civil law merely established ground rules for disputes between 
individuals. If the laws were in tune with generally-accepted values, 
they could be left to take their course; and discordant laws could be 
harmlessly forgotten. Thus, laws allowing divorce on grounds of 
adultery (1583) or desertion (1573) were not going to be followed by 
campaigns to require all partners of adulterers, say, to seek divorce 2 
Having passed the law, the government let the commissary court get on 
with it. 
Thirdly, we have what we expect from modern laws: full, country-wide, 
permanent implementation. Even modern governments face many 
constraints on their ability to implement their laws. Were there, in 
fact, any laws which a sixteenth-century government could enforce fully 
and permanently? Not many, certainly. The customs, perhaps, are an 
example. They at least were being collected all the time somewhere, 
and at the rates laid down from time to time. There was certainly 
large-scale evasion of the customs, but when have there ever been taxes 
without tax evasion? The government was able to maintain its hold on 
the machinery of collection. 
APS, 11,544-45, c, 27, I 
2. APS, it, 539, c. 10; iti, 81-82, C. I. 
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The fourth approach to law-making, however, was very common. It may 
be called permissive legislation. Parliament passed these laws with 
sweeping claims, certainly. But nobody thought that they would be 
implemented permanently; nobody thought that they would be observed 
all over the country; and nobody thought that they would be applied to 
everyone, even in a locality which was paying attention to them. They 
were enabling laws. The government, worried about Gone social 
problem, passed a law inviting local administrators to consider what, 
if anything, they would do about it. Thus, the poor law was first 
enacted in 1575 to deal with the social threat of growing poverty and 
vagrancy. ' It required parishes to assess the level of poverty, and 
to impose local taxation to pay regular poor relief to all those in 
need. Probably not a single parish did so - at least, not immediately 
or regularly. Certainly the government made no attempt to compel 
them. But arguably, the act did encourage thinking about how to 
tackle vagrancy at a local level, and it gave parishes a mechanism of 
which they could take advantage to cope with a temporary crisis. 
This, perhaps, was as such as administrators could expect. 
There were many laws and even more proclamations against shooting wild 
game. -- But this was not principled conservationism; it was about 
preserving the royal sport. The laws were usually proclaimed (and 
only enforced) at a time and place when the king was actually 
Chapter S. 
2, E, 9, AFS, 11,541, c, 15, 
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hunting. ' Thus the law might sound permanent, but the problem was 
often intermittent. Nark Acheson, exporting grain contrary to statute, 
would have been much less likely to get into trouble if the mid-1590s 
had not been years of dearth. The law limiting the followers which a 
noble could bring to the law courts was only important when there was 
a serious attempt at intimidation. This law is a good example of the 
type of law which fades out and then comes back. Having been passed 
as a statute in 1584, not for the first time, it was re-issued by the 
privy council in 1590 - but the council saw no harm in tinkering with 
the statute's permitted limits .2 
The temporary (not to say evanescent) nature of such laws was not the 
same as desuetude, which was not mentioned by Balfour (1580s) or Hope 
(1630s) and took its modern fora only with Stair's Institutions of 
1881.2 By Stair's time, full implementation of laws was expected as 
normal, so the concept emerged to weed out the minority of laws which 
were not continuing to bear fruit. Craig, before his time in this as 
in much else, mentioned that laws could go out of use, though he did 
not elaborate on the principles which could allow this to happen. ' In 
1611, the Edinburgh council protested against a revival of the anti- 
usury 'poenall laws which have heirtofoir beine left in... deswetude'; 
what this meant was that only a small number of laws might be attended 
to at any one time, yet dormant ones might easily take on renewed 
1, E. g, TA, 1601-04, SRO, 621/76, fo, 78r,; RPC, vi, 353,542, 
2, APS, Iii, 301, c, 17 (reissuing 4/'S, ii, 51, c, 29; 495, c, 15); RPC, iv, 608, 
3, Balfour, Practick Sir Thosaa Hope, Mafor practirks, /608-1633,2 vole,, ad, 
J, A, Clyde (Stair Society, 1937-38); Stair, lmrtltatiomr, 87-88, 
1, Craig, A& /Achle, I, 8,9, 
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life. ' This happened in England too, where there was no desuetude; 
the Scots were surprised in 1602 when a campaign against their cloth 
exports was launched under a statute of Edward IV. 2 The interest in 
old statutes means that it is normal to find that the contemporary 
editions of the statutes have been heavily annotated: legislation back 
to the reign of James I continued to attract attention 2' 
In extreme cases of permissive legislation, no enforcement was 
envisaged at all. Local authorities were not being invited to enforce 
the law; the subjects were being invited to comply with it. In 1579, 
a law was passed requiring all members of the propertied classes to 
possess bibles and psalm books. 4 Possibly some law-abiding citizens 
went out and bought them as a result;. but nobody can have expected 
punishment if they did not. True, a 'sercheour' was appointed in 1580 
with power to enforce the law in Edinburgh; ß but if this was ever 
widely known it was soon forgotten. In 1584, the exiled presbyterian 
minister James Xelville was in Newcastle attending to the spiritual 
welfare of a group of nobles who had been forced to flee, he felt, for 
their loyalty to presbyterian principles. He told them of the need 
for bibles and psalm books, but he did not mention the legal obligation 
to possess them. Indeed, he limited his advice to saying 
I, Quoted in S, 6, E, Lythe, rho ecunay of Scotland in its Eurvmn salting, iSSO- 
l6. S (Edinburgh, 1960), 106, 
2. Nicclson to the English privy council, 22 May 1602, CSP Scut,, xiii, 987, 
3. E. g. 4ctis and cunslitutiounis of tha rnalna of Scotland,,,, copies in NLS, 
Ry, 111. c, 200-2), ä, 33, c, 21(1-7), H, 33, c, 21, 
4, r1PS, iii, 139, c, 10, 
5. RSS, vii, no, 2396, 
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that 'everie an that can reid' should have then. ' 
Huch effort went into fine-tuning the penalties, even for the most 
unenforceable laws. For the bibles and psalm books law, for instance, 
the penalty was £10, scrupulously divided up: one third to the king's 
commissioner and two thirds to the poor of the parish .2 No doubt the 
scale of the penalty reflected parliament's view of the seriousness of 
the offence; there were also pious efforts to provide incentives for 
action. In 1579, the law against carrying firearms was re-enacted 
with the penalty reduced from lose of the right hand to a t10 fine, 'be 
reasons of the pane of deith or demembering quhilk the ordiner juges 
has bene faith to execute'. 3 
Mention of financial penalties leads us to the fifth tendency within 
the laws: fiscalism. One eager hope of many laws was to make money. 
In fact almost all laws had an eye to the fiscal possibilities. Fines 
were lucrative; so was the sale of exemption licences. Kark 
Acheson's real crime was not to export grain, but to do so without 
paying for a licence. It is worth pondering that modern governments 
disapprove of tobacco so such that they... ban it? No, they tax it. 
This administrative problem was the same in the reign of the author of 
the CounterbIaste to tobacca an import ban had soon to be replaced by 
a monopoly of tobacco imports. ' Monopolies had clear fiscal 
1, Melville, Diary, 183, 
2, APS, iti, 139, c, 10, 
3. RPS, iii, 29-30, c, 23; 146, c, 25, 
4, Lythe, Ecomay of Scotland, 86-87, 
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potential; if they were not paid for in cash, they were distributed as 
rewards. One interesting case is the 1599 scheme to import weapons, 
run by Michael Balfour of Burleigh: a law was passed requiring the 
propertied classes to possess weapons, and he was given a monopoly of 
importing them. He used the courts assiduously to drag in unwilling 
customers, but he failed to make money - partly because the crown 
granted many suspensions of obligation to buy. Or did it sell these 
suspensions? The potential ramifications of fiscalisa are endless. ' 
The fiscal use of laws did not even have to be legal. New customs 
rates were issued on privy council authority in 1811: they included 
1,10 per chalder on export of great coal .2 This was curious, since the 
export of great coal was illegal under statutes of 1563 and 1579, which 
had been repeatedly reissued, most recently in 1609.0 Possibly the 
ban was still in force to countries other than England - the king's 
main motive in obtaining the 1609 reissue was to ensure a good supply 
of Scottish coal for London - but the point remains. ' If many laws 
were partly fiscal in their aims, some were almost entirely so. In 
1575 a new law on salt production lifted a two-year old export ban; 
but in return it required exporters to purchase signet licences, and 
ordered all salt masters to provide six bolls a week to the crown at 
fixed prices for domestic resale. E 
i, For the arrour isport schese, see chapter 7, 
2, RFC, ix, pp, lxv-lxvi, 
3. AP$, ii, 513, c, 22; iii, 147, c. 28; RPC, viii, 232; J, U, Ntf, rho rise of the 
British coil imA try, ii (London, 1932), 226, 
4, RPC, viii, 547, For sore on export policy, sae chapter 6, 
S. +QPS, iii, 82, c. 3; 93-94, 
Par! }amant and the Jaw 94 
The sixth type of law is the large group for which implementation was 
negotiable. No doubt the salt export law was preceded by discussions 
with the salt masters; but many laws were followed by negotiation. 
This is the reality behind Good Counsel's advice (standard in medieval 
times) that a king's duty 
Is for to do erarilk sin Justice, 
And for to six his Justice with . orci,, 
out rigour, favour or parcialitis, ' 
The admixture of mercy to justice is most noticeable in the field of 
criminal law. The law might prescribe a specific punishment for a 
specific offence; but the privy councillors, to whoa usually fell the 
thankless task of coping with feuds, were desperately willing to 
overlook offences if this would reduce future trouble from powerful 
families. -- Any means, coercive or conciliatory, would be adopted on a 
pragmatic basis. 3 In 1579, John Boswell of Auchinleck complained that 
he feared 'bodilie harm' from John Crawford of the Shaw and other 
Crawfords. Although there had already been 'divers bluidscheddis 
betuix thame', the privy council passed over these crimes and merely 
ordered the Crawfords to give lawburrows that they would not harm him 
further .4 The council was relatively uninterested in the letter of the 
law: in enforcing law and order, the stress was very much on achieving 
order. If mercy to either side was exercised without this legitimate 
1. Lindsay, 'Thria estaitis', 187, 
2, Brown, SlWferai, ch, 9, 
3,8, Lenean 5 6, Parker, 'Cries and control in Scotland, 1500-1800', History 
Today, 30, no, 1 (January 1980), 15, 
4, RPC, lit, 148-49, 
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aim it might degenerate into illegitimate 'rigour, favour or 
parcialitie'. This was, perhaps, class-based law: the peasant 
murderer could expect no mercy, whereas the noble could obtain a 
remission at a price. On the other hand, when such a small fraction 
of crimes came before the courts, perhaps a higher proportion of 
nobles' crimes did so. 
If remissions were available at a price, how was that price negotiated? 
First of all, for a case of slaughter, it had to be preceded by 
assythement - compensation to relatives of the victim. That required 
one set of negotiations. At Justice ayres, further negotiations would 
follow with 'lords componitors' on the price of a remission. ' 
Remissions were only available from the crown, but one of the 
administrative problems of the period was the ease of obtaining one at 
court by pulling the right strings - sometimes (and this was the key 
point) without satisfying victims. Regular acts ordered that no 
remissions would be given for a year, three years, five years - these 
orders probably came at tines when the privy council was asserting its 
influence 2 The problem was not newt parliament had demanded a 
moratorium on remissions in 3473.3 In practice it was hard to 
overturn even a dubious reaission. 4 
1, J, iloraald, 'Bloodfeud, kindred and govarnsent in early sodirn Scotland', Fast 
anal Presort, 87 (May 1980), 82, 
2, E. g, TA, Kii, 14; R'$, iii, 67; 298, c, 12; 426; 457, c, 54, pars 4; 575, 
c, 67; iv, 18-19, c, 16, 
3, Macdougall, James 111,99, 
4, E. g, Pitcairn, Trills, ii, 1,97, 
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Remissions have a large fiscal component: James V prosecuted some 
nobles merely in order to seil remissions to them. ' The fiscal 
connection is even clearer with 'unlaws' and 'wills' in the court of 
justiciary - the rather rudimentary central criminal court. 'Unlaws' 
were the occasional, but sometimes substantial, compositions for fines; 
'wills' were the penalties imposed on those who 'came in the will' of 
the monarch, submitting without a trial in the hope of more lenient 
treatment 2 Edward Johnstone, burgess of Edinburgh, came in the 
king's will for treasonable behaviour during the 1596 tolbooth riot. 
The king's will was that since he himself owed huge sums to the 
goldsmith Thomas Foulis; and since Foulis owed 8,000 marks to 
Johnstone; Johnstone should not pursue Foulis for the 8,000 marks (or 
for any interest payments) until the king had paid Foulis. Johnstone 
probably never saw his money again. for was that all, for his escheat 
was granted to a courtier, George Home of Spott, who mulcted him of 
another 3,500 merles. =' These complex transactions, involving four 
different parties, must have involved careful negotiation. 
By law, of course, Johnstone could have been executed for treason. But 
some laws were not implemented fully because they were too general. 
They were reserve weapons; and this is the seventh and final category. 
Treason, for instance, was what the king said it was: as Janes VI 
advised his eon, `I remitte to your owns chaise to punish or pardons 
I. Donaldson, Jass V- James VII, 53, 
Z, TM, xii, p, xxviii. 
3, Pitcairn, Trials, ii, 1,33-34, For the significance of Foulis' debts at this 
tie*, see chapter 4. 
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therein. " The supreme penalty was hardly ever paid. Censorship 
laws were similar: there was frequent criticism of James, but he let 
many hostile comments pass without invoking the statutes .2 In an 
effort to suppress presbyteries, the Black Acts of 1584 banned all 
assemblies, prompting Calderwood's complaint that 'there is no 
particular specificatioun of the Judgments and assembleie heere called 
in questioun... commoun laves should be cleere, to assure the subjects 
certanelie what sould be done or left undone'. ' Arran knew it was in 
his interests to leave things vague. 
This discussion of the implementation of acts has focused on the acts 
the government wanted implemented. Chapter 3 takes this further by 
looking at the available executive institutions. Xeanwhile, there is 
another way of approaching the acts: 
All saneir of pan I vairne that be opprast, 
Cut and coaplaine and thay salbe redrest. 
For quhy, it is the nobill princes will, 
That ilk cospleiner sail gif in his bill, ' 
Not all acts were government ones; many were inspired by the various 
sectional and individual interests that swarmed round parliament, 
bombarding it with petitions. When parliament was held in Stirling 
castle, 'it wes allegeit that thair wes na frie acces nor libertie to 
i, Janas VI, Basilican dorm, 1,64-£5, 
2, For censorship policy, sae chapter 7, 
3, APS, iii, 293, c, 4; Caldarvood, Xislurr, iv, 64, 
4, Lindsay, 'Thrie estaitis', 233. 
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the saidis liegeis to frelie repair and resort to our said soverane 
lord, his thrie estatis and lordis of articulie`. ' Were these lieges 
seeking private acts, and if so how did they differ from public ones? 
The question may appear simple - but in fact the answer is that 
private acts were public, and that public acts were private. 
To explain this, perhaps it is best to begin by asking who drafted the 
acts. We rarely know, but it is usually assumed that government 
measures were framed by the privy council or the lords of the articles, 
and other measures by interested parties? such an assumption can take 
us a long way, though we shall see that it fails us in the end. 
Drafting could be a lot of work: Chancellor Maitland and the king were 
at work on the legislation of July 1587 by April 1586.3 We have seen 
that the court of session also played an important role in inspiring 
civil law statutes. Parliament does not seem to have had its own 
institutional draftsmen like the Lords' and Commons' clerks in England, 
though the clerk register, as the official in charge of the 
parliamentary paperwork, was involved in receiving petitions. ' Unless 
the measure was a government one from the start, its drafting may have 
been left to the lobbyists: the convention of royal burghs in 1592 
paid 10 crowns to William Scott, the writer who had drafted recent 
statutes for it, as well as £100 to the clerk register for seeing them 
1, Afs, tti, 94, c, l, 
2, N. Gow, 'The character of Scots acts', JR, new ur, 7 (1962), 41, 
3, Lee, Haitla#f of Thirlestan', 92, 
1, Neale, Elizabethan huts of c owns, 322; A. L. Murray, 'The lord clerk 
register', SMc'S3 (1974), 135. 
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through parliament. ' Many private acts embodied petitions, converted 
into acts with a few standard phrases: 'Anent the supplicatioun gevin 
in and presentit to our soverane lord and thrie estaitis... aakand 
mentioun that... as at mair lenth is contenit in the said supplicatioun; 
quhilk being hard and considerit be ours said soverane lord... ' - and 
parliament's decision would be tacked on to the end 2 
Xany statutes thus provided work for lawyers like William Scott even 
before they were passed: lawyers were often hired by lobbyists, like 
the Edinburgh craft deacons when they sought better representation an 
the burgh council. ' Others relied on their own talents, like the 
Edinburgh council itself which appointed a committee of six leading 
burgesses to prepare legislation 'for the weill of the toun' in 1593. ° 
These may not have been commercial matters: town government was, 
after all, government, and when the council decided in 1595 that 
seduction was too common in the burgh they drew up an article against 
it for parliament. E An Edinburgh skinner was admitted to the guild 
'fre for 40s deburst of befoir for ratificatioun of the act of 
parliament', probably the act of 1594 which ratified an earlier act 
against exports of calf and kid skins, hutherons and shorelings. 6 
1, RCRB, i, 382-83, 
2, uPS, iii, 498, c, 108, 
3, Lynch, £dinbdrgh, 61, 
4, £din, Rsts,, v, 90, 
5, £din, Rem, v, 141, 
6, V. Angus (ad, ), 'The incorporated trade of the skinners of Edinburgh, with 
extracts froa their minutes, 1549-1603', "C6 (1413), 74-75; AP S, iv, 75-76, 
c, 47. 
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Lobbying had its sorrows as well as its joys. the skinners spent over 
£43 on 'fortificatioun of the act anent the purssis' in May 1599, but no 
such act emerged from the convention of that date. ' Probably the 
number of petitions was growing - after all, the number of statutes 
was; if so, this may help explain the parliamentary committee (four 
members from each estate) set up in 1594 to weed out unwanted 
petitions 20 days before parliament met .2 
As well as these statutes which benefited a particular interest group - 
and in the last analysis, what statute does not benefit an interest 
group? - there were acts in favour of (or against) private individuals. 
Acts naming specific people fell into a number of categories. By far 
the largest was the de-luxe charter. These were ratifications of 
possession of property; the beneficiaries would return home clutching 
extracts from the parliamentary roll which looked very auch like the 
charters they already had. Secondly, there were the former rebels who 
took advantage of a period of national reconciliation to obtain a 
remission or restoration, often in the form of admission to the 1573 
pacification of Perth. Almost all these were between 1578 and 1585, 
with a foretaste in the parliament of April 1567 when the Gordons' 
restoration was ratified. These acts had often been preceded by a 
third type: parliamentary forfeiture. Finally, a fourth type was the 
parliamentary adjudication - least common, but sometimes most 
revealing. Sometimes one party or the other would bring the case back 
3, Angus (ed, ), 'Skinners of Edinburgh', 99, 
2, APS, iv, 69, c, 28, 
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time and again to parliament - the record perhaps being the dispute 
over the escheat of William Maitland of Lethington, pursued between his 
father Richard and David Hoge of Fishwick over four acts between 1578 
and 1584. ' 
All the cases in which an individual benefits can be divided into just 
two categories by asking: at whose expense? If people were prepared 
to go to the trouble and cost of obtaining an act of parliament, they 
clearly expected to gain by it. The ostensibly uncontroversial 
ratification of A's possession may well be a weapon in a struggle 
against B. Similarly the restoration of a former rebel may mean that 
someone else had to disgorge their grant of that rebel's escheat. 
These acts are really little different from those which explicitly 
decide between the disputed rights of A and B. 
The case is different, however, if A benefits at the expense of the 
crown. This would be so for some restorations of former rebels, if 
their lands were still in crown hands. The act making an exception 
from a general revocation of crown lands also in effect ratifies a 
grant received (perhaps indirectly) fron the crown. Similarly the 
confirmation of a great seal charter may simply be a promise that the 
crown will not attempt to reclaim a recent grant: 
Thou sail have yairly for thy hyra 
The teind aussallis of the ferne syra, 
Confirait in Parliaaant, 2 
APS, iii, III, c. 31; 162-63, cc, 45-46; 354-56, c, 17; cf, bit, FPtliaaeafs, 
471-72. 
4, Lindsay, 'Thrte sstaitts', 181, 
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Elton argues persuasively that many general acts in England were the 
product of private initiative. His claim that there were no private 
acts in Scotland is less than persuasive, but by now it is worth asking 
whether and where a line can be drawn. ' It is even clearer in 
Scotland that general acts could be privately sponsored, when so much 
legislation was obviously inspired by a particular estate. -- James VI, 
who was in a position to know, wrote that parliament could be 'the 
injustest judgement-seate that may bee, being abused to mens 
particulars: irrevocable decreits against particulars parties being 
given therein under colour of generall laws'. 3 Such a 'generell law' 
might be the act of 1584 against ministers holding legal office - 
tacitly directed against Robert Pont, a dissident Xelvillian minister 
who was also a session judge. ' 
So general laws were not necessarily public. How far were the acts 
applying to individuals really private? Forfeitures, remissions, 
ratifications: it was the government that was forfeiting people, de- 
forfeiting them, or exempting them from revocations, and while some of 
these acts may have been concessions to the just claims of an isolated 
individual, there is no reason to suppose that they all were. All acts 
affected individual people, and acts in which individuals were named 
were no less the product of an overall government policy. 
i, 6. R, Elton, 'Tudor governiantt the points of contact; 1; parliasant', TAWS, 
5th sar, 24 (1974), 191-92, 
2, Chapter 1, 
3, Jasas VI, 8n111r0n o7rorr, 1,60-61, 
4, APS, iii, 294, c, 6; Brunton 1 Haig, Serialars of the roll of Justicr, 152, 
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This is particularly clear for royal revocations, by which the crown 
attempted to reclaim crown lands granted out during royal minorities. 
These acts were in theory general, but many revocation statutes 
incorporated individual exceptions obtained in advance by the best- 
connected courtiers, and were followed by other parliamentary 
exceptions as more people sought secure guarantees for possession of 
former crown lands. ' Vhether they were general acts, or acts 
concerning particular individuals, is an inextricably tangled question; 
but whatever the answer, revocations were undoubtedly a component of a 
general policy attempting to revive the crown's ancient landholdings .2 
Parliamentary ratifications, as guarantees for private property, were 
essentially political rather than legal. 3 There was a technical 
Justification for parliamentary exceptions from a royal revocations 
they amounted to an alienation of crown lands, and the accepted law was 
that only parliament could do this. But other parliamentary 
ratifications had limited legal force. The key question was always: 
what about the rights of others? This is where the adjudications 
between the disputed claims of A and B do differ from the simple 
ratifications to A: if the dispute was admitted, both parties could 
hope to get a fair hearing and the resulting act, though still 
legislative in form, might well have a judicial character. ' Otherwise, 
1, E. g. 4PS, iii, 307-10, c. 26, 
2. Chapter 4. 
3, Soirc's arad literature of Scats 1ar, 14. 
4, V. B. Gray, 'The Judicial proceedings of the parliaaants of Scotland, 1660-1668', 
IR 36 (1924), 142-43, 
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parliaient could not be expected to look at the small print of A's 
in. feftsent, and ratifying it sight well do injustice to B. The court 
of session coaplained in 1587 about the difficulty of overturning 
unjustly-obtained parliamentary ratifications, and obtained an act 
declaring it to be 'ca petent to the reductioun of all sic 
infeftaentis". ' In 1542 parliament declared that the ratifications it 
had Just passed would not 'hurt nor dirogat the particular richtis of 
other partits', and another act made ratifications invalid without the 
treasurer's signature= In the seventeenth century, parliaments 
regularly declared that ratifications should be salvo furs cufuslibet. 
äackenzie was cure about this rule for most ratifications, but not 
about whether it applied to lands subject to revocation. ' In other 
cases, judges were ordered to try cases on the situation obtaining 
before the ratification. " But if this had always happened, it would 
haue made the parliamentary ratification pointless - clearly it 
continued to have an effect, if only as a blunt instrument. 
In 1585, £daa Hepburn of Bonhard secured the cancellation of a statute 
of the previous year. as it had been 'purchest upoun sinister 
inforsatiarn'. ' Vhat was sinister, however, was the information rather 
than the purchase, In England, the best definition of private acts 
I. A'S, 111,29, c. 22. 
2.4"S, M. 641, c. 38; 663, c. 12. 
3. Rutsnzis, ýsrrrrýttoas, 281. 
ý. Cray, 'Judicial proc oWtogs of the pirltskats of Scotland', 143. 
Ail, iii, 420, c. K. 
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was simply that fees were paid for them. ' Ye can catch a glimpse of 
what such acts cost in Scotland: some of those who obtained 
ratifications in 1592 paid their fees direct to the treasurer . -2 Among 
than were Patrick Vaus of Barnbarroch, who paid £13 6s 8d for approval 
of his proceedings as an ambassador to Denmark; ' Villias Keith of 
Delny, who paid t33 6e 8d for a ratification of his property - an act, 
incidentally, omitted from the Acts of the parliaments of Scotland 
and the young earl of Xaray, who paid £40 for two acts, one suspending 
his creditors' actions against him during his minority, and another 
ratifying his lordship of Douna. s These were payments to the crown, 
as crown rights were involved in these cases; officials also expected 
a reward for their services, and we have seen the clerk register in 
1592 collecting £100 from the convention of royal burghs for favouring 
some recent statutes .0 
Finally, it uy be that these burgh statutes included some of the least 
controversial private acts. It Jr. perhaps because it was so 
unastanlshing that mat such can be said here about the parliamentary 
ratification of Dalkeith's bridge tolls, needed to pay for repairs to 
I. Neale, (JIzi rrtAja h»so of c, a. mr, 323. 
2. TA loves 3 fwlvtlle duplicate), 1590-92, SRO, E22/8, fos. 92r. -92v. 
3.4'S, iii, "I-69, c. 49. Peter Young, the other aabassador favoured by this act, 
IIHs not to have had to pay. 
4. Extract act of parlis. nt, S&0, PAT/1/4S, The act ratifies a great seal 
charter: AM, v, so. 162S. 
6. VSS iii, 628, c. 166; 529-36, c. 168. 
6. AG S i, 382-83. 
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two bridges. ' It night be regretted by those who had to pay, but they 
knew that bridge repair benefited everyone. The Tay bridge at Perth, 
Indeed, was considered important enough for nationwide taxation to be 
imposed to repair it. 2 But many such acts were surely among those 
that Lindsay of Pitscottie had in mind as he concluded his account of 
the legislation of a convention of estates: 'many uther actis var maid 
quhllk var tedious to rehers'. " 
I. WS, iv, 8S, c. 73. 
2. . 'S, iii, 148, c. 21. 
3. Pttstottis. Nlrlorls, il, 320. 
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Chapter 3 
PABLIAIIBIT AND THE EXECUTIVE 
In 1585, it was felt necessary to pass a law saying simply that the 
law should be enforced. ' It saw the problem as 'aisknawlege of his 
hienes laves and actis of parliament' and the 'negligent erecutioun of 
the pants thal. rof'. But surely, especially now that the statutes were 
printed, the 'Jugeis officiaris and ministeris of the lawes' did know 
the law - or at least could find it out if it was important? And 
surely they were not negligent when it came to their own interests? 
We have seen that zany statutes were implemented only partially, if at 
all. But historians have passed beyond the stage of deploring this as 
'lawlessness'. Clearly, if laws were passed and then ignored, this was 
because one social group or institution wanted them - but they 
threatened other groups or institutions which were in a position to 
block their operation. So when we consider the implementation of any 
act, we have to ask: who welcomes it, and who is hostile? What 
follows is a discussion of the administrative machinery available to 
sixteenth-century legislators: partly to Gee how able it was in 
general to make people dance to its tune, but mainly to show that the 
administration itself was not all playing the same tune. 
The gain adzinistrative conflict was between centre and localities. 
£cae adzinistratcre had deep local roots; others were more dependent 
1.4'S, iii, 375, c. 2, 
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on the centre. Of course, even privy councillors had local interests, 
and a rigid line can never be drawn; but there is value in the 
distinction. This was a period of state-building in Europe: 
government was increasingly carried on by a professional bureaucracy, 
dependent on the crown rather than on the nobility. The nobility 
themselves relied more on the state, drawing income from state 
subsidies. While they retained control over their estates, their local 
political power was whittled away to be replaced by a share in deciding 
the direction of government policy as a whole. ' In Scotland, Lee has 
argued that the late sixteenth century saw the construction of a 
'Stewart despotism'? These administrative questions have a direct 
bearing on the question of absolutism, raised in chapter 1. 
L. L. Brown has pointed out that in the late fifteenth century, 'an earl 
at court sight achieve sore in five minutes' than the clerk register 'at 
umpteen meetings of the council'. ' That was still true a century 
later; but it only applied to policy-making, for even an earl could not 
tspleaent the policy in five minutes, and with the expansion of 
government, the administrators became increasingly important. Robles 
never ceased to sake and remake government policy, in the interests of 
themselves, their kin groups, their factions and their class; but by 
the sixteenth century they were reluctantly beginning to rely on a 
centralized government machine to implement rather more of their 
policies. 
1. Kiernan, Stitt imf society, 6. 
2. Lee, Iliitiand of ThirltstirM'. 
3. A. L. Bronn, 'The Scottish 'estabiishsent' in the later 15th century', JR, now 
sec. 23 (1978), 105, 
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The key to centralization was information-gathering, an effort to 
persuade local authorities to report on their activities; in later ages 
it would be statistics. luny reports had an additional importance as 
financial accounts. The sheriffs and other eesi-Independent local 
authorities were hounded to demonstrate that they were doing their Job 
properly - that is, doing it in the way the privy council, exchequer 
and other central bodies expected. 
The traditional local authorities often had other ideas about how to do 
their Jobs properly - ideas which commanded much local support, 
otherwise they would have been swept away. Once we stop looking only 
through the eyes of central government, and adapting its attitude to 
the localities, we find that Scotland's centuries old local institutions 
made sense. They had not been set up primarily to implement a wide 
range of statutes, for at that time there had been few statutes and 
central government had made few demands on them. But the concepts of 
permissive legislation and negotiated implementation, developed in the 
previous chapter, should remind us that statutes could be implemented 
quite successfully by traditional authorities, sensitive to local 
conditions and to the needs of local elites. 
Executive authorities can be divided into three types. First, there 
were traditional local courts, which had established their authority in 
the days before statute case to dominate the law; they were often 
reluctant to adapt to an environment of flux, driven by the constant 
evolution of government policy. Then there were the locally-based 
administrators whose authority derived more directly from the crown or 
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sole other national source, who sight be agents of centralization - but 
who night also be drawn by their local connections into co-operating 
with the traditional regime. Finally there were the expanding central 
courts and councils in Edinburgh. How did each fare, and how 
successful were the local administrators in maintaining control aver 
how, when and whether they would implement statutes? 
The main rural administrators, of course, were the sheriffs. They had 
long escaped fron crown control: all were hereditary in the sixteenth 
century except Orkney and Shetland, where the crown had little 
influence. ' James VI raw 'no present reaedie' for heritable 
Jurisdictions, which were "the greatest hinder to the execution of our 
law'. 2 But in what way? Were they amateur? But at least their 
Justice was comprehensible to non-literate people, in contrast to the 
arcane jargon of Edinburgh professionals. Were they partisan? But 
in a feuding and locally-oriented age this was easy to understand, and 
it was even possible to develop mechanisms to counteract it. The idea 
that Justice could be abstract was a hard one to grasp. 
The sheriffs' popularity was declining, and some of them lacked the 
"Strang hand' necessary to do the job. 3 More people were going to 
Edinburgh to seek law. This is a trend that pre-dates government 
interest in administrative centralization: there had been a demand for 
central justice throughout the fifteenth century, and often the council 
1. Ja. es Madill I John 8kllfnd. n, Iisrcirs pirtIculidrr d'Estass+r, id. T. Thossae 
(Bannatyni Club, 1824), 12. 
2. J& s VI, SasiIIAd7 dmoff, 1,89-89. 
3. jVS, iv, 145, c. 48. 
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had not been at all pleased at litigants coming to bother them. By 
the mid-sixteenth century, this had changed: a professional court of 
session was actively seeking to extend its influence over the 
localities, for instance by advocating cases from the sheriffs' courts. ' 
Attempts were also made to integrate sheriffs themselves into a central 
system. There was no intrinsic reason why they should not abandon 
their local roots to become components of an absolutist administrative 
system, for such systems were usually marked by bureaucracies in which 
the offices were a species of personal property - often heritable 
property .2 Sheriffs were regularly prodded to keep registers of 
hornings, and to produce them centrally: most sheriffs (sometimes 
sheriff clerks> were asked for them seven times between 1585 and 
1602. ß Once, despairing of the sheriffs, the order went out that those 
obtaining letters of horning should themselves give the names in to the 
treasurer. ' The heaviest pressure was applied at the end of the 
century, as in 1598, when all sheriffs were summoned personally to 
explain why they were not enforcing hornings - there is no record that 
any came. r, The story of the establishment of the register of sasines, 
which would allow easier determination of land disputes centrally, is a 
i, Balfour, Practitk3, if, 340-42, 
2, Anderson, Absolutist state, 33, 
3, TA, 1535-86, SRO, £21/64, fo, 93r,; TA, 1586-87, SRO, E21/65, ¬os, 72v,, 78v., 
79v,; TA, 1588-90, SRO, £21167, fa, 211v,; TA, 1593-96, &RO, 621170, fos, i4ly  ION,; TA, 1693-99, SRO, 621172, fos, 9iv, -92r  TA, 1601-04, SRO, £21176, fos. 
91v,, 104r, 
4, TA, 1593-96, SRO, 621170, fo, 184r, 
S. RPC, v, 440; cf, TA, 1599-1600, SRO, 621173, fos, 79v,, 100v,; TA, 1600-01, 
SRO, 621174, fos, 44r,, 55v,; i, I, Rae, the ar i#istratio, of the Scottish 
frontier, ! SMI-/ Oi (Edinburgh, 1966), 14, 
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parallel one: the sheriffs and the localities fought it successfully 
all through the sixteenth century. A proposed statute in 1592 was not 
enacted. ' A notaries' boycott even forced the abolition of the first 
register (1599-1649), but the localities had to concede defeat in 1617.2 
Sheriffs' executive officers, the mairs or officers of arms, came in for 
such central attention. Skene had some home truths about hereditary 
mairs 'quha knawis nacht their office, bot ar idle personas, and onely 
data diligence in taking up of their fees'? ' Attempts were made to 
check officers' corruption in summoning assizes - even if not actually 
partisan, they could be bribed to leave names out. A cut in officers' 
numbers was ordered by a statute of 1587, which stressed that they 
should be men of substantial property. ' But attempts to implement 
this met with local resistance at justice ayres the following pears the 
assizes, who were usually alleged to suffer from officers' extortion, 
were willing to get rid of a corrupt individual but refused to give 
names for a general purge .6 
Below the sheriff was the private jurisdiction of the baron court. 
Central government rarely asked for its involvement in implementing 
1. Draft act for registration of sasinas, probably 1592, SRO, PA7/1/39-40, 
2, APS, iv, 184-85; 237-38, c, 36; L. Ockrant, Land rights an e'ngiilry into the 
history of registration for p0licattun in Scotland (London, 1942), 69-70; 
Introduction to Scottish lawl history, 33. 
3, Skens, ©PS, s. v, sarus, 
4, AFS, Iii, 449-58, c, 30; 1,0. Villock, The' origins and &relepwnt of the jury 
in Scotland (Stair Society, 1966), 160-51; cf, APS, 111,143-44, c, 14; 664-66, 
c, 29, 
5, Questions at a Justice court, 17 April 1588, BL, Add, MS 333,631, fos, 217-18, 
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statutes. This was a period of some decline for the baron court, as 
feuing weakened traditional rural ties, before it was revived as an 
engine of seigneurial control in a modernizing agrarian regime. ' Like 
sheriffs, baron courts were suffering incursions by the court of 
session into their jurisdiction, which increasingly used advocation to 
remove complex or serious cases from then .2 
A bigger problem for the centralizers was the type of baronial 
jurisdiction known as a regality. Regahities covered about half the 
country - about the same as in Spain. ' They usually excluded the 
crown's brieves and justice ayres, except in cases of treason and 
witchcraft; they might also exclude the judicial authority of the 
sheriff, equally local but technically public. Sheriffs could enter 
regalities to collect taxes, however: 4 as they probably could on other 
non-judicial matters like the implementation of the poor law. Such 
administrative matters, rather than the provision of justice, were 
becoming relatively more important to central government. But 
regalities were still alive and well in this period. In 1587, the act 
of annexation of church temporalities returned ecclesiastical regalities 
to the crown, though many had to be re-granted. 1 Revocations may 
i, HAD. Sanderson, Scottish rural society in the sixteenth century (Edinburgh, 
1982), 18; I. D. Vhyta, Agriculture and society In sarw iewth-century Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1979), 44-15; fitchison, lordship to patronage, 81, 
2, Court Look of the barony of Carnath, IS24%Iü2, sd, Y, C, Dickinson (SHS, 1937), 
p, xlvi, 
3, L. naan S Parker, 'Cris* and control', 13; Kiernan, State and society, 26-27, 
4, Chapter S. 
S. #'S, tit, 431-37, c, 8, 
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also have regained some for the royalty. ' The crown exploited its 
established right to take treason cases out of regalities' hands, 
creating a new series of 'statutory treasons' in parliament: theft or 
retying by landowners; murder under trust; saying mass; fire-raising 
in coal workings; resetting of Jesuits or seminary priests; brawls in 
law courts; and refusing a new alloy coinage .2 This may have 
circumvented a few of the regalities' privileges, but a well-established 
regality could always defend itself against frontal attack: when the 
king's lieutenant, Lennox, took over Spynie regality in 1594, be was 
obliged to preside over a spate of acquittals .3 In 1849 feuars were 
allowed to buy themselves out of regalities. ° 
Scotland's rural courts had deep roots; but how numerous were they? 
Counting both sheriffs and sheriff deputes, assuming that sheriffdoas 
had between one and three sheriff deputes along the lines of a statute 
which classified the sheriffdoms in 1587, and adding a few stewards 
and bailies, there may have been about 75. E England in 1580 had 1,738 
justices of the peace .6 Assuming (very roughly) a population of four 
million, and not counting English sheriffs and lord lieutenants, that 
makes one local administrator for every 2,300 people. If Scotland's 
1, fQPS, Lit, 441, c, 14. 
2, APS, iti, 451, c, 34; 545, c, 14; 576, c, 68; iv, 17, c, 11; 22, c, 22; 48-49; 
cl, Stair, 1, tiifutiini, 640-41. 
8, 'Extracts fron the register of the regality court of Spynia, 1592-1601', ad, 
J. Stuart, Spalding CJ N1sCnllanr, it (1842), 122-26. 
4, ltakey, Ctwrrh of thr Coronjnt, 80, 
5, APS, 111,458-61, c, 57, 
6, A. G. R. Saith, rho vornaerrt of ElizabithJR frigland (London, 1967), 90, 
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parallel administrators were divided among a population of one million, 
that would give one for every 13,000 people, only a fifth of England's 
administrative potency. France had one crown official per 4,500 
people as early as 1515 - and these were more subject to central 
direction than either Scotland's or England's. ' The Scottish record 
would seen more impressive if the concentration of administrative 
resources in the Lowlands was taken into account; but this would still 
leave even Lowland Scotland with less than half England's local 
administrators, while the Highlands, as we shall see, had virtually 
none. Nor did the number of administrators rise in this period, 
though a fifty per cent rise would have been needed Just to keep pace 
with population. (In England, the JPs' numbers were growing faster 
than the population. ) As we shall see, there was growth in Scottish 
administration; but the traditional rural local government was 
stagnating. 
Urban local government was similar in some ways. The royal burghs 
represented localism at its most entrenched .2 They had gained very 
considerable independence. They taxed themselves and collected their 
own burgh fermes, accounting to the government merely for a fired sum. 
Their officers were all (in theory and usually in practice) locally 
elected, and the only significant crown official in a burgh was the 
custumar. 
The government rarely had the problem of compelling burgh courts to 
i, Saloon, Society In crisis, 79, 
2, Cl, Lynch, 'The crown and the burghs'. 
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implement its statutes. Many of the burghs' concerns - over local 
trading privileges, over regulation of burgess-ship, over apprentices 
and the like - were not concerns of the government. ' If any laws 
were passed an these subjects, they were initiated and supervised by 
the convention of royal burghs, as when the convention ordered its 
members in 1580 to enforce eight statutes passed in the previous year's 
parliament .2 Government was only drawn in, as a mediator, when the 
burghs failed to resolve some internal dispute. So long as burgh 
self-management remained stable, central government left well alone. 
In the drama of the creation of a national political community, the 
burghs found themselves drawn towards centre stage. Government 
interference in burghs was growing. Elections were rigged, 
constitutions rewritten, burgesses of rival factions flitted through 
corridors of power and occasionally found themselves in prison or 
worse. This was party politics rather than administration: the issue 
was which party would enjoy the fruits of power. True, many 
administrative problems were largely urban: vagrancy, for instance-3 
But here was where permissive legislation was at its most successful, 
because burgh magistrates could, when they chose, govern quite 
intensively. Parliament was happy to furnish the tools, and let then 
decide whether, when and how to get on with the fob. The Dundee 
magistrates were worrying about incest in 1583, and about regulation of 
their maltmen in 1588: they had no difficulty in obtaining commissions 
1, For policy on these sattere, set chapter 6, 
2. RCR8,1,102-03, 
3, Chapter S. 
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of justiciary to enforce the relevant laws. ' But if they ignored these 
laws in other years, nobody was bothered by it. 
If the burghs were drawn only reluctantly on to the national stage, the 
kirk sessions were never out of place there, and the presbyteries were 
barn with ambitions for a starring role. They are included here as 
local administrators, but in some ways they were not under local 
control at all: they were agents of an active, centralizing general 
assembly, which fashioned them as working parts in a completely new, 
more integrated matrix of national authority. In 1583, for instance, 
Stirling presbytery acknowledged that its acts had to be in line with 
the policy of the general assembly .2 But at this early period, 
presbyteries were still largely independent of central government. 
Church-state conflict initially inhibited the government from trusting 
presbyteries as local administrators. But once the Golden Act had 
recognized them in 1592, presbyteries' co-operation was increasingly 
sought. The court of session was ordered to back up their decisions 
in 1593, and they were authorized to deal with recusants in 1594.3 in 
1594 and 1599 they were asked to report names of adulterous and 
incestuous persons to the treasurer: this would have been a 
significant first step towards integration of church and state social 
control, since such cases formed the largest single element in 
1, Miscellaneous burgh papers, Dundee District Archive A Record Centre, noi, 66,70, 
2, Stirling presbytery records, ii3, 
3. APS, iv, 16-17, c, 7; 62-63, c, 4, 
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presbyteries' business. ' So long as mutual concord was maintained, 
the relationship between presbyteries and central government was 
potentially fruitful. 
Kirk sessions were less of a threat, but the government was slow to 
learn how to use them. They insisted on setting their own course, 
leaving the legislators struggling in their wake: the reverse of the 
traditional view of laws as the beacons of progress which hidebound 
local authorities followed only reluctantly. -- They had potentially a 
wide area of competence: even the grain exporter Mark Acheson, 
mentioned in the last chapter, may have felt the impact of the 
Edinburgh kirk session when in 1594 it was asking the presbytery of 
Haddington to stop grain exports from East Lothian. ' Kirk sessions 
were effective in compelling obedience to their jurisdiction - 
strikingly more so than any other courts, including presbyteries. ' 
The sessions' main interest, of course, was sex: there was a statute 
passed against fornication as early as 1587, but it was not followed up 
centrally, and the sessions themselves seem largely to have ignored 
it. 6 St Andrews kirk session had been punishing fornicators on its 
own authority for more than a generation when, in 1593, it finally 
decided to make its penalties 'aggreabill with the act of parliament'. 6 
1. TA, 1593-96, SRO, E21170, fos, 118v,, 119v,, 123r,; TA, 1699-1600, SRO, E21/73, 
fos, 74v  87v,; Stirling prosbytery racordr, passia, 
2, Cf, Lansan & Parkar, 'Cries and control', 16-17, 
3, McQueen, 'General assembly', 186, 
4, Foster, Church Warir the Covenants, 80, 
S. APS, iii, 25-26, c, 14, 
6, St Andrews kirk cession regiih'r, ii, ad, O. H. Fleming (SHS, 1890), 767, 
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In Aberdeen, fornicators were still being fined £5 into the seventeenth 
century, though the statute had specified £4O., In many parishes, the 
fine would be related to the offender's resources .2 Kirk sessions were 
the only bodies to take rural poor relief at all seriously, but their 
activities on this were invariably quite different from what statute 
required. 3 With their own momentum and their own well-springs of 
authority, they had little need of statutes. The successful 
centralization led by the general assembly remained largely outside the 
government`s control. Scottish absolutism had its limits. 
Despite these often unsympathetic local institutions choking its route, 
the government still had a number of paths to the localities either 
actually or nominally in its control, and it showed increasing skill 
and determination in navigating them. If some of these paths were 
indirect or proved to be dead ends, the Scottish government was not 
alone with this problem. Yhen Philip II wanted to stop the export of 
horses from Spain, he had to turn to the Spanish Inquisition to 
organize border patrols. 4 
To be a credible force in the localities, the government had to show 
itself able to do Justice. Despite the growth of court of session, it 
was still important to bring the courts to the litigants. Nany must 
1, Kirk session accounts, 1617-18, Aberdeen City Archivas, 
2, Foster, Church before the Covenants, 79, 
3, Chapter S. 
4, Kiernan, State and sirlfty, 30, 
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have thought of the central courts the way we think of the European 
Court - important, but would we ever take a case there? For serious 
criminal justice, there were periodic travelling courts: the justice 
ayres. The conventional wisdom is that they were eclipsed after the 
death of James IV and the appointment of the earl of Argyll as 
hereditary justice-general in 1524: in their place emerged a 
rudimentary central criminal court. Justice gyres were then revived 
after an act of 158?. ' But nobody has investigated this view in 
detail. 
It is relatively well known that reports of the death of justice gyres 
were exaggerated. James V, Mary of Guise, and Queen Mary all held 
them personally when they could .2 The Regent Moray made them a 
priority. '-' The coup d'etat of the Ruthven Raiders was made easier in 
1582 because 'many of the consaill' were away 'to hold justice sires in 
dyvers schyres of the contra', according to Sir Janes Melville whose 
job it was to hold the Vest Lothian court. " The best source for 
justice ayres is the treasurer's accounts, which record fines collected 
from major ones. E We also have numerous references in Pitcairn's 
Trials to cases which were continued to justice ayres. It is clear 
that Justice ayres continued to be an established component of central 
i, Intru*rrrtiof to Scottish lag, i history, 39; Willock, Ivry irr Scotliftd, 44; 
#'S, M, 456-61, c, 57, 
2, Donaldson, Jars V- Janis VII, 52,123; R, K, Marshall, Airy of Srrisi (London, 
1977), 207-09, 
3, Melville, l'wir,, 198, 
4, Melville, Meawirs, 276-77; cf, Henry Ytddrington to Valsinghaa, 19 July 1582, 
CSF Scot vi, 143, 
S. Appendix B. 
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justice - until, that is, they fizzled out almost completely in the 
1594s. The question is not whether the 1587 act was successful in 
reviving justice ayre or not, but why they declined. 
Justice ayres, even at their best, hardly offered regular criminal 
Justice for ordinary people. Even if, as seems likely, only the major 
gyres were recorded in the treasurer's accounts, there would still have 
been several years between courts in any one sheriffdom. They were 
held in order to maintain political control by the central government, 
and to raise money: 
For the pure peopill cryis with ciiris, 
The aisusin of justice airi$, 
EXercit : iii for covetica, 
Then for the punisching of vyce, ' 
It was the civil war and its aftermath that saw the most political 
dissent - and the most judicial activity. The Regent Moray in 1569 
extracted 432,085 from the sheriffdoms of Banff and Aberdeen, and in a 
series of courts in the west in 1574 the earl of Argyll hanged eight 
score people, 'although hempe and towe were scant'? Between 1573 and 
1576 the Regent Morton held a series of justice ayres in the south- 
east, in which hundreds were fined for a range of socia-economic crimes 
(like salmon fishing out of season, or cutting green wood) which just 
happened to have been combined with support for the queen's party' 
1, Lindsay, 'Thrie sstaitis', 253, 
T4, xii, 198; Henry Kiliigrer to t 1, July 1574,8L, Cotton MSS, Caligula, 
C, IV,, fus, 271v, -272r. 
3, Tee, xiii, appendix 2. 
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Lindsay of Pitscottie had supported the king, but his distaste 
overflowed in his chronicle: 'their was no thing at that tyme bot 
haulding of justice airis from schere to schare and the puir men war 
hereit and Goddis plaigue rang at this tyme quhat of derth and quhat 
of evill weathir and falsit invy and malice and na creddit all rang at 
this tyme in Scotland'. ' 
An easier and growing alternative to the justice ayre was the issue of 
a commission of justiciary to some private individual, to deal with a 
specified local crime 2 Similar were commissions as sheriffs in bac 
parts: these gave authority to act as sheriff to try a specified case 
in which the regular sheriff was held to have a personal interest. 
These commissions were hardly accountable centrally, and were if 
anything a surrender to local pressure. When this type of commission 
was used in England, it was found to be less effective and more 
partisan than the earlier general eyre. =1 It is true that there are no 
recorded protests such as those quoted above against justice ayres. 
But there were clear signs in the 1580s and 1590s that commissions of 
justiciary were getting out of hand, apparently because the king could 
not say no to anyone who asked for one through the medium of the privy 
chamber. His councillors tried repeatedly to rein him in. Orders 
were issued discharging all current commissions in 1587; again in 
1. Pitscottie, Historie, ii, 312, 
2, Villock, -Jury irr Scotland, 44-45,155. 
3, J. Eeliaiy, Crite and public vr+far Iii England in tho later Middle age; (London, 
1973), 2-3. 
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1592; and in 1594 and 1598. ' The council clashed with the chamber, 
who were 'causing his majeste subscryve sindre hurtfull signatours and 
commissions' in 1590; and again in 1558? 
By the seventeenth century the council had succeeded in staunching the 
flow of commissions of justiciary, perhaps aided by the departure of 
the court, though commissions continued to give local commissioners 
more control over justice than trials in the court of justiciary. '-' 
They had only been abused for want of anything better at a time when 
the demand for justice was heavy. When they threatened to get out of 
control in 1590s, the government failed to steer them in the direction 
it wanted - but it was eventually able to apply the brakes. 
While the central government's distrust of the church remained too 
great for it to promote the powers of the church's existing local 
organization, it was seeking for ways to insert its own representatives 
into the parishes. The Reformation brought a new emphasis on the 
parish as a unit for the management of local society under the 
direction of the ministry, and the civil parish was a creation of this 
period in England., ' The absence of crown-controlled officials at this 
level in Scotland can be pointed up by the exception to the rule. In 
Orkney and Shetland, the bailie was a public, parish official, appointed 
1. TA, 1587-88, SRO, E21/66, fo, 93v  4PS, iii, 556, c, 30; TA, 1593-96, SRO, 
E21/70, fos, 94r, -94Y,; TA, 1598-49, SRO, E21172, fo, 47r, 
2, Melville, M frs, 375; RPC, v, 268-69, For sare on the struggle to control 
the royal signature, sea chapter 4, 
3, C. Larner, frriaies of &oi, the witch-hunt in Scotland (London, 1991), 63, 
#, Elton, Pariiaaa, it of E1Jlarr4 268, 
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by crown or bishop, who held courts, collected rents and headed local 
military musters. ' Clearly a similar network of bureaucrats, 
answerable to Edinburgh, could be of inestimable value in bypassing the 
more remote sheriffs and bringing central government into direct 
contact with the people. 
Before 1560 there had been locally-elected garish clerks .2 They lost 
their authority along with the ecclesiastical structure of which they 
had been a part, but there may have been a plan to continue then under 
central direction; in an isolated but interesting 1588 case, a parish 
clerk was appointed under the privy seal .3A local tax of 1563 for 
repair of parish churches illustrates the flux and experimentation in 
the aftermath of the Reformation. 4 The privy council, charged with 
the implementation of the act, sought to construct a hybrid 
institutional structure involving four different sources of authority: 
a secular, centrally-appointed sheriff in Mo parts (probably covering 
a group of parishes) was to organize the election of assessors by the 
parishioners who were to pay two thirds of the tax. The rest was to 
be paid by the pre-Reformation benefice-holder, and the receiver of the 
tax was to be the minister . c- However, this never established itself 
i, f, J, Shaw, The northern and aestsrn islands of Scotland; their economy and 
society in the seventeenth century (Edinburgh, 1980), 61, 
2,0, McKay, 'The election of parish clarka in aaditval Scotland', IR 18 (1967), 
25-35. 
3. RSS, v, no. 3004. 
4. APS, it, 539-40, c. 12. 
S, RPC, i, 247-16. 
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an a regular basis. ' 
A more straightforward scheme, to establish crown commissioners based 
in each parish, was launched in 1579. Commissioners were to be 
appointed to implement laws on poor relief, sabbath enforcement and 
bible possession? It was perhaps linked with an earlier scheme of 
the general assembly, which in 1574 had asked the regent for 
commissions to 'gentlemen' to enforce the recently-passed statutes on 
incest, adultery and witchcraft. - No doubt the 1579 commissioners 
(when and if they were appointed) were intended to work with kirk 
sessions, but they were to derive their authority from the state - or 
from the bishops, which amounted to the same thing by 1585 when 
Archbishop Adamson was wanting to appoint parish 'censors of maners'. ' 
It is hardly likely that many commissions were issued, though there 
was one in Edinburgh in 1585, and a poor relief act of 1588 kept a 
place for them. r, Some kirk sessions might have welcomed them - the 
church was aware of the limits of what it could or should be involved 
in, as when the kirk session of Alva was censured by the presbytery 
for meddling in 'civill thingis' 6 By 1592 the idea was being merged 
with the Presbyterian church structure: blank signet commissions to 
enforce laws an witchcraft, poor relief and the deprivation of unworthy 
i, JAPS, lit, 763-77, c, 16. 
2, A PS, ILL, 138, c. 8; 139,00; 139-42, c, 12, 
3, iw, t, 305, 
4, Cald$rvood, History, iv, 267. 
5, fdii, hers iv, 421; C, iv, 302-03, 
6, Stirling presbytery records, 133, 
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ministers were handed out to the commissioners to the general 
assembly. ' Presbyteries were offered their own commissioners in 1544, 
and ministers were invited to nominate commissioners in 1595.2 While 
the church was not hostile to these offers, its indifference suggests 
that local elders saw little value in them. Little is heard of the 
idea thereafter, though in 1608 a revival was suggested at a tine of 
attempted poor law reorganization .3 Kirk sessions were happy to go it 
alone. 
The introduction of justices of the peace in 1809-10 increased the 
density of the matrix of authority in the localities. JPs were not 
overly accountable to the centre, but at least they were not actually 
heritable. The conventional wisdom that they were the fruit of the 
king's experience in England has been challenged by Vormald, who draws 
attention to a series of precedents going back to the parliament of 
1581.4 Arguably the story begins in 1575, when a national network of 
54 local commissioners was appointed to hold regular wapinshawings. 11 
Their reports were to be 'rollit in bukis' and sent to the regent. The 
law of 1587 to reorganize justice ayres envisaged over 300 local 
commissioners to arrest criminals 6- The resounding tinkle produced by 
this scheme is better attested than usual, and next year another idea 
i, RPC, Lv, 753-51, 
2. A'S, iv, 63, c. 8; RPC, v, 200, 
3, M, Lee, Savormwflt by pan; Scotlarri undrr Jams VI arrd I (London, 1980), 72, 
4, Voraald, Court, kirk and coawrrity, 162, 
5, . 4p$, 111,91-93, 
6, APS, 111,158-61, c, 57; cf, Historical atlas of Scotland, ids, P, 6,8, McNeill I 
R, Nicholson (Conference of Scottish fledi*vallsts, 1975), text 60, sap 113, 
P1r11iad at , &ni tha ex'tntfr' 127 
was tried: the issue of high-powered commissions to 58 individuals to 
implement a number of laws in rural areas. ' Included in their remit 
was the enforcement of hornings, normally the sheriffs' job. They 
also had to implement the poor law (through parish commissioners), 
banish Jesuits, mediate in local feuds, and hold wapinshawings - most 
of these were tasks on which statutes had recently been passed. No 
more is heard of these commissions either, but they would not be likely 
to have left much trace except in family papers. Quite possibly they 
had some impact: they were, after all, similar to the justiciary 
commissions which were undoubtedly popular with local elites; on the 
other hand, they did not offer the unique combination of power and 
irresponsibility that was the hallmark of the commission of justiciary. 
Another 1575 law regulated salt production, allowing the crown to 
purchase set quantities at set prices; p as a result there were 
'collectouris maid in evirie towns quhair salt vas maid'. *, How long 
these collectors lasted is not clear. In 1587 John Boyd was given a 
privy seal commission as inspector of fish barrels, a commission which 
he was forced to surrender in 1595 after pressure from the convention 
of royal burghs. 4 These examples illustrate the heterogeneity of 
administrative devices that the government might employ, with a 
varying combination of administrative, judicial and fiscal powers. 
They might be given responsibility for one of the government's 
I, R/'C, iv, 300-02, 
2, mss, tu, 93-94. 
3, Pitscottie, Historie, tt, 319, 
4, RCRS, 1,467; for wra on such econoalc regulations, sta chapter 6, 
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newly-created policy areas, like the salt collectors, or for a branch of 
the existing administration of justice. No Scottish statute offered 
rewards to private informers, in contrast with the English statute of 
artificers: more than half of prosecutions under the latter arose from 
semi-professional informers. ' 
The customs administration was a branch of centrally-controlled 
administration to be found in all royal burghs. It is strange that, 
when the burghs extended their powers over their fernes and taxation, 
they left the collection of the great customs (duties on overseas 
exports, and from 1597 on imports) untouched in crown hands. Local 
influence over who held the custumar's office did manifest itself in 
some burghs, such as Kirkcudbright where the sixteenth century saw a 
veritable dynasty of Maclellan of Bombie as custumare. When in 1602 
the current incumbent arrested a ship to collect unpaid customs, no 
customs had been paid into the exchequer for twenty years 2 Yet this 
pattern was not repeated, it seems, in the most important burghs - and 
over 80 per cent of customs revenue came from just four burghs. ' gor 
were the burghs able to determine the customs rates. They were 
reduced to lobbying to influence customs policy: one angel noble was 
paid to the advocate John Sharp to draft Edinburgh's successful protest 
against an act an the customs in 1582. ' Shortly after, the crown set 
i, N. G. Davies, The enforcement of (mulish apprenticeship, F5 3-F$I2 (Cambridge, 
mass., 1956), 18-19, chs, i-3, 
2, A, L, Murray, 'The cuts accounts of Dumfries and Kirkcudbright, 1560-1660', 
Anfriesshire Trams,, 3rd cer, 42 (1965), 121-22, 
3,1, Guy, 'The Scottish export trade, 1460-1599', Scotland and Europe, ad, Snout, 
62, 
A. (dia, Rocs iv, 232, 
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the customs in tack to the burghs; but the very fact that it was able 
to do so (and later to terminate the contract) shows that it was 
maintaining central control over the customs bureaucracy. ' 
The real local influence was perhaps indirect, through the graft which 
pervaded the customs collection .2 Some aspects of this were welcomed 
by the merchants, who could bribe the custumar or searcher to 
understate the value of their goods. But the convention of royal 
burghs was petitioning parliament in 1579 against corrupt customs 
searchers; the issue of centre versus localities was not 
straightforward in this area. In 1588 the burghs had had a chance 
to see things the government's way, for they had taken on a tack of the 
customs, and they now felt that the problems were 'generall sersouris 
undescreitlie sersing forbodin gudes, and omitting the upgeving of ane 
compte thairof'. ° Perhaps the customs administration was autonomous, 
with neither central government nor local merchants able to influence 
it quite as they wished. 
The customs tack to the burghs was a prime example of administrative 
privatization. Others are not far to seek. Piecemeal tacks of local 
customs were quite common, presumably in response to local initiative; E 
1, Chapter 6. 
2, A. L. Murray, 'Sir John Skena and the exchequer, 1544-1612', Stllr Society 
tlisc'ila#y, i (1971), 145, 
3, RcR8,1,76, 
4. RCRB, 1,212, 
S. E, g, A, L, Murray, 'The custoss accounts of Kirkcudbright, Vigtovn, and Duet ties, 
1434-1560', f, /rieuh}re Trass, 3rd sar, 40 (1963), 137-38, 
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though the national tack was a failure. The mint, too, was often 
leased out, without apparent ill effects. These were permanent 
government departments which functioned at least equally well in the 
public domain, but the government was unable to manage others: the 
lead mines were normally leased to entrepreneurs. ' From there it is 
only a short step to other monopolies or privileges connected with the 
implementation of economic policy, such as salt-manufacturing 
monopolies or licences to export forbidden goods i2 By and large the 
government maintained control over the granting of such privileges, 
though daily accountability must have been small. There may be a 
connection here with the endemic struggle between privy council and 
privy chamber: through which were economic privileges normally 
granted? As a rule grants through the privy council were more likely 
to harmonize with an overall policy and to carry some obligations. 
Conveyancing was a local matter, and dear to the hearts of the landed 
class, but who controlled the notaries who carried it out? Being 
free-lance, rural notaries in a sense depended on the market for their 
services; but this market was unable to eliminate fraud and 
incompetence. '-4 So notaries were increasingly subject to central 
regulation. The initiative was taken by the court of session, which 
had to sort out the problems caused by inadequate or corrupt notaries. 
In 1579, an act was passed requiring two notaries to act in many 
i, Chapter 4. 
2, Chapter 6. 
3, For conveyancing fraud, cf, 1,0. &rant (ed, ), `Nat faproven; advocate and 
Leslie r, Brown and Johnston, 1582', Stair Society Xiscoliany, i, 
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cases. ' This proved to be hard to operate, and in 1584 the rule was 
abandoned for sasines 2 Even after then, the law had to be 'construed 
with the utmost freedom' by the court of session. - Local authorities 
ca-operated in the battle against fraud, sometimes enthusiastically, as 
when corrupt notaries had their hands 'striken of' in Edinburgh in 
1563. ° But only the central government was interested in another 
aspect of regulation: requiring notaries to hand in their protocol 
books, perhaps with the hope that these would come to form some kind 
of sasines register. Earlier attempts to prevent notaries giving 
sasine were abandoned in 1563. E Thereafter the government made a 
virtue of necessity by enforcing earlier requirements for notaries' 
protocol books to be checked by the privy council: statutes on this in 
1552 and 1555 'tuik not than dew executioun', having to be suspended 
and re-enacted, for the last time in 1563 which may suggest that it 
was being observed . c- There was a proposal in 1567 for all protocol 
books of dead notaries to be handed in to sheriffs and burgh 
magistrates .7 This was not adopted, and the register of sasines in 
its final 1617 form was an alternative to this scheme. E' However, the 
many surviving urban protocol books, and the occasional 
i, .? FS, iii, 14$, c, 18, 
2. APS, iii, 353, c, 11, 
3. Craig, iv, fecfale, 1.8.9, 
4. fdirr, Rees., iii , 166-66. 
5, APS, ii, 493, c, 7; 542, c, 18, 
6. APS, ii, 487, c, 17; 496, c, 18; 641-42, c. 16, 
7. APS, iii, 44, 
8, Ockrent, Lead rights, E5, 
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sixteenth-century burgh register of local sasines, show that burgh 
magistrates were interested in the recording of land transactions; ' 
and of course the burghs were left out of the 1817 register. In 
Dundee the town clerk was given a monopoly, to exclude 'unkenth 
notaris'. 2 These local developments, however, would have done nothing 
directly to increase the powers of central government. 
The court of session was more fortunate in its efforts to control the 
admission of new notaries: following a statute, a register of notaries 
was begun in November 1563. =- Xany existing notaries derived their 
authority from the pope, and this may have been another example of the 
crown stepping into the pope's shoes. ' A 1587 law to tighten up on 
the proliferation of notaries was probably unsuccessful: it ordered a 
five-year moratorium on new admissions and a seven-year apprenticeship 
as a condition of admission, while requiring existing notaries to bring 
their cautioners up to date and to hand in their books for checking. ` 
All this pressure on notaries contrasts with the lack of attention paid 
to those more traditional local officers, the coroners: there was only 
one coroner per sheriffdom, and when a noble was appointed coroner of 
Perth, the post had probably become a sinecure .6 There is no evidence 
of central regulation earlier than 1600, when five coroners and their 
i, E, g, Prestwick: 0, Murray, Early burgh ar #ization !n Scotland, ii (61as9ow, 
1932), 89, 
2, Dundee council ainutas, t, Dundee District Archive 5 Record Centre, p, 122, 
3. , 9PS, ti, 512, c, 17; register of adatsstoni of notaries, 1563-67, SRO, NP2/1. 
4, Donaldson, &wff'ß aen, 55, 
5, APS, tit, 448-49, c, 29, 
6. RSS, vii, no. 1566, 
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officers were summoned for 'extortioun'. 1 
Before passing from local to central executive institutions, a visit 
must be made to those regions where the local implementation of 
statutes took on a distinctive character: the Borders and Highlands. 
A reading of older histories can suggest that the problem 
('lawlessness') was the same in both regions: not so. The Borders 
were close to an alien, sometimes hostile, administration and recurrent 
war; long experience showed that English intrigues could exact a high 
price for administrative failure or neglect, and attention to Border 
government never ceased. The Highlands, distant and culturally 
distinctive, were quite different. Government in the late sixteenth 
century inherited a long tradition of leaving Highlanders to their own 
devices. This is reflected in 'national' Scottish politics, in which 
the actors were almost all Lowlanders, half of Scotland neither seeking 
nor being offered a role in the Scottish political system. This is 
too big a subject for full treatment here; instead of ignoring it, 
however, its implications for the executive institutions of government 
must at least be tackled. If the Highlands' long self-sufficiency was 
to be broken down by central government, the impetus would come not 
(as with the Borders) from outside, with a shift in international 
relations, but from the inside, with the developing administrative 
dynamism of the Scottish state. 
The impression that Borders and Highlands posed identical problems to 
central government, though erroneous, is strengthened by the adoption 
i, TA, 1699-1600, SRO, £21/73, fo. 142r,; cf, Skene, OWS, s, v, coroner, fiter, 
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of the same remedies. Parliament typically lumped the two together as 
areas infested with criminals 'delyting in all mischeiffis, and maist 
unnaturallie and cruellie waistand, slayand, heryand and distroyand 
thair awin nychtbouris and native cuntrie people', in the words of a 
1587 statute. ' But here we are concerned with executive government 
institutions in the localities, and a glance will show that these were 
quite different in the Borders and Highlands. The Borders were over- 
governed, with the wardenries as a unique extra layer of local 
government. The Highlands, without even the normal executive 
institutions, were under-governed; there were baron courts, but one of 
the few things that is known about then is that they were quite beyond 
central control .2 Statutes on Border issues had long been regular. - 
Only in the 1580s did parliament begin to pay attention to the 
Highlands as well. -* 
Why, then, did the statutes treat both-areas the same? Essentially it 
was because the government had difficulty in obtaining access to those 
who failed to observe the statutes. The special characteristic of 
laws passed to deal with the Highlands and Borders was the lack of 
expectation that law-breakers would come into direct contact with the 
executive machinery. In 1587, for instance, Border and Highland 
landlords (apart from non-residents) were to be held responsible for 
i, JPS, tit, 461, c. 59, para t, 
2. Lansar 3 Parker, 'Crise and control', 13; V. D. N. Sa11ir, 'Barony jurisdiction 
in the Highlands', Abtes a, 7d QrxrI's of the Society of Mist Highland and Mahd 
ihstorical Research, 16 (Saptasbar 1981), 23-24, 
3, E. 9, APS, iii, 31-32, c, 27, 
A. APS, iii, 218-i9, c, 16, 
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the delinquencies of the tenants and inhabitants of their lands, and 
were ordered to find caution, binding on their heirs, that they would 
observe this. Victims of crime could demand redress from a clan 
chief, and if not satisfied within 15 days could pursue that chief as 
if they held a commission of Justiciary. Landlords were to be 
summoned every six months to answer for their dependants' observance 
of the laws. ' Little or none of this happened, but the point remains: 
such laws attempted to deal with law-breakers indirectly, by 
legitimizing attacks on their chiefs or landlords. This was nothing 
new, and the three estates of Lindsay's 'Satyre' had passed a similar 
'act'2 There is irony in the 1587 law's exception for non-resident 
landlords; these actually made social control more difficult. ' The 
legislators' aim, however, was not to maintain social control as such - 
that had been done successfully for centuries by local, traditional 
means - but to subordinate local elites to central government. 
The elaborate detail of such laws could be pursued further, but there 
were few important variations. The main distinction to be drawn is 
between the laws that attempted to hold only feudal lords responsible 
and those that conceded a measure of legitimacy to the despised clan 
system. ' The most that was normally hoped for in the Highlands, 
where the laws were reserve weapons for only occasional use, was to 
bring crimes home to heads of clans - or, what amounted to the same 
i, APS, iii, 461, c, 59, 
2, Lindsay, `Thris astaitis`, 349, 
3, Rae, A*i#istraiiuri of the Scottish fritttiar, 17-18, 
4, A. Cunningham, rho loyal clan (Cambridge, 1932), ch, 6, 
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thing, to use crises as a weapon to make life difficult for chiefs who 
did not collaborate with the government. Such manipulation of local 
elites has always been the means for colonial regimes to get a foot in 
the door, before their own executive institutions can be established. ' 
The distinctive executive machinery of the Borders had been developed 
over the centuries to cope with the proximity of the 'auld inemeyis of 
Ingland'. The wardens were additional to the sheriffs, and on the 
whole above rather than below them: they found it na easier to make 
contact with individual law-breakers. In the more temperate 
diplomatic climate of the late sixteenth century, however, Border 
wardens ceased to be front-line war officers, and were turned to this 
kind of police work .2 This did not increase their central 
accountability; if anything it reduced it, for the government was 
obliged to appoint gamekeepers who were also poachers. But though its 
choice of wardens was restricted, the government never surrendered the 
right of choice: a warden who strayed too far from his duty could 
always be sacked in the end, even if his derelictions in the meantime 
were often severe indeed. Central government was maintaining an 
administrative foothold in the marches, but no more: its considerable 
aspirations were not matched by its achievements before the union of 
crowns. 
There was, perhaps, a special executive institution for the Highlands: 
the lieutenancy. But this was a pale shadow of the elaborate Border 
1, Hair, Primitia' kvrop aent, 256-59, 
2, Rat, A*inistratiorr of the Scottish frontier, ch, 3, 
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system. Highland lieutenants were never permanent like Border 
wardens, being appointed only in times of political upheaval; they had 
no distinctive duties other than the general maintenance of order (as 
the concept was understood in Edinburgh), and there was no 
administrative machinery other than the lieutenants' own armed 
followings. Lieutenancy powers were simply devolved Justiciary 
powers, typically to punish the four pleas of the crown (murder, rape, 
robbery and fire-raising) and to grant remissions. There was even 
less choice of lieutenant than in the marches, the earls of Argyll (in 
the west) and Huntly (in the north) being almost the only contenders, 
and if the government did not see eye to eye with then there would be 
no lieutenants. Greater Lowland centralization left the Highlands 
behind - and thus increasingly vulnerable. 
For centuries, the Highlands had been sheltered behind a language 
barrier. There is no evidence that the Lowland ruling class knew or 
used Gaelic (with the exception, perhaps, of scholars like Skene); at 
the interface between two language groups, business is normally 
conducted in the language of the dominant group. ' The MacGregor clan, 
at the edge of the Highlands, provide some evidence of this: when one 
family of HacGregors became burgesses of Perth, they had to adopt the 
name Johnstone2 As government extended its demands over more social 
groups, this would have meant more Highlanders under pressure to learn 
Scots - or, more likely, suffering for failure to do so. The 
government's increasing dependence on paperwork compounded the 
1, P, iru ill, SocioliiWistics (Harwndsvorth, 1974), 133, 
2, Perth gu ildry book, Perth Museum A Art Gallery, p, 339. 
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problem; a few more Highlanders night learn to speak Scots, but where 
would they learn to read it? ' Traditional Highland administrators 
were no use in this new climate. So remote had the government become 
from them that Skene in 1597 puzzled over the jurisdiction of the 
toi6asc of Kintyre: was he a species of bailie, a coroner, or what? 2 
The Highlands saw little or nothing of the government's executive 
institutions, central or local, traditional or modern. Sheriffs' seats 
were almost entirely in the Lowlands, the only exceptions being Argyll 
and Tarbert in the west. The sheriff of Inverness seems normally to 
have ignored the vast Highland area over which he had jurisdiction. 
When Huntly was appointed sheriff in 1509, it was thought a daring 
move to send sheriff deputes to remote places like Kingussie, 
Inverlochy, Tain, Dingwall and Vick .3 The only active royal burgh in 
the Highlands at this time was the tiny Rothesay. ° Since government 
was so such carried an from towns, this was a major handicap: no 
market crosses meant no government proclamations, for instance. There 
was a very fair sprinkling of ministers and readers appointed to 
Highland parishes, but there must be doubts about their effectiveness 
as agents of social control, especially since there seems to be no 
i, d, £anneraan, 'Literacy In the Highlands', rho R naissaaca and Raforaation in 
Scctlarrd, ads. I. D. Cowan & D. Shaw (Edinburgh, 1983), 215, 
2, Skene, Ob'S, s, v, tocheoderache, 
3,0, Gregory, History of the a'stern Highland, and Islas of Scotland (2nd adn,, 
London, 1881), 105, 
4. Historical atlas of Scotland, ads, McNeill A Nicholson, sap 74, iarbart vas 
active as a sheriff's seat only, and the sheriff (the earl of Argyll) vas able 
to obtain tax exasption on the grounds that the inhabitants would not obey his; 
Pryde, Burghs of Srotlami, no, 42; Tax decrests, 1694, SRO, £62/i, fo, 81r, 
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evidence of kirk sessions. ' There were local commissaries in the 
Highlands - in Skye and Iona, at least .2 Notaries are mentioned, 
though none are found in the register of admissions .3 But this is 
only a matter for comment because Lowland-style local government was 
so sparse. Kost of the Highlands saw no proclamations; no 
wapinshawings; no members of parliament, general assembly or 
convention of royal burghs; no privy councillors; no sheriff courts; 
no justice ayres; no royal visits except occasionally for conquest; no 
commissions of justiciary; no presbyteries or kirk sessions; no 
custumars. It is hard to think of any normal activity of central 
government that regularly crossed the Highland Line. 
This was often a problem for Lowland authorities. But did they 
actually want local chiefs implementing the law? Angus MacDonald of 
Glengarry was issued with a commission of justiciary in 1574 to punish 
those of his tenants who had killed a Kinghorn fisherman: but it is 
"clear that he neither requested nor welcomed it, for the assize was to 
be drawn from 'the marchandis and marynaris that first sail happin to 
arrive at Lochstrone or Lochcarroun at the nixt fischeing'. * They 
would trust MacDonald himself only with the job of hangman. 
The Glengarry episode suggests that Lowland efforts to exploit Highland 
i, J, Kirk, 'The kirk and the Highlands at the Reforaation', Nvrtharn Scotla#l, 7 
(1906), 1-22. 
2, Cvilactanaa do rebaor 41banlcis (Iona Club, 1847), 7, 
3, Eanneraan, 'Literacy in the Highlands', 219-20; Protocol baud. of John Faular, 
1528-1S, Nl, ed, J, Durkin (SRS, 1985), pp, ix-x, 
1. Collectar'a dig ra'bu 4Ibanfcit, 100-01, 
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natural resources were seen as illegitimate. Leslie wrote that the 
'rude pepill' of the Highlands 'admitt na man thair with thame to the 
fisheing willinglie excepts thair awne nychtbouris and cuntrey men'. ' 
Exploitation of the western fishings was growing, but as yet the 
Highland economy was more or less independent, and there were only 
occasional signs of the future trend towards specialization in a few 
primary products for export to the Lowlands. 
If the institutional vacuum in the Highlands had some advantages for 
the government, it also had advantages for the Highlanders; so long as 
they could maintain it, they could also maintain their traditional way 
of life. We assume that they owed allegiance to the government in 
Edinburgh, but did this really mean to them as such as the government 
was beginning to think it should? The commissioners of the lordship 
of the Isles distinguished carefully between the loyalty which they 
acknowledged to the Scottish crown and the hostility which they 
assumed between themselves and the Scottish realm2 Casual references 
by Lowlanders show similar assumptions - as when the fugitive earl of 
Arran was said to have left the country and gone to Kintyre, or when 
grain exports were banned and an exception was made for the Isles. ' 
To be subject to the Scottish crown meant something quite different, 
and far more limited, in the Highlands. The legitimacy of the crown 
itself was recognized - what harm had the crown ever done, remote as 
it was? It was the crown's lieutenants or commissions of justiciary 
Leute, N1stirta, t, 38, 
2, J. Bannerssn, `the lordship of the Isles`, Scottish soclsty in the fiftav7th 
century, ed. Brown, 215. 
3, Calderwood, History, iv, 547; I9P$, ii, 495, c, 14, 
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that were resisted. Government expansion implied an abstract legal 
system, written land titles based on charters granted in Edinburgh, an 
extension of literacy in Scots, a professional urban bureaucracy, 
burdensome taxes. Administrative growth and centralization were often 
unwelcome in the Lowlands; how auch less did they have to offer in 
the Highlandst3 
Ve have now completed our tour of the localities, visiting local 
administrators old and new, popular and unpopular. Returning to 
Edinburgh, we can now ask: what of the central administration itself? 
What role did it play in the implementation of statutes? 
At the helm of the central administration, supposedly, was the privy 
council. If anyone was in charge of the executive implementation of 
statutes, the privy council was. Indeed, any questions about how 
Scotland was governed must lead back to the privy council. Yhat made 
Huntly"s rebellion of 1570-73 so auch more serious than the average 
magnate rising was his erection of a formal governmental system in the 
queen's name - headed by a privy council 2 Below the crown, the 
council was the supreme executive authority, with a general political 
competence that allowed it to intervene in almost any area of 
government. For was this always the unwarranted meddling discussed 
in chapter 1: the lords of session were not going to complain if the 
i, For a useful aadal of the procaasai at work harn, list M, Hechtar, Int+rriiJl 
C010171i11sa; the Collie frIng irr örltish rational Arvoluo"rri, ISX-I%b 
(London, 1975), 9-10 and pasata. 
A. L. Murray, 'Huntty's rebellion and the adsinistration of Justice in north-east 
Scotland, 3570-1573', Xnrthera Scitla ,4 (1981), I. 
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privy council (nominally an equal, parallel body) ordered the court to 
rise when plague threatened Edinburgh. ' The privy council, as auch as 
the crown, was the government, and neither Mary nor James VI ever 
disagreed strongly or for long with their privy councils before the 
union of crowns. James found it difficult at times to hold the 
balance between privy council and privy chamber, but this could be a 
problem in England too .: 2 
The council's legal powers were not precisely defined - for instance, 
administrative and judicial business (acta and decreta) were not 
separated in its records until 1810, when it had the example of star 
chamber to follow. 3 (1810 was also the year that an English-style 
court of high commission was created. ') Like parliament itself, the 
business the council dealt with was both public and private; in 1578 
there was a rule that public affairs should be dealt with in the 
morning, and private suits in the afternoon. B This law came at a time 
of attempts to formalize and recast the central courts' jurisdictions. 
The 1579 parliament, as we have seen, slapped down the council's 
interference in the administration of justice by the court of session; 6 
this may have been part of a wider attempt to untangle the two 
conciliar Jurisdictions. 
1. VC, vi, 345, 
2,0, Starkey, 'Privy secrets-, Henry VIII and the lords of the council', History 
T+wtay, 37, no. $ (August 1987), 24, 
3, RF1C, ix, p, v, 
4, Foster, Clwreh before the Covenants, 47, 
S. iPS, iii, 97, c, 4, 
6, Chapter i. 
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The council was, however, constrained by its lack of reliable servants. 
A single illustration from 1623 may suffice. A Dunkirk pirate ship 
was brought in to Leith. Local people began to plunder it, and guards 
were set to protect it; but they deserted. The councillors themselves 
had to ride down to Leith docks to mount guard in a rota. Eventually 
they were forced to give up, exhausted, and plunder began again. ' 
In practice the council still relied an the private power and standing 
of the councillors - particularly the nobles. In 1593, in exasperation 
at the way recently-appointed noble councillors 'attendit nacht 
thairupoun in maner as wes appointit', a new council was appointed with 
only three nobles among its large membership. Other nobles, it was 
ordained, 'salbe of his hienes privie counsaill quhen that happin to be 
present or bets send for be his majestie'? It did not work; six 
months later, a new council was appointed with ten nobles and nine 
others .3 In 1598 the king wanted 14 nobles and only seven 'learned' 
councillors. 4 But in the early seventeenth century, the only nobles to 
be found as working councillors were recently-created lords of 
erection. 8 
Compared with the privy council, the exchequer has had such less 
attention paid to it, especially in the context of implementation of 
i, V, Taylor, 'The Scottish privy council, 1643-1625; its cosposition and its 
work' (Edinburgh PhD, 1950), 61-62, 
2, Q'S, iv, 34, c, 45, 
3, +QPS, iv, 53, 
4, Nicolson to Cecil, 1 July 1598, CSF Scot,, xiii, 226, 
5, Taylor, 'Scottish privy council', 13, 
fa'JIiairnt ind tha IFAVCM Iv' 144 
government policy. For most of the sixteenth century, there was 
scarcely any fiscal policy worthy of the name, for there was no body 
which could have co-ordinated one; the exchequer was an irregular, 
passive body, convoked ad ha: to receive and audit financial accounts. ' 
However, the exchequer was becoming more institutionalized. Its 
reputation for efficiency is not enhanced by the king's much-quoted 
outburst of 1591c 'I heue been Fryday, Setterday, and this day waithing 
upon the directioun of my affairs, and nevir man cumand. Thane of the 
chekker that wee ordainit to tak the compts, nevir one. '2 It is, of 
course, quite possible that the king himself had got the day wrong. 
One thing is clear: the exchequer was growing in status. The 
financial system, little changed since James I, was forced to adapt to 
changing crown revenues, as when the crown took over from the papal 
curia in confirming feus of church lands. A 1584 statute marked a 
new departure, the beginning of a permanent exchequer commission which 
would supervise and ca-ordinate the individual financial officers. ` 
The transition to a permanent exchequer was gradual: meetings were at 
first concentrated in a few months of the year as before, and they were 
largely confined to adjudicating on the complaints that an increasingly 
intrusive fiscal policy was generating. ' These complaints chiefly 
related to church revenues in government hands, the main new source of 
i, A. L. Murray, 'The procedure of the Scottish exchequer in the early sixteenth 
century', SW 40 (1961), 89-117, 
2, Quoted in Sir Villiai Purves, R'veaw of t/, Scottish croon, /661, ed, O. M. Rose 
(Edinburgh, 1897), p, xxxvii, 
3, JP$, iii, 309, c, 26; Murray, 'Sir John Sk, rne and the exchequer', 126, 
4, Exchequer auditors' act book, 1684-66, SRO, E4/1, 
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landed revenue at this period. 
However, the exchequer soon began to take the initiative in 
administration. In 1584, for instance, it put the sheriff depute of 
Dumfries to the horn for non-payment of mails. ' In the 1587 
parliament, it was asked to take action on the customs, fishing, piracy, 
royal castles, and other such natters .2 Although another 1587 statute 
confined its meetings once more to July and August, this had clearly 
been abandoned by 1590 when it was said to have been the 'only consell' 
for a while, and even a move to have 'na prevy consaill bot the 
chekker' was considered .a The continuing link with the council is 
illustrated by an order of 1594 that the 'lordis of... secreit counsale 
and chekker' should meet twice weekly for council business and twice 
weekly for exchequer business. '' 
In 1556, the eight exchequer auditors known as the Octaviane made the 
exchequer into a power-house, stepping up the pace of change with 
initiatives on customs, crown lands, and other aatters. El It was to 
the exchequer, not the privy council, that the general assembly went in 
1596 with its proposals for teind reform . c, The Octavians cracked the 
whip over the existing financial officers so such that all resigned, 
i, RSS, viii, no. 2018, 
2. AFS, Iii, 455, c, 51, 
3, AC'S, iii, 455, c, 49; Melville, &soirs, 373,39i, 
4, Rfv', v, ii8, 
S. Murray, ̀ Str John Skene and the . Kch*quer`, 127-31, 
6, Caldnrv od, lllitory, v, 421-33. 
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and the posts were shared out among members of the group - possibly a 
lucrative move, on which Xelville blamed their unpopularity. ' Although 
the Octavians resigned in January 1597, they were reappointed to a 
similar, enlarged exchequer commission, and more initiatives continued 
to be taken until a reaction took place in June 1598. The old system 
of separate financial officers was restored, and there were to be no 
more permanent exchequer commissions .2 This was no doubt a manoeuvre 
by courtiers, angry at the Octavians' squeeze on patronage. 
However, the clock could not be turned back completely. The exchequer 
was still able to take initiatives in 1600, when it advocated a case to 
itself, brought by Edinburgh against centrally-licensed exporters of 
wool3 Since the Octavians, it had been discovered that financial 
offices could be held jointly. Central control was soon returning, 
though it took other forms from the Octavian formula of supreme 
auditors of exchequer. In 1603 a new body known as the commissioners 
of rents appeared, exercising some of the financial control that the 
Octavians had had. In 1610 a weighty new financial department was 
created by combining all four financial officers (treasurer, 
comptroller, collector general and treasurer of new augmentations) in 
one person, the earl of Dunbar. ' The treasurer depute, who did the 
work, was assisted by assessors; and in 1611, after Dunbar's death, 
I, Malvilla, t'wirß, 390. For avidanca casting doubt on the profitability of the 
financial offices in the 1590s, sae chapter 4, 
2, P$, iv, 16S; Murray, 'Sir John Skane and the exchequer', 131, 
3, RCAV, 11,75, 
4, A, l, Murray, 'aha pra-Union records of the Scottish exchequer', Journal of the 
Soclity of Archivists, 2 (1960-64), 99; /1WC Nip 1 tW11a, i, 65-66, 
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this arrangement was formalized when the treasury was put in 
commission under eight assessors who were known as the 'new 
Octavians'. ' 
The exchequer (which in the seventeenth century we must speak of as 
the treasury) gives an impression of increasing red tape. New 
officers of state like collector general and treasurer of new 
augmentations seem to be more subject to it. There are new civil 
servants like the clerk of the temporality. The new officers may have 
been granted lands or benefices for their work, limiting their 
dependence on the centre; but a growing use of pensions, which in 
theory were easier to control, is more likely. At any rate, this 
fledgling bureaucracy, like all bureaucracies, had to become self- 
supporting in some way. Information on its exactions from the public 
is hard to come by: fees were not standardized until 1808 2 In 1598 
it cost the burgh of Aberdeen £4 2s to present its accounts, and in 
1600 it cost £5 16s 8d, including clerks' fees, drink silver, and wine, 
cheese and bread to porters and ushers: ' And that was the cost of 
paying money in. 
The exchequer was at the forefront of the central government's 
information-gathering campaign. In 1592 the treasurer was required by 
parliament to keep registers of licences for export of forbidden goods, 
of monks' portions, of first fruits of benefices, and of licences of 
1, Murray, 'Sir John Sksne and the "xchaqu*r', 132. 
2, Donaldson, Ja+rai V- ia. rß i'll, 234, 
3, geie#n ci, ntil litters, i, ad, L, 8, Taylor (London, 1942), 76,84, 
--W' 
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exemptions from military service. ' Military service was often 
commuted for cash, becoming almost a form of extra-parliamentary 
taxation, about this time -2 Also in 1592, the treasurer and justice 
clerk were ordered to compile a list of all remissions granted since 
the king's majority in 1578 .3 In 1597, more statutes demanded yet 
more red tape. Rentals of church temporalities were to be given in by 
ministers. provided to any benefice. 4 Feuars of church lands were to 
give in copies of their titles. ' All feuars were ordered to hand in 
copies of their titles to the clerk of the temporality in 1599.6 
It would be easy to exaggerate this proliferation of pen-pushers. But 
most historians have done the opposite, creating a pervasive scepticism 
about government effectiveness. Was Scotland really under-governed if 
it could maintain (in 1594) not one but two registers of exemptions 
from military service? - one for permanent absence, kept by the keeper 
of the register of casualties (associated with the privy seal), the 
other for temporary absence, kept by the keeper of the register of the 
Signet .7 The chance survival of other registers, such as that for the 
admission of notaries, is surely evidence that government paperwork was 
originally much more extensive. Nany centralizing initiatives, such as 
1, APS, iii, 556, c, 30, 
2. Chapter S. 
3, aPS, iii, 575, c. 67, 
4. APS, iv, 133, C. IS. 
S. alPS, iv, 133, c, 16. 
6. TA, 1699-1600, SRO, E21173, fo, 42r, 
7. IW'C, v, 177-78, 
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the Octavian. ' tightening-up on the collection of feudal dues, were not 
the kind to leave a permanent trace in the archives; and the main 
exchequer minute book of their decisions is missing. ' The Octavians 
themselves, highly visible because of the stir they created at court, 
were the tip of the iceberg. after all, these same eight 
administrators, and many more, all had long and active careers. 
Many parliamentary statutes set up commissions to continue their work. 
Some commissions were for clearly 'parliamentary' business, euch as 
making decisions on a list of articles presented to parliament. They 
tended to be large and to contain a balance of the three estates. 
They were not really executive commissions - rather they were an 
extension of parliament's legislative and judicial power. This was 
particularly clear in the 1563 commission to administer the act of 
oblivion - the law burying the crimes committed during the religious 
revolution. -- Its surviving minute book shows that it acted like a 
miniature court of session, meeting at intervals for some years .3 But 
there were also commissions to implement a particular decision. A 
balance of estates was less important in these, and they tended to 
contain a higher proportion of working members - officers of state and 
others active in the administration. Wore commissions were like this 
by the 1590s. ' 
i, Murray, 'Sir John Skins and the exchequer', 128, 
3, APS, 11,536-37, c, 2, 
3. Ach of the loafs interpreters of the act of oblivion, SRO, PA9/1, 
4, Appendix C, 
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But by then commissions were in relative decline; they failed to match 
the enormous expansion of parliamentary statutes. Probably the 
government had developed more effective administrative machinery. Not 
that we know such about the achievements of parliamentary commissions: 
most have left no trace of their successes or their failures. 
Occasionally we are told that 'na thing is yit performit' by a 
commission. ' Commissions' ad hoc nature, which has preserved few 
written records, probably hampered them. Although one commission was 
invited to 'creat clarkis' and no doubt others did, they lacked the 
continuous momentum which only a permanent bureaucracy could provide .2 
Similar problems may have affected the central justiciary court, which 
remained a shadowy body in the sixteenth century. Its administrative 
continuity may have been weakened by the periodic justice gyres, and it 
seems to have failed to attract the resources invested in the court of 
session - though Scotland was not alone in seeing most growth in the 
civil rather than criminal law. 3 A potentially far-reaching 
development was the law encouraging public prosecutions: this might 
have allowed the justiciary court to emerge as a major branch of 
government, but few Initiatives seen to have been taken by the court 
before the seventeenth century. ' The most that can be said is that it 
1. RK, iii, 199, 
2.4? PS, ii1,220, C. 17. 
3, $, Lenean 1 6, Parker, 'The state, the cossunity and the crtainal law in early 
. adern Europa', Cris snd the lar; the social history of rrlar in wrstern 
Europe since ISM, eds. Y. A. C. 6atrelt, B. Lenean f 6, Parker (London, 1980), 
16, 
4, Brown, 81w+# , 257. 
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remained under unquestioned central control. ' 
Growth of central control is also a feature of the commissary court. 
This emerged in 1564 from the pre-Reformation courts of the bishops' 
officials. The historian of the latter has stressed the elements of 
continuity in the transition, but points out that the new court was 
state-controlled. -- The officials' courts had been answerable to nobody 
in practice, but the commissaries depended on the court of session 
which issued letters of poinding to collect their unpaid fines. ' Local 
commissaries were answerable to the Edinburgh court. In 1587, they 
were decreed to hold office only during the crown's pleasure, and were 
ordered to hand in their registers annually. ' Crucially, although they 
administered family law, they were free of church control; when in 
1595 the general assembly was wanting to restrict the remarriage of 
adulterers, it had to 'tranell with the commissars'. ' 
The admiral's court was a creation of the fifteenth century .6 While 
the admiral's powers derived basically from military responsibilities, 
his court was also competent to decide all maritime cases 'tuiching the 
i, Ssxwrces and literature of Scots law, 408; Villock, Jury irr Scotland, 44-45, 
2. Otiivant, Court of the official, 164, 
3, Arts of seo runt, 5, 
4, Arts of sederuat, 16-17, 
S. Calderwood, History, v, 370-71, 
6, A, R, B, McMillan, 'The adsirat of Scotland', SHH 20 (1923), 11-12; r1rts of the 
aoiral's court of Scotland (Arta curiae adfirirallatus Scotiaal, JS57-/562, ed, 
T. C. wade (Stair Society, 1937), p, xiii, 
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carrying, lousing, and away taking of merchandice be sea'. ' This was 
potentially a powerful weapon for centralization, as many cases in 
local burgh and dean of guild courts might have been claimed for it. 
A session case of 1533 held that debt cases between a Scottish and a 
foreign merchant fell under the jurisdiction of the burgh court, not the 
admiral .2 Could this area of jurisdiction be claimed for the centre? 
The post of admiral passed from the fourth earl of Bothwell to the 
Regent Morton, and in 1581, following the latter's execution, an article 
was submitted to parliament on the 'ordoure betuix the merchandis and 
marrinaris for pilleit guidis'8 This suggests that the burghs wanted 
a redefinition of the jurisdiction In maritime causes; but when they 
got one, in 1587, it was quite the opposite of their hopes. Francis 
Stewart, fifth earl of Bothwell, was restored to his uncle's lands and 
to the admiral's office: his infeftment allowed his to hold 
civil and crisinal courts,,, in all actions coaaittad at $ea, between native and 
foreign merchants or between foreign and foreign, concerning merchandise, 
fishings, materials of war, piracies, contracts, pledges and agreements,,, and 
on violators of the laws of the reale concerning exporters and regraters of 
victual, flesh, corn and other prohibited and uncustomed goods, as freely as any 
admiral of the realms of France, Spain, England, Denmark or other foreign 
nations, ' 
Here was a brand new central jurisdiction, professedly based an foreign 
example. 
i, Balfour, Practicks, Ii, 530, 
2. Balfour, Practir, ,, tf, 635, 
3. AFS, tit, 214, c, 9. 
4, AWS, v, no. 1316, 
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There was also pressure to extend the admiral's jurisdiction 
geographically. In practice the admiral's court was probably confined 
to Edinburgh, and similar cases in other burghs went to local courts. 
It took time for the new-style admiral's court to emerge, as in 1590 
Velwood referred to reforms in the pipeline - the place ordinair for 
this jurisdiction is not as yit constitute' - and argued for setting up 
a similar court in the head burgh of each maritime sheriffdom. ' Some 
things were already changing, for in 15,20 the convention of royal 
burghs was stung into protest at the admiral's 'new exactiounie'2 The 
project might have succeeded if the unrelated antics of the hereditary 
admiral had not brought ruin on his court. In 1591, on Bothwell's 
forfeiture, the commission by his successor Lennox to the new vice 
admiral gave his only a vague Jurisdiction over all cases 'pertening 
and concerning the jurisdictioun of the said admiralitie conforms to 
the lawis thairof'. 3 Next year the burghs were able to strike a 
decisive blow against the court, securing a statute limiting the 
admiral's jurisdiction to what it had been under James V. " In 1593, a 
statute an the subject reaffirmed the principles of standardization and 
foreign example, but ceded control to the burghs. Cases between 
merchant and merchant were now to be tried by the local dean of guild 
court, as it is now usit in the toun of Edinburgh... according to the 
lovable forme of jugement usit in all the guid townis of France and 
Flanderis... and speciallie in Paris, Rowen, Burdeaulx land) 
Yelvood, 'SUU l&v', 77-79. 
2, RCRB, t, 339-40, 
3, Commission to limas Vaayss of Bogie, $ August 1591, quoted in 6, Eaton, 'ihm 
vita admiral, and the quest of the 'golden pannia ", SMc'20 (1923), 123, 
4, APS, iii, 5E0, c, 79, 
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Rochen'. ' Central government could be resisted in some ways, but the 
clock could not be turned back completely. 
At this point, this accumulating evidence of central government 
expansion might give rise to enthusiastic conclusions about a 'Stewart 
revolution in government'. But no. The word revolution is better 
kept for real revolutions, and this was a trend. Nor was it as benign 
and harmonious a trend as Elton once identified in early Tudor 
England 2 There was continual friction between centrally-controlled 
and locally-controlled administrators - as indeed there was in England 
too. -' But while there has been little acceptance for Elton's 
proposition that the transformation of government was a conscious, 
deliberate process concentrated in the 1530a, his critics have been 
chiefly concerned to show that the restructuring was a slow, piecemeal 
process dependent an short-term political contingencies. ' That the 
restructuring took place there is no doubt. Nor can it be doubted 
that, in the Scotland of the 1580s and 1590s, there was a similar 
expansion of bureaucracy and professional government. Vithin a social 
system that was still largely feudal, this was absolutism. 
The scale of the shift to the centre could easily be exaggerated: 
1. VS, iv, 30, t, 38, 
2,6, R, Elton, The Tu or rerolytion in go vrn. +rnt (Ctibride, 1953), 
3, R. Ashton, rho English clrii war: ronserratist and rerviution, W-16I9 
(London, 1978), th, 3, 
4, D. Starkey, `After the 'revolution", Revolution reassessed recisions in the 
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perhaps the most significant point, indeed, is the successful resistance 
and continued vitality of Scotland's traditional local courts. Frontal 
assaults by the government, such as summonses to sheriffs, were forlorn 
hopes; the main centralizing trend was towards the creation of new 
channels of government to bypass the entrenched strongholds of local 
power. For despite continuing localism, the trend was clearly towards 
the centre: no new regalities or heritable jurisdictions were being 
created. ' (An exception is the tiny regality court of the wardenry of 
the mint, created in 1584-1) A central executive was being 
refashioned to meet the demand for implementation of a wider range of 
more complex statutes. This chapter has shown both absolutism under 
construction, and the resistance that it generated. At the end of this 
period, it was by no means certain whether the will of the centre would 
prevail over the localities. The issue was a complex one, but at its 
root was the questions if central government was to prosper, who would 
pay for it? 
1. Reality of 0u17 Talani court took, ! Sä! -1W *di J, fl, Vebiter A A, A, N, Duncan 
(Ounf$rittns, 1953), 11. 




The Scottish state in search of cash was nothing if not enterprising. 
In the autumn of 1565, an army was being raised to crush Moray's 
rebellion: the queen summoned Edinburgh's leading burgesses to hear an 
'orisoun' on her need for loans to pay for it. When this failed to 
inspire them to open their purses, six of them were imprisoned 'to 
thole the lawis for certane crymes' (probably they were to be accused 
of lending to the rebels), and released only when they 'appoyntit with 
our soveranis' with a loan of 10,000 merke from the burgh. ' Knox 
claimed that there were 'soldiers set over them, having their muskets 
ready charged, and their match lighted', and even the most sober 
accounts of the episode leave the crudity of this fiscal expedient in 
no doubt 2 
A generation later cane an attempt to borrow that was not so much 
crude as extraordinary. The 1590sß parallel to Noray's rebellion k 
was 
the armed resistance of eastern Catholic earls, and in the north- July 
1594 their relations with the government were deteriorating rapidly. 3 
At this point the king approached the defiant earls through an 
intermediary, Lord Home: would they lend him 10,000 crowns? The 
i, Qiurratl, 84, 
2. Knox, Hhsiory, ii, 169-70; cf, Captain Cockburn to Cecil, 2 October 1565, CSP 
Scot,, 11,217, threats were followed by bribery, with the burgh being offered 
the superiority of Leith; for sort on all this, sea lynch, fdM&Pgr, 110-11. 
3, crown, sloafvid, 166. 
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request was politely refused. ' 
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These two episodes took place against very different backgrounds. 
Nary in 1565 needed to borrow for a specific and rare occasion - 
warfare. She was basically solvent, as the Scottish state had 
normally been since medieval times 2 This is the more remarkable in 
that her personal reign followed a period of civil disruption and 
international war, and it was war (rather than court luxury) that was 
the principal drain an the resources of European states of the time. 3 
But by 1594, there had been almost a generation of internal and 
external peace which had made no such demands an the crown's finances, 
and there was no need to borrow to raise an army - 10,000 crowns from 
the Catholic earls would certainly not have been spent on fighting 
them. King James needed the money because, unlike his mother, he 
could not make ends meet. 
intensified fiscal demands were both a cause and an effect of state- 
building in Renaissance monarchies, as new sectors of society were 
brought face to face with the state and its proliferating revenue 
collectors. Store people were taxed, more often, and on a wider range 
of activities. In France, government revenues doubled in real terns in 
the early sixteenth century ;4 the story was similar in 
1, Nava fron Scotland, 21 duly 1594, CSF Scut xi, 378, 
2, Grant, lad ounce afld natlum'w d, 166, 
3, G. Parker, 'The awarganca of lodern finance in Europe, 1500-1750', rho FOntaii 
acurrc. ic history of farr4oi, ii, ad, C, M, Cipolla (London, 1974), 662, 
4. M. Vol f e, rho fiscal syit r of Rehtau rsa icO Francr' (New Haven, 1972), 99-100, 
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Spain. ' Another way in which 1544 differed from 1565 was that this 
process was well under way. Not only was the Scottish fiscal 
administration growing in sophistication (that would not have obviated 
the need for loans, after all: the new absolutist monarchies made 
greater use of loans than before), but a recognizable financial sector, 
able to provide the crown with a range of banking services, had 
developed. And yet the crown still had to resort to outlandish 
contrivances. 
Although deficit finance was becoming increasingly normal, loans had, 
eventually, to be repaid out of revenue. Moreover, each loan was still 
taken out as a response to a specific, urgent requirement; there was 
no Scottish parallel to the growth of long-term, funded debts like the 
French rsntes. 2 So before discussing borrowing and other forms of 
crisis management, it is necessary to look at the ordinary revenue that 
was supposed to suffice for ordinary expenditure. One thing was 
certain: by the 1580s, at least, it no longer did. It was no use 
waiting, Nicawber-like, for something to turn up; action would have to 
be taken, in the words of a 1592 finance commission, 'befoir it cum to 
ower instant necessitie'. 3 In the years after 1594, there was an 
intensified struggle over what form this action should take, a struggle 
which highlights the problems the crown had run into over the past 
generation. The need - and the opportunity - to make real choices in 
the direction that fiscal policy should take became clear during that 
1, Parker, 'Emergence of modern finance', 661, 
2, WIN, Fiscal system of buiiijrrc,, frantic, 92-93, 
3, 'Concernyng the chukkar and the kingis rentis', NLS, Adv, MS 34,2.7, fo, 127r. 
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week in January 1596 when the king was persuaded to supersede his 
financial officers in favour of the eight exchequer auditors who became 
known as the Octavians. Although the Octavians were in sole control 
of the exchequer for only a year, resigning in January 1597, it has 
been convincingly argued that their reign was the high point of a 
regime of fiscal restructuring lasting from early 1595 until aid-1598. ' 
In Prance, the high-powered can sail des finances was superseded in 
1597, only to be replaced by Sully as supreme surintendant des 
finances. It was not the end of financial restructuring, only of one 
administrative approach to it .2 Could this have been so in Scotland 
too? Why, in fact, were the Octavians eclipsed in 1598, and what 
fiscal direction did the government take thereafter? Answers to these 
questions must begin by looking more closely at the opposition to the 
Octavians. The Octavians' own public image was that of dedicated 
professionalism, an image that was widely accepted at the tine. " But 
were there not other influential, even forceful, figures who opposed or 
remained aloof from them? George Home of Spott, for instance, tried 
to persuade the treasurer depute, Robert Melville of Xurdocairny, not to 
resign in January 1598. '' He himself later became earl of Dunbar, and 
as treasurer wielded at least as much power as the Octavians had done. 15 
Edward Bruce, commissary of Edinburgh and future Lord Kinloss, served 
i, Murray, 'Sir John Sksna and the axchsßuar', 127-31, 
2, R. Doucet, Las idItitations di Ja Fra, ica au XUI' ßiitla, i (Paris, 1948), 160, 
3, E. g. Jaws Hudson to Cecil, 14 July 1596, CSP Scot xii, 278, 
4, Nicolssn to Boves, 7 January 1595, CSP Scot xii, 1)2-13, 
5, #WC Nar i Kaliie, 1,65-66, 
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on many parliamentary and privy council commissions in the 1590s, on 
the coinage, ministerial stipends, customs, taxation, cloth manufacture 
and other matters. ' He collected the English subsidy in 1598, and 
argued in favour of the disastrous taxation scheme of 1600.2 Then 
there was the earl of Kar, another future treasurer, who ca-operated 
with some Octavian policies but was never wholeheartedly on their 
side .3 To dismiss these people, as has often been done, as courtiers 
who blocked 'reform' for short-sighted, selfish reasons, is to see the 
events of the late 1590s through the eyes of one party only. There 
was a coherent alternative to the Octavian approach, which deserves to 
be taken seriously. It was never promoted by an identifiable party: 
the 'cubiculars' or 'chamber' faction who appear in the reports of 
disapproving English ambassadors are an amorphous and faceless group. 
But they did exist, and they promoted real policies rather than simply 
wallowing unheeding in the luxury of a bankrupt court. 
Still, the chamber faction scarcely believed in primitive simplicity; 
it was the Octavians who combated the famine of 1598 by reissuing the 
sumptuary legislation of 1581 which looked back austerely to a virtuous 
past. ' The Octavians' identification with the exchequer is 
significant, for to contemporaries, exchequer reform already meant 
1, APS, iii, 553-54, c, 27; iv, 27, c, 31; 33-34, c, 45; 113; 113-14; 145, c, 48; 
RPC, v, 483; vi, 68,98, 
2, List of gratuities to Jaaas VI, c, Novesber 1600, CSP Scot,, xiii, 742-43; 
Nicolson to Cecil, 29 June 1600, C$P Scot,, xiii, 661-64; for sore on the 
taxation schau, sat chapter S. 
3, M. lea, 'King Jaaas's popish chancellor', Rrraissanro and R forHllun in 
ScolJan ads, Cowan A Shaw, 174-75, 
4, Chapter 6. 
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above all the backward-looking policy of recovering crown lands, and 
this in turn was counterposed to the chief alternative: direct taxes. ' 
The Octavian party was thus seen as the party of low taxation. This 
should in itself be a warning not to take the Octavians at face value, 
for the largest direct tax of the century, 200,000 marks in 1597, was 
imposed under their auspices - not to mention the largest single 
increase in indirect taxation .2 But most of the Octavian party's 
efforts went into the recovery of revenue from crown lands and 
traditional feudal dues. This policy necessitated the restriction of 
patronage and access to the king, since it was royal giving that eroded 
the revenues, and it was this restriction, rather than heavy taxation, 
that led to their downfall. 
By contrast, the chamber faction favoured unrestricted spending - 
particularly on handouts to the nobility, which continued to grow until 
the 1630s. This may have been short-sighted and selfish, but it led 
to a definite approach to revenue-raising. The chamber approach was 
never hostile to taxation, and they pressed more urgently for higher 
taxes after 1598: if they failed to find the pot of gold at the end of 
the rainbow, there were nevertheless some solid successes in 
establishing regular parliamentary taxes .3 Coinage debasement was a 
source of easy cash; the mint was idle during the Octavian regime, but 
resumed its work with a vengeance thereafter. While the chamber was 
willing to impose direct taxes on all property-owners, there was a 
i, E, q. Aston to Sows, 14 February 1595, CSP Seat,, xi, 585, 
2, ,? FS, iv, 142-45, c. 48; 118, 
3, Chapter S. 
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tendency to favour indirect taxes which fell largely on the mercantile 
classes: numerous such taxes were tried or proposed after 1508. 
One thing that was not possible in the long term, though the Octavians 
tried it, was to plan ahead. The pressure to spend was so great as to 
engulf anything that could be raised and more; any limitation of 
expenditure was largely unplanned and entirely short-term, arising 
simply through insolvency. The system was income-driven - what was 
raised was spent. The accounting system did not allow advance 
budgeting; the function of the traditional exchequer, a largely passive 
body which met annually to receive accounts, was to prevent fraud. ' 
Under the charge and discharge accounting system, items were recorded 
at the point when liability was incurred rather than when the 
transaction actually took place; this meant the inclusion in the 
accounts of income that had not been collected and expenditure that had 
not been paid out .2 If this gave each account something of 
the 
character of a budget, it was not one that could be used to plan ahead. 
John Skene's 'Proposals' of the early seventeenth century included the 
suggestion that the exchequer should not allow expenditure items 
pericuIo computantis, which would have removed this problem on the 
discharge side, but the proposal was not implemented. ' 
A second planning disadvantage of the accounting system arose fron the 
Chinese walls that separated the financial officers. The 
1, Murray, 'Procedure of the Scottish exchequer', 
2. To, xii, p, xviii; A, L, Murray, 'The exchequer and crown revenue of Scotland, 
1437-1642' (Edinburgh PhD, 1961), 7-9. 
3, Murray, 'Sir John Sk*ne and the txchaqunr', 149, 
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establishment of a permanent exchequer in 1584 was a step towards more 
active fiscal planning. ' However, it was still hard to distribute 
pressure evenly through the system: in the early 1590s, when the 
treasury was staggering ever deeper into deficit, the comptroller's 
accounts on occasion showed a small surplus .2 In 1597-98, when 
Valter Stewart held both offices, it must have been easier to transfer 
funds between the accounts - though by this time it was the 
comptroller's account that needed aid. ' 
If long-term fiscal policy thus ignored expenditure, there was 
nevertheless a tendency to realign expenditure towards more generally- 
acceptable ends. It is impossible to consider expenditure in detail 
here, but trends on spending were sensitive to the changing needs of 
the nobility who made or approved policy. What the nobles needed 
was an increase in cash handouts, particularly pensions. ' This 
redistributive use of crown revenues might be popular with the 
politically powerful, but would lead to long-term problems with the 
non-feudal classes who had to bear an increasing proportion of the 
burden. Nevertheless, actual cuts were unlikely in this branch of 
expenditure - or in any other branch. The cost of the royal 
household, the focus of the privy council's fiscal concerns, had an 
underlying tendency to grow in the 1590s because of the king's marriage 
and growing family. There were occasional cuts, as when the privy 
i, Chapter 3, 
2, ER, xxii, 317,408, 
3, ER, xxiii, 191, 
4, K. H. Brown, 'Aristocratic finances and the origins of the Scottish revolution', 
EAW 104 (1989), 71, 
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council achieved a reduction in household staff to 'farre less nomber 
then had been used' in May 1590. ' In 1620-21 there was an attempted 
freeze on pensions, which by then had eaten away at the revenues to an 
alarming extent .2 But such measures, essentially responses to crisis, 
were rare and probably not significant. Sir James Melville was aware 
of the possibility of cuts in the household - one of his brothers was 
master of the household, while another was treasurer depute; but his 
advice to restrict the number of household officers to two per post was 
probably, like most good advice, easier to give than to act on. * It 
was politically necessary to have a lavish court. 
If there was little prospect of cutting expenditure, there was, in 
theory at least, a good deal of scope for increasing income. Host of 
the traditional sources of revenue were given over to inertia; they had 
sustained the crown for centuries, but a new age was dawning in which 
they faced unprecedented challenges. The policy favoured by the 
Octavians was the recovery of crown lands. These lands, after all, 
had been the mainstay of the crown for a century and a half, reaching 
their greatest extent around 1542.4 What was needed, to combat 
inflation, was vigilant and effective administration, which is what the 
Octavians could offer. The line of attack was clear: exploit to the 
full the crown's right to revoke lands granted out during minorities, 
by using the archives to identify unpaid dues and former crown lands 
i, Domes to Burghley, 31 May 1590, CSP SCOI., x, 306, 
2, Nc Har J Kalii', t, 90-95,99-101, 
3, Melville, /airs, 380, 
4, Murray, 'Exchequer and croon revenue, 172, 
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that were being concealed from the comptroller. 
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But while the theory was obvious, the practice was much less clear. 
Rents were stagnant; inflation on an unheard-of scale had eroded thew. 
But of course many people had a vested interest in fixed rents - some 
of them influential, as we shall see. Moreover, while most alienation 
of crown lands had in the past been by means of freehold grants to 
tenants in chief, the preferred tendency in the sixteenth century was 
to retain the crown's superiority but to set the lands in feu. Feuars 
made cash payments, sometimes large, in return for becoming proprietors 
with only the obligation to pay a feu duty fixed in perpetuity. In 
the early sixteenth century this had done the crown little harms feu 
duties might be as much as the old rent if not more, and inflation was 
not high enough to make much difference. 
Feuing of crown lands had been encouraged by policy-makers on non- 
fiscal grounds: it was felt that feuars, with a secure title to their 
property, were likely to invest in improvements. ' In practice what 
feuing meant was probably not so much investment as increased rents 2 
In an inflationary age, freedom to raise rents was vital to the very 
survival of the landlord class. Rent rises may have been particularly 
likely when fees were granted at the full rate (rather than being, say, 
concessions to relatives at nominal feu duties): the feuars would have 
had to recoup their outlay from the peasants. "-' In the burgh lands of 
1, Macfiill 4 Bettenden, Oiscours, S, 
2, Kurrag, 'Exchequer and crown revenue', 2O1-O2, 
3, Sanderson, Sottish rural tocl'ty, 159, 
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Ayr, the rents had been unchanged for so long that they were actually 
equal to the old extent valuation: feuing in the 1590s was followed by 
vast rent increases. ' Feuing was, in fact, the jolt to the static, 
customary landlord-tenant relationship that an institutional landlord 
needed to break free of the old rents. 
The full contours of the disposal of crown lands have yet to be 
charted, but in the late sixteenth century, their feuing was clearly 
proceeding by leaps and bounds. Statutes encouraging it - or rather, 
permitting it, since feuing was in principle frowned on - were passed 
in 1584 and 1587.2 In 1588 there was an attempt to link feuing with 
agricultural improvement: those taking feus of the crown lands in Fife 
and Strathearn were to be required to plant trees and orchards and to 
build houses and doocots. 3 But it does seem that most feuing was 
simply a source of short-term cash. This trend, which was eventually 
to prove irresistible, was incompatible with the recovery of crown 
revenues from land. Lands granted out could be reclaimed, but once 
feued they were gone for good .4 
The governffient, however, was reluctant to accept the verdict of 
inflation. The seriousness of the determination to rejuvenate landed 
revenues is captured in a warning of a finance commission of 1592 that 
I, Air accomll, p, xxxvii, 
2. APS, iii, 349, c, 5; 439, c, 13, 
3, 'Concsrnyng the chakksr and the kingis rsntis', NLS, Aviv, MS 34,2,17, lo, 121r, 
4, Murray, 'Exchequer and crown revenue', 202-03, 
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this should be 'na utherwiss bot according to law'. ' A series of 
statutes of 1597, originating not in the regime of the Octavians but in 
acts of sederunt of the court of session in 1595 (though the exchequer 
had some input into these), attempted to provide a framework for 
recovery of the crown lands - or rather, for limiting their continued 
dispersal 2 The acts helplessly accepted that more feuing was 
inevitable, but feu duties were at least to be set 'with augmentatioun 
of the rentell' so that the crown would lose out only once inflation 
overtook the existing rents. ' To ensure payment of the feu duties, 
the lands could be forfeited for two years' non-payment. ' Feu dutieG 
themselves were not to be alienated. L' An exception was made even for 
this, allowing the alienation of feu duties of church lands annexed to 
the crown . c, No disposition of crown 
lands other than by feuing was 
allowed. ' 
Parliament was useful to lend authority to this programme. For one 
thing, the assembled notables in parliament were as fully persuaded as 
the king and the exchequer of its desirability: from parliament's point 
of view, the alternative was taxation. One statute required 
parliamentary confirmation of feus, which, if observed, might have 
1, 'Concernym2 the ch! kk? r and the kin2is rtntis', NLS, Adv, MS 34,2,17, fo, 127r, 
2, Murray, 'Sir John Skene and the exchequer', 127-2C; Mackenzie, Obssrrltim-1, 
282. 
3, APS, iv, 131, c, 4, 
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5, 41S, iv, 132, c, 10, 
6, MS, iv, 132, c, 14, 
7, APS, iv, 131, c, 5, 
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helped to limit their number or at least to discourage the granting of 
over-generous terms. ' But parliament was even more necessary because 
the programme was linked with revocations of crown lands. with 
these, the crown took advantage of its position at the apex of the 
feudal pyramid to act as private individuals did in reclaiming lands by 
revoking deeds done in their minority 2 The monarch did not have to 
wait till the age of 21 as others did - the first of many revocations 
of James VI's reign was made in Narch 1575 when he was nine, recalling 
all crown lands granted out since the death of James IV on the grounds 
that only parliament could alienate crown lands. ' This tended to 
undermine the trend towards absolute landownership, and to create a 
fruitful field for intrigue and patronage. Those nominally affected 
would have to wait until the comptroller's officials identified the 
crown's rights, and normally negotiations on a compromise settlement 
would follow. The outcome of those negotiations is invisible from the 
statutes themselves - only a systematic investigation of individual 
cases could establish the result of the political trial of strength 
between crown and other landlords; occasional comments like that of 
1585 that the lands reclaimed by previous revocations had been 'newlie 
impetrat and purchast of his majestie be inoportun and unreasonable 
suittis' perhaps signal a lack of confidence in the bargain the crown 
was obtaining. ' 
i, AfS, iv, 131, c, 4, 
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The 1585 revocation statute was the most significant from the vantage 
point of 1598, when Its enforcement was still hoped for. ' It was more 
far-reaching than those of 1584 and 1587, including fewer individual 
exceptions? It also contained the king's pledge not to regrant any 
reclaimed lands until his 'awin necessiteis' were provided for. 
Similarly there were parliamentary annexations of lands to the crown; 
but these too, if they were to have any effect, would clog up the flow 
of patronage. ' The annexation of 1594 was limited in its scopes a 
companion act explicitly dissolved the annexation of crown lands for 
the purpose of setting them in feu to their existing tenants. '' It was 
predicted in 1595 that exchequer reforms, if they led to greater 
efforts to recover crown land, would 'crab' many important people. " 
None of the revocations could touch feuars, whose titles were rock- 
solid so long as they paid their ever-diminishing duties. But there 
were efforts to increase revenue from existing feuars. There was an 
order, probably in January 1598, to investigate feus in Galloway and 
Lochmaben. E More seriously, the feuars of the Fife crown lands were 
ordered in 1599 to pay increased feu duties, based an a rental of 1487 
that Skene had discovered. The feuars successfully resisted; one of 
i, Copts of docusents rststfng to the rsvaouss of Scotland, 6L, Add, ftS 24,275, 
fo, i6r, 
2, APS, itt, 307-10, c, 26; 439-42, c, 14, 
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them, threatened with eviction, won a case in the court of session, 
arguing that the 1487 duties had been reduced again in 1499 and in any 
case had never been paid. This decision was ratified by parliament in 
1800. The list of the feuars affected, including many eminent 
personages, shows that feuing to kindly tenants did not necessarily 
mean peasants. ' If the duties had been increased before feuing, their 
legal defence would have been much poorer; the Octavians came too 
late. Perhaps that was one reason why the Octavians were so 
interested in the crown lands in the Highlands - an issue to which we 
will return. 
As well as feuing, wadsetting of crown lands seems to have been 
escalating. Vadsets were temporary alienations in return for loans, 
probably betokening greater desperation than feuings crown lands to 
the value of £1,000 were to be wadset in July 1587 when the 
comptroller's revenue could not maintain the royal household until his 
rents could be collected at Xartinmas 2 The act banning disposition 
of crown lands other than by feuing was perhaps aimed at preventing 
wadsetting. 3 If so it was unsuccessful, since L8,000 worth of crown 
lands were being wadset in 1599.1 Official concern about wadset 
crown lands is clearly identifiable in the early seventeenth century. 
Nt Skene recommended that priority shod be given to redeeming them in 
1, iPS, iv, 251-66, c, 56, 
2. APS, iii, 466, c, 53, 
3. r? PS, iv, 131, c, 5, 
550-51. 
Fiscal p, 7Jicy 191 
his 'Proposals' of c. 1605-14. ' In 1610 it was proposed to use a cash 
windfall from an escheat to redeem some wadsets. 2 
The question of crown lands was linked with the statute that squeezed 
the last drop of revenue from the medieval church. On the whole the 
beneficiaries from the dispersal of church property had been, not the 
crown, but the landed classes - the exception being the thirds of 
benefices in 1581 - and with the act of annexation of 1587 the crown 
took over the empty shell of a once-rich ecclesiastical structure. The 
act annexed to the crown the superiorities of monastic and episcopal 
lands as these were no longer 'necesvar nor proffitable'. '" The 
annexation was not 'proffitable' to the crown either; the finance 
commission of 1592 told the king flatly that 'your Manes rent is nevir 
the better'. 4 Very little could be gleaned from the church after this 
final, meagre harvest, as shown by a 1592 order to mulct Coldingham 
and Kelso, two monasteries exempted from the annexation, to pay the 
royal guard - considerably less than 8,000 marks was expected from 
this source. E Thereafter revenues moved if anything back towards the 
church. John Lindsay of Balcarres, one of the Octavians, responded to 
the pressure for more funding for the parish ministry with a report 
proposing that most teinds should be allocated to the church to 
1, Murray, 'Sir John Skene and the exchequer', 160, 
2, Copies of documents relating to the revenues of Scotland, EL, Add, MS 24,275, 
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compensate for its lost lands. ' The king later decided to restore 
what could still be found of the bishops' ancient revenues. There was 
an abortive move to do this in the 1800 parliament, and it was 
successful in 1606 .2 
Though the king eventually came to regard the act of annexation as 
'vile`, parliament in the early 1590s continued to legislate to make it 
effective. 21 A census of church lands and thirds of benef ices was 
ordered in 1592.4 Since the comptroller in 1599 was wanting a rental 
of annexed church lands to be compiled, this may not have happened. " 
Registers of rentals and fees of church lands were to be compiled by 
two 1597 statutes, perhaps following on from the inventory of crown 
land that Skene had compiled in 1595. c, The main problem was that 
revenues from these lands slipped through the crown's fingers, ending 
up, as usual, in the hands of secular lords. In 1592 and 1594 there 
were statutes limiting pensions granted from benefices, and ordering 
that no more church lands should be erected as secular lordships. ' 
However, none of these acts could be passed without conceding a host of 
exceptions 1' 
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Another fiscal question which was administratively related to landed 
revenue was that of feudal casualties. The Octavians favoured driving 
a hard bargain over these. One of the points on which they insisted 
at their appointment was that wards, nonentries, marriages, bastardies, 
liferents and recognitions should be held for 40 days before being 
granted out, and escheats of moveables for eight days; they were not 
to be sold or disponed before then, and even after that only to the 
highest bidder. ' This would have cut off much of the flow of 
patronage that lubricated the court. Because the issue was so such an 
administrative one, there seems to have been very little legislative 
effort specifically directed at increasing income from feudal 
casualties - no statutes were passed on wardship after 1491, for 
instance .2 The administrative framework was well established; 
indeed, probably the last significant change had been the 
administrative supersession of the sheriffs by the treasurer in 1471.3 
In 1581 there was a brief revocation, of unknown but perhaps small 
effectiveness, of all casualties granted since the beginning of James 
VI's reign., ' in 158? parliament enacted that casualties 'sail not be 
gevin away in gryte, as of the casualities of ane haill cuntrie 
togidder'. E The practice was probably towards the granting of 
casualties on increasingly generous terms. 
i, RPC, v, 760, 
2, A'S, it, 224-25, cc, 6-7, 
3, C. Madden, 'Royal treatsant of feudal casualties in late sudisval Scotland', SM '
56 (1976), 173, 
4, RPS, iii, 243-44, c. 69, 
6. JPS, iii, 466, c, 54, pars 2. 
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There were, however, some prominent struggles over fiscal feudalism, 
concentrating on two issues which may have been seen as test cases for 
a more thorough-going revival of feudal rights. Economically 
speaking, collecting burgh mails in sterling and converting bleach 
fermes to cash were not going to solve the crown's money problems. A 
statute of 1592 ordered that the requirement of most burgh charters to 
pay mails in 'striviling money' should be enforced literally - meaning 
English currency, then ten times the value of Scottish. ' The act was 
initially ignored; Aberdeen won a case against it in the court of 
session in 1595-96, but the most serious attempt to enforce it came in 
1600.2 Burgh mails were worth £740 in 1593, so a tenfold increase 
would have been welcome to the crown, but it was hardly worth the 
storm that it provoked - the burghs paid only 1265 in 1597, for 
instance, probably as a deliberate protest. ' In the end a compromise 
was reached, in which some burghs conceded smaller increases. ' The 
attack on blench fermes came with an exchequer order of 1596.15 It 
was reversed in 1606 when a statute observed that holders by blench 
ferme were being 'yeirlie without any just cause burdenit, urgeit and 
compellit to mak payment in his hienes chekker', and ordered the 
payment of blench fernes on demand only, effectively abandoning then. 
The act's harsh words on the exchequer, and the protest entered against 
the act by the lord advocate, show that it was an opposition 
i, APS, iii, 561, c, 36, 
2, Abern C4U1TCil letters, 1,63-66, 
3, ER, xxii, 291-92; xxiii, 192-93, 
4, RCRB, ti, 69-71; Apr icciuirti, p, xviii, 




A central aspect of the management both of crown land and of fiscal 
feudalism was the struggle for the royal signature. Casualties arose 
constantly, and lands still came into crown hands through revocations, 
through the act of annexation, and through forfeitures. Would they be 
granted out again, and if so on what terms? A running battle over 
this question was waged between the court and council: between 
politicians concerned to distribute patronage (and forever seeking for 
new ways of giving to bolster their position), and administrators with 
some concern for collecting the revenue. James VI's tutor, George 
Buchanan, sided with the latter. Tired of upbraiding the young king 
for lack of restraint in signing petitions and grants, he administered 
a practical lesson: one day, James discovered that he had signed a 
deed making his tutor king for a fortnight. ' James may have been 
both careless and generous, but it is unhelpful to focus on his 
personal qualities: the struggle was endemic in the patronage system. 
Nor was it always a problem. In a sense the system maintained a 
creative tension between the courtiers and the administrators: the 
preponderance of historiographical sympathy for the latter's point of 
view is misplaced, for the crown clearly needed both to raise revenue 
and to distribute rewards. 
This discussion must rely on administrative sources, but because 
administrators were partisans in the struggle, care is needed in 
i, QPS, iv, 387-88, c. 13, 
2,1,8, Macfarlane, 85, tha, ian (London, 1981), 448-49. 
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evaluating their complaints. Even Queen Elizabeth was castigated as 
'too liberal' by her lord treasurer. ' In Scotland the issue was not 
new; unregulated royal giving had been claimed as a problem under 
James V and before .2 Melville thought that Mary was 'naturally 
liberall, more than ache had moyen'. 3 The court of session ordered a 
chancery writer not to pass irregular royal signatures in 1568.4 In 
March 1567 there was a freeze on gratis dispositions of gifts, pensions 
and tacks. 'l But neither Nary nor her father had the serious money 
problems that James VI faced. If James VI was too liberal, it was not 
because he distributed rewards without obtaining political advantage, 
but because the demand for patronage exceeded the supply. 
The chief weapon available to the privy council was to use parliament 
to make rules requiring either that the council itself should approve 
signatures, or that only officers of state should present signatures to 
the king, or sometimes both. The most intense period for such 
activity was between 1578 and 1593. In 1578, a statute appointing a 
new privy council laid down detailed rules on grants of casualties and 
infeftments in lands: essentially, new or altered infeftments had to be 
considered by the council. Only renewals in which there was 'na thing 
changit bot the persoun quha salbe infeft' could go direct from suitor 
to king to treasurer, while the comptroller was authorized to set tacks 
1, F, C, Dietz, English p itlit fi, rarice, FSS9-1611 (2nd *do., London, 1964), 32, 
2, Hannay, 'foundation of the college of justice`, 32, 
3, Melville, Awirs, Ill. 
4, Acts of seJJrrrnt, 9, 
S. BL, Royal MSS, 18 8 vi, fo, 231r, 
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only for up to five years and to renew kindly tenancies. The keepers 
of the seals were not to pass any grants not following this procedure. 
Financial officers were not to answer the king's precepts for cash 
payments without the council's approval. ' In 1579, a similar but 
simpler statute ordered that none but the financial officers should 
present signatures to the king :2 there were three attempts to enforce 
this in the next two years .3 This position was temporarily abandoned 
during the spending spree of the Lennox regime, a statute of 1581 on 
'importune and untymous suitters' accepting that suitors could present 
signatures to the king so long as they did not demand an immediate 
answer. ` The 1579 position was restored in 1585.6 
The growth of a permanent exchequer aided the administrators, though 
perhaps the end result was only to prolong the hard-fought retreat. 
The privy council handed over much of the responsibility for 
considering signatures - and, presumably, for continuing the struggle 
to be allowed to consider then - to the exchequer in 1500.91 This 
arrangement was ratified, broadly, by several statutes of 1592 and 
1593.7 In 1587 there were to be na parliamentary ratifications until 
the appropriate composition had been paid to the treasurer, but nothing 
i, APS, ttt, 97-98, c, 4, 
2.4PS, ttt, 151, c, 32, 
3. RPC, iii, 284-85,326,349, 
4, AFS, iii, 229, c, 39, 
6, AC'S, iii, 380, c. 16, 
6. RPC, iv, 561-62, 
7. 4P$, iii, 560, c, 34; 562-63, c, 41; iv, 19, c, 18, 
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was said about how this was to be enforced. ' This can be coapared 
with a 1592 statute despairingly enacting that the parliamentary 
ratifications, of which there were a record number in this parliament, 
would not be valid without the treasurer's signature . 22 A more 
practical measure, perhaps, was to order the establishment of a 
register of signatures, recording their progress through the 
bureaucracy, in an attempt to eliminate antedated grants. 3 
There were no elaborate regulations on signatures for the next five 
years. The Octavians simply made the king promise not to sign 
anything without their approval; uniquely, while it lasted, their 
regime had the political muscle to enforce this. ' Their successors, 
however, did not. In early 1599 there were orders that signatures 
should be passed through the seals and that the comptroller and 
treasurer of new augmentations should authorize all dispositions of 
annexed and erected church lands. & Casualties were not to be granted 
out by the king but to be componed for in the treasurer's office. ' In 
Jane 1599 there was even an order that all who had obtained 
infeftnents, remissions, legitimation or other signatures were to pass 
then through the great seal by 1 August. ' Since there were fewer 
i, APS, iii, 457, c, 54, pir& 14, 
2. AFS, iii, 563, c, 42, 
3. APS, iii, 569, c, 51, 
4, RPC, Y, 757, 
S. RPC, Y, 542,652-63, 
6, APS, iv, 180, 
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great seal charters registered in June and July 1599 than in the 
corresponding period in 1598, this can have had little effect., The 
same might be said of any of these measures, but it is hard to believe 
that all that effort was wasted. Xore detailed study would be needed 
to establish when, if ever, the administrators were able to establish 
control over royal giving; the impression given by the administrative 
measures is that patronage was relatively unchecked in the early 1580s, 
in the late 1590s, and possibly in the early 1590e too; before then, 
the crown's relatively secure finances had made the problem less 
urgent. 
All these failures, caused as such as anything by conflict between 
supporters of the Octavian and chamber approaches, must have been 
frustrating. So it must have been good to find an issue that all 
sections of the governing class could unite on: the customs. Skene 
thought that 'thair is na rent of his hienes propirtie quhairin his 
hienes is sa far prejugit as in the abuis of his hienes gret costumes'? 
Perhaps, but this probably tells us more about the attitudes of the 
ruling class - who were landlords, not merchants - than about actual 
trading practices, for the most detailed investigation of the latter has 
uncovered evidence only of moderate customs evasion. ' Probably the 
landed classes looked with a more censorious eye on customs fraud than 
on, say, those who concealed a wardship or evaded a revocation of crown 
I. RNS, vi, nos, 721-6 , 919-48, 
2, Quoted in Murray, 'Sir John Skene and the exchequer', 145, 




Medieval customs were traditionally levied only on exports, at more or 
less permanently fixed rates. This, however, was coming to an end: 
in England, for instance, the customs had been freed from inertia in 
1558.1 In Scotland, in December 1582 the convention of royal burghs 
had been forced to deny a 'senister report' that customs were being 
evaded, and to offer under pressure to take the customs in tack .2A 
four-year tack of the customs was agreed in March 1583, with the 
burghs paying 14,000 and 30 tuns of wine per year. ' This was a 
defensive measure by the burghs: when the tack was renewed in 1588, 
it was done only because the alternative was higher customs rates. 
Despite efforts to improve collection procedures, the burghs' collectors 
could not raise enough to break even on the contract, and more than 
once the convention of royal burghs had to tax its members for 'inlaik 
of the customes'. ° Effectively, then, the crown had increased its 
income from the customs by a roundabout method: the burghs had chosen 
to provide this extra money through taxation on themselves rather than 
through increased customs duties. Artisans and small merchants were 
subsidising the large overseas traders. 
This arrangement was too unusual to last, and the customs returned to 
i, Dietz, iVlisi public finance', 7. 
2. RCR6, i, 347-48. 
3, PCRB, 1,152-54,158-61; ER, xxi, pp, lviii-lxii, 561-64. 
4, RCR8,1,207,235. 
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direct management in September 1589. ' This might have been the time 
to raise the customs duties, something the 1587 parliament had asked 
the exchequer to consider .2 But by now the government was 
concentrating on another, related objective: taxing wine imports. 
This measure had already been taken in England in 1558 and in Ireland 
in 1589 - in Ireland's case it was almost the only fiscal change of 
this period. -' Scotland's tax, introduced by a convention in July 1590, 
imposed a duty of three crowns per tun of wine imported, less 10 per 
cent for 'the lekkage'. ° Mithin months the tax was being demanded on 
re-exports as well, and 'the boroughs withstood the order set downs', 
with Dundee even being put to the horn before the government relented. 3 
in the final agreement, negotiated in March 1591, the government agreed 
not to levy the tax on re-exports, and to change the duty to £8 per 
tun. As part of the deal, it was recorded that the king 'promittis the 
saidis burrowis that the payment of thair customes sail not be alterit 
nor changeit fra the forms that hes beine usit thir fourtie yeiris 
bygone sa long as the said impost is liftit'. 6 
Not surprisingly, this practise was being cited by the burghs in 1597, 
when the traditional customs rates were finally raised, as evidence of 
1, RPC, iv, 416, 
2, r9PS, 111,455, c, 51, 
3, Dietz, English public fInancir, 306-07; S, 6, Ellis, Tyr bell d, crovn, 
c mmflity and the conflict of cultures, 1470-ISM (London, 1965), 174-76, 
4, RPC, iv, $14, 
3, Bowes to Burghley, 3 April 1591, CSP Scot x, 494; Edle, Rocs., v, 34, 
6, 'Concernyn the chekker and the kingis rentie', NLS, Adv, MS 34,2,17, fo, 2v, 
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official duplicity. ' Export duties went up dramatically, and new 
customs were imposed on imports. ' This was a striking success. The 
burghs' protests were brushed aside. 3 The measure was first passed 
by a convention, and when parliament came to ratify it, what purported 
to be a transcript even added a new clause highlighting its class 
nature: landlords were allowed to import or export goods for their own 
use duty-free. ' In January 1601 the wine import tax went up from £7 
18s (this figure presumably represents the t8 of 1591 minus a leakage 
allowance) to t27 18s per tun; resistance to this duty led to its 
reduction to t21 the following October, and again an element of class 
privilege was introduced with the duty on wine for nobles' and lairds' 
households being only £7. E 
The expanding fiscal power of the state was mainly used to exploit the 
merchants, not the landed classes. The state completely failed to lift 
the incubus of tradition from the land tax. Direct parliamentary 
taxation was such a significant question for the government, and for 
taxpayers of all propertied classes, that it is dealt with in more 
detail in the next chapter. Here it is only necessary to say that 
the government did achieve some success in imposing taxes which in the 
early 1580s were more frequent than before, and from 1588 were far 
heavier. However, there were many structural problems with the 
I Mi'CR8,11,19-21, 
2, APS, iv, ii8, 
3, (din, hcf,, v, 161, 
4. At'S, iv, 135-36, c, 22, 
6, RFC, vi, 200-01,291, 
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antiquated assessment and collection system for direct parliamentary 
taxes on land, at first concealed but eventually only too obvious. The 
government suffered some embarrassing defeats which crippled its hopes 
of using parliamentary taxes on a scale for which they had never been 
designed. The only alternative was to continue along the lines begun 
in 1590s with even heavier exactions from commerce and finance - in 
particular the 1621 taxation of annual rents. ' 
Although this is not the place to discuss the tax on annual rents, it 
is worth pointing out that the search for some such tax had a long 
history. The success with the customs pointed the way for the policy- 
makers, and from 1597 onwards they were casting around for new 
indirect taxes. A convention in December 1599 was called mainly to 
revise parliamentary tax assessments. -- However, it also considered a 
novel proposal for an excise an sales of grain (16d per ball), cattle 
(2s each) and sheep (12d each), reportedly to meet the king's need for 
Z500,000? This was surely an exaggerated sum to expect from any tax, 
even though crown debts and pressing expenditure may well have reached 
such a figure. ° It may have been presented as a tar or penalty on 
forestalling (sales outside official markets), as Hoysie described it 
when recording that it had been dropped after being 'mourmoured 
against1. & It is hard, however, to imagine how a tax on forestalling 
i, 0. Stevenson, 'The king's Scottish revers and the Covenantors, 1625-1651', 
Historical Jo+vrRa1,17 (1974), 19, 
2. Chapter S. 
3, Aston to Cecil, 16 8acaaber 1599, CSP Scot,, xiii, 584, 
4, Cf, Nicolson to Cecil, 6 February 1600, CSP Scot xiii, 622-23, 
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could have been collected. The English ambassador was told the next 
February that the idea was not dead, but that if ever imposed it would 
be sure to be resisted by force, so unpopular had it been; ' a week 
later the idea was officially buried, with a proclamation denying that 
it had ever been planned -2 
In Nap 1601, Thomas Foulis was told that he, Thomas Acheson and Robert 
Jowsie would get the money the crown owed them (of which more below) 
if he could devise a tax worth 4180,000 over 11 years - but it would 
have to be 'nawyse grevous to his majesteis loyall subjectis'. 8 To 
square this circle he may have proposed a tax on cloth manufacture, 
since this was an idea that the burghs were lobbying against, 
successfully, in July. 4 
The only tax on domestic trade that was actually imposed in this 
period - and then only briefly - was a tax on wine sales. A levy of 
12d in the pint was ordered in January 1001, at the same time that 
wine import duties were quadrupled, and a minimum price of 6s per pint 
was set. E, A sales tax was something quite new, and it could have been 
highly significant if it had succeeded in putting a new tax-collection 
machinery in place. It was the machinery that probably failed - 
nothing could stop the vintners continuing to sell wine at 5s per pint, 
i, Nicolson to Cecil, 6 February 1600, CSP Scot xiii, 621. 
2, R'C, vi, 205-06, 
3, RPC, vi, 245-47, 
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presumably without paying the tax. ' The privy council attempted to 
enforce the tax in March 1601, but by October it had been abandoned. -- 
As well as these taxes on commerce, the state might go into business 
on its own account. Would this lead to direct public investment in 
the hope of a return? Parliament gave a good deal of attention to the 
mining of gold, silver and lead, but this was largely a question of 
granting leases of mining rights and leaving the lessees to raise the 
capital' The inventor and entrepreneur Bustace Roche, for instance, 
had a tack of the mines from 1583.4 However, a consignment of his 
lead ore was arrested at Leith in 1590, apparently for failure to pay 
his tack duties. E In 1592 there was a brief attempt at direct 
management, under John Lindsay of Balcarres as master of the metals 
and Thomas Foulis as master refiner; however, it seems that their 
preferred management option was to feu the mines to landlords. 6 
There was little or no direct crown investment. 
A different business project, less glamorous than the quest for El 
Dorado but striking in its own way, was unveiled in 1599, when the 
crown's debts were crying to be paid. Eustace Roche had developed a 
new type of salt pan which he would build with crown finance. An act 
#, £irrai, 'Oiiry', 53-54, 
2, AM vi, 230,513-14, 
3, Lythe, (com ay of ScoiIi d, 51-57, 
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of convention authorized the borrowing of £20,000 at more than the 
legal 10 per cent interest in order to build two salt pans. ' At that 
price they must have been remarkable pieces of technology, since an 
ordinary pan could be built for £2,500 or less in the 1620e 2 They 
were expected to be so profitable as to pay for themselves, and then to 
fund the building of further, similar pans as well as rewarding Roche 
and paying the crown's x. 25,000 debt to William Stewart, cammendator of 
Pittenweem, who was appointed comptroller of the salt pans for this 
purpose. There is no evidence that any such salt pans were built. 
The crown lands offered possibilities for official enterprise. James V 
had gone into business as a sheep farmer' Stocking the royal parks 
with sheep was one of the ideas that Melville offered the king in the 
1590s, and the Octavians favoured it too. ' However, their preferred 
area of official spending in the hope of a long-term return was not 
strictly a business project at all. What they wanted was to attack 
the Highlands, partly an general policy grounds but also to gain 
control of the lands that had once belonged to the lordship of the 
Isles and to which the crown now had a nominal title. 
This was a project that required a large outlay on warfare. The 
finance commission of 1592 advised that an Isles expedition be called 
i I. iQPS, iv, 182-84, 
2, C, A, Yhattey, The Scottish salt i try, 1570-100 (Aberdeen, 1987), 79, 
3. P. Symms, 'Soge aspects of the sheep farming activities of James V', Scottish 
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revenue', 175-76, 
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off, as it would not be 'effectuall' in paying for itself. ' There were 
such expeditions, but eventually the government decided to adopt the 
same approach as to the mines - grant out the rights to the Highlands, 
and let the expense of colonization be borne by private capital. Thus 
was born the Lewis adventure, in which a group of 'adventurers' from 
Fife sought to take advantage of strife among Lewis's ruling MacLeod 
family to conquer the island. The adventurers financed the first 
expedition themselves, and were promised legal possession of the island 
in return for a large feu duty. ' The Lewis people's resistance 
defeated them, however, and in 1605 the crown had to pay for an 
expedition on their behalf. ' By now this was done on grounds of 
general policy; the idea of an economic return from investment in 
colonization had receded. Ironically, the ultimate beneficiaries from 
the Lewis fiasco, the Kacgenzies of Kintail, may have been successful in 
agricultural reorganization, if a 1615 report that the island was 
'dispeopled' betokens a deliberate policy on their part., ' 
If the western Isles failed to yield up any revenue, there were more 
solid prospects from foreign countries. The significance of Mary's 
dowry as dowager queen of Prance is only Just beginning to be 
appreciated: 60,000 Iivres taurnais (ß, 30,000 Scots) annually was a 
fabulous sum, funding more than half of all the queen's household 
t, `Concernyng the chekker and the kingii rantii', NLS, Adv. HS 34,2,17, f027v, 
2. APS, iv, 160-64, 
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officers. ' James VI was keenly aware of the possibility of 
Continental subsidies; he probably hoped in 1594 that the Catholic 
earls might prove a conduit for Spanish gold. Huch diplomatic effort 
was expended in vain on the search for such funds 2 But the main 
chance was closer at hand. The English were prepared to spend money 
to establish or bolster a sympathetic regime in Scotland; when 
official Scottish policy was not pro-English enough, the money went to 
nobles who were believed to be 'well affected'. 2' There had been 
intermittent payments from England to the Scottish government since at 
least the regency of Moray. ' A regular subsidy began at £4,000 
sterling per year, in 1586. r, In real terms this was not much more 
than half what Mary had received from France, and by the late 1580s 
only £3,000 sterling was being paid; but even that was received by the 
impoverished Scottish government as a 'legion of angels'. 6- 
There was, however, no guarantee that `angels' would descend to help the 
Scottish crown out of crisis. James VI learned early about the 
precarious state of his finances: one crisis struck just as he was 
beginning to take a role in government. Having made the first formal 
I, H, freengrass, 'Mary, dowager queen of France', Karp Stauart, ed. Lynch, 172-75. 
2, R, S, £rydon, 'The finances of James VI, 1557-1603' (Edinburgh PhD, 1925), ch, /, 
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entry into his capital, he had to go on progress through Fife and Angus 
in the summer of 1580; 'this progresse was devised becaus the Lord 
Ruthven, treasurer, alledged the treasurie was exhausted'. ' It is 
surprising that these progresses did not become the regular money- 
saving events that they were in England for Elizabeth 2 However, 
there were certain recognizable policies which were regularly adopted 
to stave off insolvency. 
Kost of the crown's income was inflexible; the most conventional 
sources of revenue, like crown lands, doubly so. But naturally 
expenditure fluctuated - and when it also had a tendency to run ahead 
of income, each crisis seemed more serious than the last. Suddenly, 
the crown badly needed a source of loans to tide itself over. 
Kedieval Europe had had only a few sources of large loans, and larger 
states had tended to raise their loans on the international money 
market. In the last three decades of the sixteenth century, England, 
which had hitherto sought loans in places like Antwerp, witnessed a 
decisive break with the past: the Elizabethan regime sought instead a 
relationship with the domestic financial sector. 8 Scotland seems 
never to have needed the Continental bankers, but on a smaller scale 
the Scottish government, too, now sought to tap domestic capital. 
Traditionally, apart from the occasional forced loan like that raised 
from Edinburgh in 1585, most borrowing had taken place within the 
i, Calderwoode N iiity, 111,462. 
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crown's accounting system. The financial officers, principally the 
treasurer and comptroller, were personally liable for the debts they 
incurred on the crown's behalf (the crown having also, of course, a 
liability to reimburse them): as a result they might have to bear 
deficits out of their own resources. They were rewarded, of course - 
in fact, this was the principal service for which they were rewarded; 
and as late as 1581 the treasurership was reckoned a 'proffytable' 
office. ' Robert Richardson, treasurer at that time, had risen from the 
lowly post of treasurer clerk, but he left his sons as lairds 2 This 
would have seemed bitterly ironic to the earl of Gowrie, treasurer in 
1582, when a list of debts incurred in the crown's service was sent to 
the English government: Gowrie himself was overspent by £33,000, the 
treasurer depute by £8,000, the comptroller by 15,000 and the collector 
general by £4,000. Together with £3,000 owed to the captain of 
Dumbarton castle, the crown's debts according to this report amounted 
to £51,000. =' Though it excoriated the duke of Lennox, whoa it blamed 
for the shambles, the report seems actually to have underestimated the 
deficit: in March 1582 the treasurer's superexpenses alone were 
£45,377.4 By May 1583, the treasurer's accounts recorded debts to the 
treasurer depute of 114,342, to the master of the mint of 15,082, and to 
Gowrie of £87,488. rl To add further irony, one of Gowrie'e creditors 
1, Randolph to Cecil, 17 October 1661, CSP Scot 1,660, 
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was a son of his predecessor, Robert Richardson. ' Gowrie had to 
wadset his own lands to bear the burden of hie office, claiming the 
interest payments in his accounts .2 The system was getting out of 
hand. 
The response, partly a sign of greater administrative sophistication, 
but partly betokening desperation in the face of crisis, was a growing 
distinction between administrators and financial entrepreneurs. 
Earlier financial officers, like Gowrie, had fulfilled the function both 
of administrator and of provider of reluctant credit. This continued; 
the treasurers in particular ran up enormous deficits from the late 
1570s on, with the comptrollers' deficits remaining relatively under 
control at least until the later 1590s. But these deficits were no 
longer the sale source of credit: a new breed of financier arose, which 
was to prove a source of loans on an unprecedented scale. Meanwhile, 
the making of policy tended to devolve upon officers who did not 
provide credit themselves. 
The emergence of these new administrators can be traced back to the 
early 1580s, a seminal time for financial administration as in so many 
other fields. The first permanent exchequer was set up in 1584, 
eventually becoming an active administrative department with auditors 
who did not bear the personal liability of treasurer and comptroller. ' 
Their responsibilities can be illustrated by an exchequer report, in 
1, iV'S, iii, 400, c, 32, 
2. TA, 1581-82, $RQ, 821162, fo, 67r, 
3, Chapter 3. 
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August 1585, on the work they had done in finding some rents to shore 
up the unstable finances of the royal household for the rest of the 
year. They took the opportunity to observe that the treasurer's latest 
super-expenses were 'greit and difficill to be spedelie relevit, gif it 
sall not be your hienes guid plesour to foirbeire for a tyme the 
subscryving of signatures gratis'. ' In July 1587, Xaitland of 
Thirlestane wrote to the exchequer outlining the desperate financial 
state of the royal household, and appointing a special commission of 11 
to overcome the crisis and to discover a 'likelie and possible meaner' 
of paying the crown's debts before 'confirmatioun of confusioun' was 
reached .2 One was David Carnegie of Colluthie, a future Octavian. 
Some of these commissioners did lend to the crown themselves - the 
advocate John Sharp of Houston, for instance. -" But the sums were 
modest, and their money was far less important than their 
administrative talent. 
A similar commission reported in 1592, stressing that drastic action 
was needed. To underline this, it suggested sacking all the financial 
officers, and came down, as the Octavians were to do, in favour of 
recovering crown lands rather than imposing taxation. This would 
have been popular in parliament, and the commission advised involving 
parliament in the work of the treasurer by having a committee of three, 
one from each traditional estate, to authorize all grants of feudal 
casualties along with the treasurer: this would prevent them being 
1, 'Concernyng the chakker and the kfngts rentis', NLS, Adv. MS 34,2,17, fo, 174v, 
2, Maitland to the exchequer, 18 July 1587, SRO, PA7/1/3, 
3, M, H, B, Sanderson, Miry StawrtIs people (Edinburgh, 1987), 25-26. 
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granted 'ower guid chaip' since parliament knew that the alternative 
was taxation. ' An exchequer commission of January 1595 foreshadowed 
the Octavians in another way, by proposing to replace the financial 
officers with 'mene' men. ' This commission may not itself have been 
effective; '` however, the proposal for 'mane' financial officers shows 
that the government had moved away from the assumption that the 
officers should be the major source of royal credit. while the 
Octavians in 2596 opted to take over some of the financial offices 
themselves, they did install one 'mene' officer, the obscure Henry 
Vardlaw, chamberlain of Dunfermline, in the new post of receiver 
general, responsible for the entire income not only of the former 
comptroller, but also of the treasurer of new augmentations (the 
receiver of duties from church lands annexed in 1587) and of the mint. 4 
if Vardlaw was appointed for his administrative abilities rather than 
his wealth, this underlines the fact that the crown was increasingly 
looking elsewhere for loans. An entirely new type of financial 
entrepreneur would supplement and eventually overtake the established 
financial officers of the crown as a source of credit, and sometimes 
take over many of the latter's accounting functions too. The 
Reformation period had marked an end to the occasional presence in 
Edinburgh of Italian bankers; thereafter Scots took their place. 6' 
1, `Concernyng the chekker and the kingis rentis`, NLS, Ady, MS 34,2,17, fo. 127v, 
2. Aston to Boves, 18 January 1595, CSP Scot,, xi, 616, 
3, Lee, Maitland of Thlrlesi m, 284, 
4, ER, xxiii, 134, 
5,5,6, Checkland, Scottish banoi"ing; a history, J$9S-l9ä (Glasgow I London, 
1975), 726-27. 
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Probably the real credit explosion is to be dated in the early 
seventeenth century, but it clearly had its precursors. ' Janet 
Fockart, for instance, was a merchant and moneylender who lent to the 
crown among others in the 1570s. 2 Unlike the new-style administrator, 
who made policy but did not bear personal liability, the importance of 
the near-style entrepreneur was simply that he or she could put large 
cash sums on the line. Such people are less visible in the official 
sources, for they made policy only indirectly - by deciding either to 
lend or not; but ultimately this would come to be the decisive voice 
in fiscal policy. 
The explosion of borrowing was not confined to the state, nor to 
isolated individuals staggering from crisis to disaster. Burghs were 
running up debts: in Ayr, the merchant John Lockhart was effectively a 
banker to the burgh for the entire decade 1578-88.0' Nobles too were 
running up semi-permanent deficits. ' Were these borrowers taking 
advantage of newly-sophisticated banking opportunities, or were they 
treading a primrose path to ruin? Examples of both could be found; 
not all debtors were insolvent, certainly. But the accumulating 
wreckage of private and public bankruptcy clearly denotes a new and 
significant extension of the tentacles of credit throughout the economy. 
Some financial entrepreneurs no doubt provided only occasional loans to 
i, Brown, 'Edinburgh aarchant elite', 239-42, 
2, Sanderson, Harp Stewart Is people, 99, 
3. Apr accounts, 151-52, 
4, Brown, 'Aristocratic finances', 60-53, 
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the crown, trusting to receive repayment in the long term and royal 
favour in the meantime. Such loans occasionally appear in the 
treasurer's accounts in the 1590s. A complicated transaction took 
place in 1593: John Arnott, merchant of Edinburgh, was owed a large 
sum by the crown, and in May received payment of 110,000 from the 
queen's tocher (of which more below) deposited with the burgh of 
Edinburgh. ' The opportunity was too good to miss, and by the next 
month £1,800 of the money was in the treasurer's hands 'by the king's 
command`? Most such loans went through the king's hands directly, 
never being recorded in the accounts. In some ways this was 
primitive and haphazard - it certainly must have made budgeting 
difficult. But in some ways it was actually more sophisticated, 
because the chief credit agents made their own accounts. Thomas 
Foulis and his partner Robert Jowsie, merchant of Edinburgh, through 
whose hands part of the English subsidy passed in 1593, were making 
their own accounts separate from those of the treasurer. ' Accounts of 
this kind could provide the crown with limited credit. Joweie was 
making regular accounts of this kind, from 1590 at least, of apparel 
provided to the royal household. ' 
To provide full banking services to the state, including large-scale 
overdraft facilities, financial entrepreneurs like Foulis and Jowsie had 
to get their hands an some regular revenue. Traditional revenue was 
I, £di, 7, Rors" if, se-89, 
2, TA, 1592-93, SRO, E21169, fo, 184v. 
3, TA, 1592-93, SRO, E21/69, fo. 225r, 
A. Apparel accounts, 1590-1600, SRO, E35/13, 
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in the hands of the traditional officers, which left four main 
possibilities: the mines, the English subsidy, the customs, and the 
coinage. Foulis, in his heyday a giant among financiers, tried all 
four, and one of his surviving accounts is of critical importance in 
illustrating how he handled three of then. ' His career may serve as 
an epitome of the new and sometimes tense relationship between capital 
and government. 
One of Foulis' early interests was in the mines, no doubt through his 
trade as a goldsmith and his post as sinker of the irons in the mint 2 
As we have seen, he became master refiner of the metals in 1592, a post 
in which he was confirmed in 1594 for good service. ' However, in 
1594 he also obtained a tack of the mines, retaining all the revenues 
in return for an annual duty of 1,666 13s 4d - which was one of the 
items, though only the smallest, on the charge side of his account., ' 
As late as 1619 he was prospecting for gold at Leadhills with a royal 
licence, but considering the heights he had reached during the late 
1590s this does seem something of a come-doan. E 
Foulis' sheet-anchor in difficult times was his growing control over 
the English subsidy. This was instant, easy cash, attractive to an 
impecunious king, and often it went the same way as much ready money: 
i, Accounts of Thous Foutis, king's goldssith, 1594-95, SRO, E30/14, 
2, RSS, viii, no. 1722, 
3. A'S, tii, 659, c, 31; iv, 84-86, c, 71, 
4. Foulis' accounts, 1594-95, SRO, E30/14, fo, iv, 
5, J. K. Caseron, 'Sole Continental visitors to Scotland', Scotland and (argue, . d, 
Stout, 61, 
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it was spent. The king in 1593 appropriated much of it as packet 
money. ' But there were pressures to use it more strategically. The 
fact that it was usually paid in London encouraged the growth of 
banking services: Foulis, or his brother David who acted as his London 
agent, received the subsidy in at least five of the years between 1592 
and 1598. £2,000 sterling in 1593 never left London, but was 
allocated with English co-operation to pay debts there2 Even more 
was in fact spent in England: Foulis received £7,880 sterling in 
subsidy in 1594-95, and the discharge of his account shows many 
sterling items, ranging from the t21 (L210 Scots) that he paid for 'ane 
greit allabast stane' for the chapel royal in Stirling and 'certane laid' 
for Linlithgow palace, to the £1,828 (L18,280 Scots) paid to Jowsie to 
settle some of the latter's English debts. ' The fact that Faults could 
establish such a strong claim to this tempting source of income is an 
indicator of his indispensability. 
By 1594 Foulis had moved into the coinage. In January he persuaded a 
convention of estates to pass an act for a new gold and silver 
currency, with the silver to be raised to 50s per ounce of lid fine 
silver. ' With the mint paying 42s for the 40s silver pieces (each 
piece one ounce, 11d fine) issued in the early 1580s, a gross profit of 
over 20 per cent was in prospect. Initially Foulis was himself to 
have taken on a tack of the mint, and the burgh of Edinburgh agreed to 
3, TA, 1593-93, SRO, E31159, fo, 225r, 
2, Gratuities to Janes Vi, c, Novasbar 1600, CSP Scut,, xiii, 742-43, 
3, Foulis' accounts, 1594-95, SRO, E30114, fos, 3r, -3v,; for the alabaster and 
lead, cf. M47, i, 314, 
4, APS, iv, 49-50. 
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be his surety for this. ' However, the tack eventually went to the 
burgh itself, paying 1,000 aerks per week to the crown, with Foulis as 
the burgh's agent; possibly his own capital was over-committed 
elsewhere .2 The operation continued until April 1598a' It was 
linked to Foulis' loans to the crown. In September 1594 the king 
pledged two gold cups with him, empowering him to coin then if not 
redeemed by November; ' in October, Faults received a £7,004 subvention 
from the mint, clearly in repayment of this loan. ` 
Foulis became a member of a commission on the customs in Narch 1597.6 
Did he play the key part in Nay's decision to increase the customs? 
At any rate, shortly after the decision, he and Jowsie were appointed 
chief customs collectors. ' At this point they were just 
administrators, and a statute in November enacted that the customs 
should not be set in tack without parliamentary confirmation - perhaps 
because the government was still intoxicated with its success .0 But 
by Xarch 1598, Foulis and Jowsie had obtained a tack of the customs 
from a convention. " This tack was probably the fruit of Foulis' 
I. (din, R'r3 if, 107-08, 
2, iPS, iv, 85-86,04; 1, H, Stevart, Thi Scottish taiirag (London, 1955), 96-97, 
3, Coina. 7a register, 1594-98, BL, Add, MS 33,517, 
4, RPC, v, 167, 
b, Foulis` accounts, 1594-95, SRO, £30/14, fo, ir. 
6, WS, iv, 113-14, 
C, v, 389, 
8, . 4PS, iv, 131, c, 7, 
9, º4PS, iv, 165; ER, xxiii, 237-46, 
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association with George Home of Vedderburn, the comptroller. ' But 
though it was to have run for a year, by December 1598 it had been 
cancelled; Home had transferred his favour to a syndicate headed by 
Bernard Lindsay, which in its turn was dismissed the following April, 
apparently after Lindsay had tried to reduce the payments .2 
Foulis had done well to obtain the customs tack, even though he failed 
to hold on to it, for his sun was already declining from its meridian. 
His furthest penetration of the crown finances had come in December 
1547, when he became the sale executive officer of a new exchequer 
commission. -' Effectively he was in full charge of the revenues, 'and 
that becaus the king was in his debt'., ' This remarkable arrangement 
needs further investigation; one reason it has not received the 
attention accorded to the Octavians is because Foulis' reign was so 
brief, collapsing after less than a month when he apparently failed to 
meet obligations to the creditors from whom he had borrowed in order 
to lend to the king - who had defaulted. B However, his own debts were 
officially suspended. E These debts were still causing concern long 
afterwards. ' Foulis himself was still capable of bouncing back; as 
1, Eimet, 'oiary', 45, 
2, RFC, v, 508,525-26; ER, xxiii, 334-35, 
3, Cosaission to exchequer cosaissioners, 29 8acesber 1597, '$P Scot,, xiii, 
144-45; cf, a provisional agreeaent between Foulis and Palter Stewart, 
treasurer, October 1597, CSP Scst xiii, 118-20, 
4, Catdervood, History, v, 668, 
5, Aston to Hudson, 20 January 1698, CSP Sc, t,, xiii, 165, 
6. Caldervood, Hfstury, v, 673. 
7, `The desyr of the barronis,,, anent the stenting of the present taxatiaun that 
the sasyn say be deriie uptakin but ahuss`, 1606, SRO, PA7/23/1, 
I 
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well as the customs tack, he and Jowsie received another tack of the 
mint at the end of 1598. ' The coinage was duly 'cryed doun, to the 
great hurt of the leidges'2 Faults was still valuable enough to the 
crown to obtain a pension of 41,000 per year in 1801, and the tacksmen 
of the mint in 1802 were making payments to his aseignees. 3 
The debts of financial officers, and other agents like Foulis, were a 
burning issue. A list of the creditors of Poulis and Jowsie was drawn 
up for the perusal of a convention in June 1598.4 The total came to a 
staggering 1160,522. Entries like the 11,333 owed to 'Thomas Annanis 
bairnis' suggest that some of the debts were of long standing. Were 
they paid interest? The case of Edward Johnstone, who was owed 8,000 
merles and who had been discharged in the previous January from 
proceeding against Foulis for this sum or for any interest, suggests 
,,. lore. that some of them 41d. 8 Xost of the debts are similar - large sums 
with round figures which suggest formal loans. However, some of then 
may have been simply unpaid bills - the convention's act on the debts 
remarked that Poulis and Jowsie had incurred them through furnishing 
the king with jewels and clothing on credit as well as by lending 
money to the crown . c, Unpaid bills may well have provided a larger 
component of the superexpenses of the regular financial officers than 
I. APS, iv, 166, 
2, moysie, M 47Ir3,138. 
3, RPC, vi, 245-47; TA, 1601-04, SRO, £21/76, fo, 152r, 
4. APS, iv, 368, 
5, Pitcairn, TrIa1ß, ft, 1,33-34; for sort on this cast, see chapter 2, 
6, APS, iv, 165. 
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of entrepreneurs like Foulis and Jowsie; if so, the latter's interest- 
bearing commitments to their creditors made then particularly 
vulnerable, and their achievement in penetrating the crown's finances 
all the more striking. 
Interest payments were rarely recorded formally in bonds or other 
transactions of the period. ' The likelihood that many creditors of 
the crown's agents received no interest on their loans is reinforced by 
the tale of the queen's tocher. When James married Anne of Denmark 
she brought a tocher of X150,000, of which 1100,000 was distributed as 
a loan to a number of burghs, who were obliged to pay 10 per cent 
interest until the crown redeemed its Money .2 Yet the king could have 
paid his debts with the money. The burghs were none too happy about 
this 'reverse' forced loan, and it does seem that the crown would only 
have benefited from the arrangement if it was not obliged (or could 
evade the obligation) to pay interest on its own debts. There may be 
exceptions: for instance, Aberdeen's £8,000 share of the tocher loan 
was repaid in 1594 to Thomas Acheson, master of the mint, and Robert 
Joasie. 3 The debt to Jowsie dated only from the recent baptism of the 
prince. s, but Acheson was a long-standing creditor of the crown - and 
continued to be, as late as 1601.11 
Acheson and his like had no legal remedy against the crown, of course. 
1, Crown, ̀ Edinburgh aerchant elite', 236, 
2, A. ttontgoaerta, `King Jane; VI's tocher gude and a local authorities loan of 
1590`, S&'4O (1961), 11-16, 
3. Obere rr cuunsil letters, i, 57-59. 
A. TA, 1582-83, SRO, E21/£3, fo, 137r,; RPC, vi, 245-47, 
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When the treasurer's accounts recorded in 1592 that Thomas Foulis 
'takis his hienes self debtour' for 418,787 owed for jewels and 
goldsmith work supplied, thus reducing the treasurer's liability, this 
must have been a reluctant concession by Foulis. ' With financiers, 
and similarly with the forced loans sometimes exacted from burghs, 
obtaining reimbursement from the crown was a matter of being 
economically or politically indispensable .2 As well as receiving cash 
payments, they might negotiate more favourable terms for their 
involvement with future revenue. In 1601-02 the crown's 141,000 debt 
to Alexander, master of Elphinstone, who had recently left office as 
treasurer, was cleared by assigning the mint temporarily to his son, 
taking it temporarily out of the hands of the current tacksaen, and 
issuing a quantity of heavily debased coin. 3 
But Acheson, 8lphinstone, and other officers and financiers who became 
entangled with the royal funds, were all intermediaries. The really 
important debts were those that they owed to their ultimate creditors, 
the suppliers of goods and services to the crown. These suppliers' 
remedy to recover their money, normally, was to sue the financial 
officer with whoa they had contracted. But all too often the officers 
would receive protection from their creditors; examples can be found 
of svpersederee: of such debts being granted by the privy council, the 
exchequer, the court of session, and of course parliament., ' 
I. TA (Leven I Melville), 1590-92, SRO, E2218, fa, 184r. 
2. E. g. a 1690 loan by the burghs: AYA t, 331,349. 
a. &Y, vi, 287-88. 
ý" E. Q. A'C, iii, 310; FR, xxii, 162; Arts of ssdamt, 33; APS, iv, 147, c. 60, 
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The royal household deserves a special mention to discussion of fiscal 
crisis management. ' From the point of view of the king, a crisis was 
essentially a time when the household threatened to run short of wine 
or other supplies. There were two basic ways to avoid such an 
unfortunate eventuality. The first was to prise some revenues away 
from any of the regular officers, usually the comptroller who had 
primary responsibility for household finance, and assign them directly 
to the master of the household. This was being done, for instance, as 
early as 1570-71.2 The long-term result, of course, would be to cause 
worse problems for an already hard-pressed comptroller. A variant of 
this was to divert other officers' expenditure towards the household, as 
when Adam Erskine, commendator of Cambuskenneth, collector general, was 
charged to supply it in 1583, presumably at the expense of ministers' 
stipends. 3 
The second approach was to force the comptroller or other officers to 
undertake to supply the household for a specified period. John Seton 
of Barns, comptroller, and Robert Douglas, collector general, made such 
an undertaking in 1588, as did David Seton of Parbroath, comptroller in 
1592 ! But there were limits to what this could achieve. George 
Ho=e of Vedderburn, comptroller in June 1598, was forced to undertake 
to furnish the household from his revenues, giving this priority over 
1. Cf. A. L. Murray, 'Financing the royal households Japes V and his co. ptrotters, 
1513-43', Rsnlisssnrt snof Atluruti m, eds, Cowan A Shaw, 
2. £i1C, xiv, 80-82,105-07, 
3. TA, 1582-83, SRO, E21/63, fo. 126r. 
4. 'Concernyng 11w che#ter and tlw kingis rentts', iLS, Adv. NS 34.2.17, 
fos, 116v. -118r,  12v, -13r. 
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payment of creditors. ' In February 1599 this came badly unstuck: 
under pressure to meet impossible obligations, Home absconded? ' 
A 1591 report an the household recommended that all existing debts 
should be divided into old and new, so that those who were currently 
'prime furnessouris' could be paid - longer-standing creditors would 
have to wait. 'Furnessauris' seem to have made allowance for the 
crown's well-known habits by charging higher prices: the report 
remarked on the need to avoid having to buy supplies 'at darren prices 
nor the comaoun mercatt for want of reddy silver's 
The nature of 'Teddy silver' was itself in flux: the best-known fact 
about Scottish coinage of this period is its dizzying plummet in value, 
as a result of debasement undertaken largely in response to fiscal 
crisis. " It is true that inflation was a European phenomenon, and 
that some was caused by other changes such as population growth. 
Some Scottish inflation may have been imported: the government 
occasionally tried to argue that finer coins were leaking abroad, which 
may not have been entirely false in the late 1570s when debasement had 
just hit the French coinage. S But at a time when the Scottish 
currency eventually lost two-thirds of its value against the English, 
i, WS, iv, 166. 
525-26,530-31,550-51. 
3, 'Concernyng the chekker and the kingts rentis', NLS, Adv. MS 34.2,17, fa, 138r, 
4, C. E. Challis, 'Debasesent: the Scottish experience in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries', CoiNag in edi'vai Scotland, 1100-lb0Q, ed. D, M, Metcalf 
(British Archaeological Reports, n, ß, 45,1977), 171 and passiv. 
S, Sa1son, Society in crisis, 224-25, 
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most inflation clearly had its roots in the government's desire to rake 
off quick profits frag the mint. 
This is not to blame the policy-makers. In those days, governments 
could not finance their military spending by running up a budget 
deficit and manipulating interest rates. When, in 1572, towards the 
end of the civil war, the king's party were faced with troops to pay, 
debts of 130,000, and 'na money to be had... except only be the 
cunyehouse', what could they do? Various rates of alloy were 
suggested, and the 'hassest' was inevitably adopted. ' That was war, 
but even in peacetime the government could never escape, from about 
1573 on, from the need to debase the Coinage .2 From then on, the 
master of the mint became effectively another of the crown's financial 
officers, with the mint accounts recording their own independent (very 
miscellaneous) discharge - and, inevitably, their own superexpenses. 3` 
The story of the mint, indeed, epitomizes the way in which short-term 
expedients increasingly became a semi-permanent way of life for a 
semi-bankrupt state. The king's own view, in Basilican daran (1599). 
is instructive: a fine coinage is desirable, he writes, because one day 
you might want to debase it. ' 
Life was commonly difficult and dangerous for state financial officers. 
1, John Acheson, 'Anent cunyia, ane asple discourse' (c, 1581), 8L, Add, MS 33,531, 
fos, 351r, -258v. For the relevant statute, sea appendix A, no, 28, 
2, Challis, 'Debasaaent', 190, 
3, ßrydon, 'Finances of Jaws V1', 89-99, 
4, Janas VI, Ba5ilirvn oivruii, 1,90-93. 
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In France they might easily end up an the scaffold, no doubt pour 
encourager Ies autres. ' This was not a Scottish habit, though there 
was a shadowy plot early in 1580 to charge William Xurray of 
Tullibardine, comptroller, and Adam Erskine, collector general, with 
'sudden reckonings' that might have led to their execution .2 The main 
threat to Scottish officers was to their purses. In 1587, the 
treasurer was ordered not to pay out more than £20,000 a year, or no 
superseders would be granted. '-' The discharge for 1587-88 turned out 
to be a worrying 127,071.4 In 1601, the former treasurer Walter 
Stewart, commendator of Blantyre, had to accept an arrangement for 
repayment of his superexpenses, incurred between 1598 and 1599, that 
would have left him still out of pocket in 1608.81 Such examples were 
by no means exceptional; George Home of Vedderburn could testify that 
much worse could happen. 
if serving an insolvent and unreliable crown was full of such 
tribulations, why did financial officers not resign? Robert Melville 
of Murdocairny wanted to continue as treasurer depute in 1598 even 
when superexpended by M5,666.6 The reason is that though there 
seemed no end to his mounting debts, he had a wolf by the ears and 
1, Doucat, Irrstitutiarrs ae France, 1,175; Silson, Society irr crisis, 76, 
2, Boves to Burghley A Valsinghaa, 10 May 1580, CSP Scot v, 418, 
3, APS, iii, 456, c, 54, para 1. 
4, TA, 1587-88, SRO, 621/66, fa, 115r, The accusulated deficit at this point was 
£52,996, 
5, 'C, vi, 542-43, 
6, TA, 1693-96, SRO, E21/70, fo, 62v,; Nicolson to Boves, 7 January 1696, CSF 
Scot,, xii, 112-13, 
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feared to let go. While he was in post, the king had to protect him 
more or less; but if he relinquished control of his sources of revenue, 
manifestly inadequate though these were to cover his current 
expenditure, he ran the risk of being flung to his creditors to be 
devoured. After he was forced out by the Octavians, he did receive 
some reduction in his debt: the king promised to pay his a somewhat 
derisory 2,000 merks, and his successor, Walter Stewart, paid him 
13,333. ' More importantly, some of his debts to Robert Jowsie were 
transferred to the king himself, which cannot have been good news for 
Jowsie, and Melville ended up owing a mere t23,447.2 He also obtained 
an act of parliament the next year protecting him from his creditors, 
so it was they rather than he who suffered in the short run. ' He was 
a loser again in 1601, however, when the exchequer unilaterally cut 
£3,333 6s 8d from the current treasurer's liabilities, and numerous 
creditors had portions of their debts repudiated. Melville lost t? 00, 
the biggest single sum from this dubious operation. 4 
Melville could be thankful that he was not ruined. The story of John 
Acheson, master of the mint, is a sad one that has been well told. He 
took on some of Gowrie`s treasury debts in the late 1570s when the 
mint was making large profits, only to find himself still responsible 
for these obligations after he had been removed from office and the 
, TA, 1592-93, SRO, £21169, fo, 227r,; TA, 1593-96, SRO, E21170, fo, 82v. 
2. TA, 1593-96, SRO, E21/70, fo. 19Ev, 
3, iFS, iv, 347, c, 50, 
4. TA, 1600-01, SRO, E21/74, foi. 138r, -139r, 
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income that went with it., he was warded for debt in 1581. ' He was 
promised action to recover the debts in 1587, but his heirs in 1594 
were still unable to sue Gowrie's heirs: the actions of Gowrie's 
creditors were still suspended, so parliament suspended the actions of 
Acheson's creditors too .2 Another financial entrepreneur who ended up 
in jail was Robert Jowsie: while in London in 1599 he fell a victim to 
the king's English creditors. Faults was blamed for failing to rescue 
him, but he himself was as much a victim of the fiscal system as his 
unfortunate partner. -' 
Foulis and Jowsie were capitalists whose aim, in providing financial 
services to the crown, was to make profits. But the main reason why 
most financial officers continued willing to serve an insolvent crown 
was that the reward, traditionally, was not monetary profit but 
political power. Without the treasurer or comptroller 'myght noe man 
gete no goodenes of the king', complained Lindsay's Poor Man. " And 
political power meant, above all, favourable opportunities to acquire 
property for themselves, their kin and friends. The gifts and 
hospitality which the burgh of Ayr, for instance, regularly had to offer 
to the officers of state, testify to their influence., Whether they 
would be protected after leaving office was essentially a political 
question: it depended how much they were still worth to those in 
I, M, xiii, pp, xxx-xxxt. 
2.1QPS, iii, 495, c, 102; iv, 83, c, 67, 
3. , lases Eiphinitona to Cecil, 28 February 1599, CSC' Scot,, xiii, 410-11; Cecil to Eiphinsto w, 13 April 1599, CSP Scat,, xiii, 445-46, 
4. Lindsay, `saris estaitih', S. 
S. gyp accowiti, 141,152 and paula, 
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power. OD e financial officer who has been studied in detail is Robert 
Barton, treasurer and comptroller in the 1520s. He left office in 
1530-31 superexpended by £8,780; probably less than half of this was 
paid by the crown, and he narrowly escaped imprisonment at one point, 
but his office had helped him to acquire a landed estate, and he 
received favoured treatment over a revocation of crown lands. ' 
Melville of Murdocairny received various grants and favours both during 
and after his period of office, ending with a peerage .2 These 
political rewards were rare for the newer financial entrepreneurs: 
although they moved in the inmost circles of government, it is hard to 
see Foulis and Jowsie as politicians, which is why perhaps their paths 
and those of the Octavians hardly seemed to cross. 
In fact, perhaps what is most remarkable is that, despite the rewards 
of office, some financial officers did resign. The earl of Cassillis 
is a case in point. He agreed to replace Valter Stewart as treasurer 
in April 1599, but resigned almost immediately on hearing that his 
appointment had been engineered to mulct him of his wealth - or rather, 
that of his wife, Jean Fleming, Lady Thirlestane 3 Unfortunately he 
had already entered into bonds for payment of some of Stewart's 
obligations, and though he rushed to the court of session it seems that 
his abortive appointment left him considerably worse off .4 His 
i, V. S. Reid, Skipper fron. Leith; the history of Robert Sarton of L7 n BJrnto1 
(Philadelphia, 1962), ch, 13; Murray, 'Exchequer and crown revenue', 261-63; 
Murray, 'Financing the royal household', $2, 
2, Scuts peerage, vi, 98, 
3, RPC, v, 548-50; Nicolson to Cecil, 10 April 1599, CSP Scot,, xiii, 444, 
4, Advices from Scotland, 8 June 1599, CSP Scut,, xiii, 496; Salts peerage, ii, 
476, 
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successor, the master of Elphinstone, learned fron the experience, 
refusing to take an any past debts with the office. ' The clumsiness 
of Cassillis' treatment left the king with no choice but to accept this. 
To some extent, from the crown's point of view, all financial officers 
and entrepreneurs were decay ducks. They were given impressive- 
looking powers and sources of income in order to make them convincing 
conduits through which the money, goods and services of others could 
be channelled to the crown without the latter being burdened with 
payment at once, if at all. The Cassillis episode was just a more 
squalid version of this approach. Equally squalid, perhaps, was the 
forfeiture of the third earl of Gowrie in 1600. The king owed Gowrie 
a vast sum dating back to his father's treasurership - the figure of 
£48,063 was mentioned in 1594.2 Forfeiture might have been considered 
to wipe this out. But Gowrie also owed the same sun to his own 
creditors; would the crown, in escheating his property, also take an 
his debts? The legal position is uncertain; the first earl had been 
forfeited in 1584, and his debts had clearly still been extant on the 
restoration of his heirs. But the 1600 parliament favoured only two 
of Gowrie's creditors, and not from the first earl's treasurership. -' 
It does look as though, having sheltered ingloriously behind Gowrie for 
two decades, the crown was finally able to disown these ancient debts. 
Which brings us, perhaps, back to where we began. In 1565, crude 
1, Advices fror Scotland, 8 June 1599, CSF Scot,, xiii, 496, 
ý. Qcis of s ru#i, 21. 
3, ? P$, iv, 245, c, 47, 
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extortion was an occasional expedient when the crown needed to spend 
heavily, for there were no sophisticated credit mechanisms to draw on, 
but it could meet ordinary needs without getting out of its depth. By 
1600 the situation had in some ways been reversed: an elaborate 
financial sector had emerged, while the crown's increasing insolvency 
had forced it to adapt its own fiscal machinery to finance its ordinary 
expenditure through slow, regular extortion. James's chronic failure 
to pay his bills was less glaringly dramatic than Mary's jailing of her 




The Scottish nobles, reported an English envoy in 1556, had rejected a 
new tax assessment, 'affirming that they meant not to putt their goodes 
in inventory, as if they were to make their last Hilles and 
testamentes'. ' Other accounts, more circumstantial, show the lairds 
taking the lead: 'the nobilitie gave way to this proposition, either 
through fear or expectations of favor; but the gentrie repynd and took 
it grevouslie, and convened in Edinburgh in no lee number then three 
hundred'? But there is agreement an the central point: 'this tax was 
grevous, but the valuation was taken worse by all men generallie'. 3 
As parliamentary taxation began its long journey from being an 
occasional handy supplement to the crown's income to become the central 
pillar of the state, the question of land valuation was vitally 
important. To succeed, a system of direct taxation had to be able to 
adapt itself to the overall distribution of property. In the century 
which followed the confrontation of 1556, parliamentary taxation became 
a more and more regular event; but the government never managed to 
unlock the nation's full taxable capacity. There was a large increase 
in first the frequency and then the level of taxation, beginning in the 
1580s, which was important in establishing the principles that the 
Report on taxation, 1556, CSP Scot,, 1,196-97, 
ý, Harries, #moirs, 29-30; cf, Buchanan, History, 1,330. 
3, Harries, ie, wlrs, 29-30. 
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government was entitled to tax and that taxation was granted by 
parliament or convention. But the practical achievement was vitiated 
by retention of outdated traditions of assessment. 
There were several attempts after 1556 to revise the tax assessment 
machinery, and analysis of the traditional system's workings shows only 
too clearly why there was pressure for reform. Kost of the evidence 
for the old system comes from the 1590s, when most taxation archives 
begin: tax rolls showing what should have been paid, accounts showing 
(in theory) what actually was paid, and the invaluable records of the 
commissions of 1594 and 1597 which adjudicated on disputed cases. ' 
However, there is enough evidence to gain a good idea of how the system 
had progressed (or not) from at least 1560. 
There were three separate types of assessment: for lay land, for 
church benefices, and for royal burghs. (Though the classic theory of 
taxation was that it was a tax an persons, a form of feudal service 2) 
Central to the assessment of secular land was that elusive phenomenon 
known as old extent. 3 This began life during the wars of independence 
as the value which lands had had 'in time of peace', and a tax of 1328 
superimposed a rebate system for war damage on earlier assessments, 
unintentionally fixing them in amber and staking the 'extent' of lands a 
i, For a list of all the direct taxes in this period, including details of the 
surviving archives, sae appendix D, 
2, Craig, firs fe alii, 1,16,20, 
3, T, Thos-son, for}i! an Old extant, e3, J, 0, Hackte (Stair Society, 1946), 
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matter of public law. The phrase found its way into brieves of 
succession, which for centuries thereafter asked what the lands 'valent 
nunc... per annum, at quantum valuerunt tempore pacis' every time they 
were transferred to an heir, so that the assize had to come up with a 
figure to put in the retour to chancery. ' Old extent was so much 
associated with retours that the fixing of old extent valuations was 
sometimes accompanied by 'inquisitiones valarum' which produced a kind 
of general retour for a whole sheriffdom or lordship .2 The valuation 
process was usually referred to as to 'retour' the lands in question. 
Taxation of the lands was always set at so such in the pound of old 
extent. 
From 1366 onwards. old extent stalked down the centuries in the uneasy 
company of new extent, which replaced old extent as the current land 
value in the aftermath of the Black Death. Thus new extent was 
originally lower. 3 However, inflation allowed new extent to catch up 
with old extent, and then overtake it, during the fifteenth century. 
Long before the sixteenth century, old extent had simply become a 
traditional, customary assessment: it gained its authority not from 
being based on the latest data but from having been fixed in the past, 
preferably the remote past. This was normal for land assessments of 
the period: in England, the medieval tenth and fifteenth became a 
stereotyped assessment, as. did the Tudor subsidy. ' There was no 
i, Balfour, Frarticks, ii, 644; RRtourß, i, introduction, 
2. Rei ors, ii, inquiiitionei vaiorus, 
3. Nicholson, Later riddle ages, 165,175, 
4, S, Dovell, A history of taxation and taxes in fnglanti, i, ed. A, R, 1laraic (3rd 
edn,, London, 1965), 86-87,154-55, 
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mechanism for revising the assessment as land values changed, for 
there was no intellectual framework for accepting changing valuations 
as part of a normal economic process. This made good sense when 
change was indeed slow and rare. The trouble was that the movement 
of land values, even at a snail's pace, could distort old extent over 
the centuries - as we shall see. 
In theory, new extent should have varied with the rent, while old 
extent was permanently fixed; but in practice things were not so 
simple, if only because old extent valuations, being largely unrelated 
to daily use, tended to be forgotten. Moreover, at some point during 
the fifteenth century, new extent had become a stereotyped assessment 
in its turn. The recreation of forgotten valuations when a retour had 
to be made thus became linked with the question of the proper 
relationship between old and new extents - if only one was remembered, 
the other could be fixed from it. In the years before 1541, Thomson 
argued, a rule was introduced by legal precedent that old extent should 
be one quarter of new extent. ' Old extents created after that date 
should in theory (if the new extent was known) have followed this 4t1 
ratio. However, a glance at the Ratsurs (before the mid-seventeenth 
century when old extent lost almost all meaning) shows only scattered 
examples of this ratio .2 The move to a 4: 1 ratio may have had some 
impact; but what about the decision of 1500 that the ratio should be 
3: 2? 3 Hannay collected retours from the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
i, Thos on, hooriai, 92-93,237, 
2, RRiuur,, i-ii, passis. 
3. Balfour, Pricticks, ti, 430. 
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centuries in which 2: 1 and 1: 1 ratios were quite common; he also found 
several eccentrics, 20: 1 being retoured in one 1502 example. ' There, 
the 'tempore pacis' (old extent) figure was the same as the blench 
ferne, the assize not having understood that head of the brieve. This 
case, like the many 1: 1 ratios, shows that old extent could become 
rusty and ill-understood if taxation was rare - as it usually was 
before the 1580s. Similarly, even if the many 1: 1 ratios date from 
the fifteenth century when old and new extents were actually quite 
close, they could only have been identical if one or other of the 
extents had been cut adrift from its origins. In England, 'time of 
peace' seems always to have meant a theoretical maximum value for 
lands; if this concept remained current in Scotland it is not 
surprising that even Balfour, in reporting one case on the subject (the 
decision was that new extent had to be higher), was muddled enough to 
describe new extent as 'time of peace' and old extent as 'time of war 1.2 
If retours often produced random variations in old extent, the reliance 
an custom and the absence of any check on retours meant that 
variations were likely to be perpetuated. Xore studies of these 
assessments are needed; but it is clear that the evolution of old 
extent was not connected with the evolution of current land values. 
Thus the power of old extent to reflect sixteenth-century land value 
was minimal. If the old extent was (as it should have been) an 
immemorial survival, we can be fairly sure that the pattern of 
agriculture and settlement (and thus the land value) would have shifted, 
1. Rapers of Prof. R. k, Hannay, SRO, 60214/39, 
2. Thosson, NHwriai, 215-17; Balfour, Prarifrks, 11,430. 
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for instance by altering the arable-pasture or infield-outfield ratios. 
On the other hand, if it was relatively recent, it stood a goad chance 
of having been thought up at random by a confused assize. ' 
The church's property was taxed by a separate, equally traditional, 
assessment known as Bagimond's Roll, the original of which had been a 
1274-75 valuation of benefices for papal taxation2 The theory was 
similar to old extent: the relative values of each benefice were fixed, 
whatever the absolute level of each tax. The relative values in our 
tax rolls are often, but not always, those in the contemporary 
'Bagimond's Roll' (so-called) recorded by Bisset. 3 They bear no 
relation to the original Bagimond's Roll, perhaps only because Bagimond 
recorded sums collected, rather than sums assessed, but it has been 
argued that the place-name evidence shows the two rolls to be 
unconnected. ' The origin of Bisset's roll remains a puzzle - was it 
connected with a 1291 papal tax assessment, or could it be no earlier 
than the early sixteenth century? And how does it relate, both in its 
many similarities and in its tantalizing differences, to the tax rolls 
which are our direct concern? Vithout answers to these questions, it 
1, The pitfalls of this subject are illustrated by the recent suggestion that the 
cove frog old to new extent represented an atteapt to change fror an 8-acre to a 
13-acre 'aerkland', which cannot be right if only for the reason that new extent 
began as less than old extent, but ended up as sore: RA, Dodgihon, LatRd and 
society in early Scotlaraf (Oxford, 1981), 87-89, 
2, '£agisond's Bolt', ad, A. 1. Dunlap, Si Kiic'llany, vi (1939), 44-47, 
3, Habbakuk Bisset, Ro1Nrn1 of c+wrtlß, it, cd, P. J. Haailton-6rierson (STS, 1922), 
38-39, which say be cospared with a tax roll in Purves, Revwnorra of the Scottish 
crony, 188-89, 
4, V, F, H, Nicolaisen, ' 8aff iond's Roll as a tsponysic text', So " any people 
Tongag s and lords, ads, H. £anskin 1 H. L. Saauals (Edinburgh, 1981), 
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is impossible to determine the lang-tern evolution of the tax 
assessment of benefices which we must continue to call Bagiaond. 
Only one thing is certain: it was with Bagimond as it was with old 
extent, in that tradition and inertia pervaded all. The government 
even possessed an up-to-date valuation of the benefices, made from 1561 
onwards for the purpose of collecting the thirds; yet for 
parliamentary taxation they were still obliged to rely on a valuation 
which was probably almost fiction. 
Taxation of royal burghs is relatively well understood. ' Payment of 
taxation was one of the traditional obligations of burgess-ship; the 
old burgh laws said little explicitly about this, however, which is why 
perhaps as taxation became more regular Perth began to find it prudent, 
around 1575, to require burgesses on admission to find caution to pay 
tam 2 Stent rolls, showing burgesses' worth and tax due, were 
compiled anew for every tax; each burgh had its own habits an this, 
but they were supervised by the convention of royal burghs. Thus, in 
1596, burghs were ordered not to deplete their common good to pay 
taxes. ' The convention was an intermediary with the government, 
collecting two out of the century's three largest royal taxes. 4 
There was little government interference in assessment of burgh 
1, Lynch (ad, ), Early . we'rrr town, asp, chi, 1,3. 
2,4rrcialt laws anal ruItue3 of ihr burghs of Scotland, i, ad, C, Innas MFRS, 
1868); Perth guildry book, Perth Musaua & Art Gallery, p, 366, 
3. RCR'B, 1,475, 
ý, RCR6, i, 309,498, 
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taxation. The convention of royal burghs assigned each burgh a share 
of the total -a process which required high-pressure negotiation every 
three years or so. ' The resulting tax rolls can be compared with the 
distribution of customs payments; though the latter do not measure the 
whole range of burghs' wealth, the divergent distribution of customs 
and direct taxation suggests that Edinburgh in particular was 
relatively under-taxed -' The burghs seem to have been torn between 
the desire to cut their tax bill and the need to create an opulent 
public image to attract trade; the tax roll was the burghs' public 
expression of their pecking order. This might explain the problem of 
Edinburgh - it was too far ahead of the pack to worry about precedence. 
If the burghs were thus driven towards conspicuous taxation as a 
species of conspicuous consumption, it was an ultimately harmless 
pursuit; the burghs' overall tax level remained one sixth of the total. 
The convention of royal burghs could impose taxes for the burghs' own 
purposes, these being identical to royal taxes from the burgesses' point 
of view. Though frequent, they were small, like the two payments of 
1,200 each which the burghs raised to enforce their overseas trade 
monopoly in 1592 and 1595. -' The total identifiable taxation imposed 
by the convention in this period (not counting taxation imposed by 
individual burghs) comes to f, 25,651 - and over £20,000 of this was 
ultimately destined for the crown's coffers, for instance as part of 
i, E. g. RCRB, if, 10, 
2, Lynch (ed, ), Early l r17 tort, 6, 
3, RCSB, 1,371-72,462-63, 
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complicated arrangements over customs tacks. ' By contrast the burghs' 
one-sixth share of the total direct taxation would come to over 
Z100,000.2 
The liability of burgh lands was confused. All tenements within the 
burgh were straightforwardly taxed by the burgh, even when held by a 
bishop. But what about lands held by the burgh itself? Dingwall 
escaped tax on the lands of the earldom of Ross which it held from the 
crown - the magistrates successfully argued that they should only be 
taxed by the estate of burghs, and as a 'puir burgh' the convention of 
royal burghs did not tax them. ' Lands held by inverkeithing of a lay 
freeholder did have to pay in his reliefs In a similar case 
concerning Inverurie's lands, the magistrates advanced the curious 
argument that they should not have to pay more than the burgh mail (7 
merks); in fact they escaped paying altogether, and the commissioners 
followed a similar rule for freehold lands held by Lanark .6 
Though it was from the peasants that all landed wealth ultimately came, 
taxation was not laid upon them directly. (The exception is the 
i. RCFB, i-ii, passfs, 
2. Appendix 0, 
3, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 7v, 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo. 334v, 
S, Tax decreets, 1697, SRO, E62/2, fo, br, 
6, Tax decrssts, 1597, SRO, E62/2, fos, 33v  90v, 
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traditional Shetland skat. 11 No doubt the landlords' on methods of 
acquiring the peasants' surplus were thought to be effective enough, and 
government intervention by an administrative system of doubtful 
efficiency might have hindered as much as helped. It was common, as 
in 1597, to ban taxpaying lords from 'causing thair pure fermoreris and 
laboraris of their grand' to 'releiff thame of the haill burdens of the 
said taxatioun"2 However, this act's concern was that some lords 
were doing Just that, 'impoverishing ans greit number of the saidis 
fermoreris and bringing of thame to utter vrak and ruin', a claim which 
cannot be proved or disproved in the present state of our knowledge of 
the peasantry. The advocate John Russell alleged that 'the 
barrownis... nevir payis ane penny out of thair awin pursis' but instead 
would 'extent thair tennentis at thair plesour'; he thought there 
should be 'ane provisioun... in favouris of the laubararis of the ground' 
but did not say what. --4 Government concern for the peasants was no 
doubt humanitarian; but it should be remembered that since effective 
taxation has to tax wealth or income, a fiscal system relying an poor 
peasants to the exclusion of rich lards (which is what these oppressive 
lords sought in effect) would in the long run have been crippled. 
Thus parliament's three estates - secular freeholders, benefice-holders 
1, T. M. Y. Hanson, ̀ Shetland in the sixteenth century', R ifssince arrd RRforaition, 
ads, Cowan A Shaw, 205; S. Smith, `What is a scattald? Rural communities in 
Shetland, I400-1900`, Esiayi in Shetl. nd history, cd, £, f, Crawford (Lerwick, 
1984), 
2,4PS, iv, 144, c, 48, 
3, John Russell, 'Ffor ansuer to ay lord clerk rsiisteris breif', 9 July 1567, SRO, 
PA7f 
if 36, 
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and royal burghs - were all taxed by their own separate assessments. 
Each tax was imposed in the form of a specified total sum, so how was 
this shared out among the estates? The answer is, once again, by a 
traditional assessment. By this period it was usual for the clergy to 
pay half, the barons and freeholders one third, and the burghs one 
sixth. ' In former days the proportions had usually been 2: 2tl rather 
than 3: 2: 1; the clergy's increased share represents their declining 
political status rather than any economic trend .2 After 1561, though 
benefice-holders' income was cut by a third, they only received 
allowance for this during the early 1580s (and in 1578, the same effect 
was achieved by adjusting the overall ratio). ** Before then (and 
afterwards) they were 'taxed to seikill and mair nor quhen thay war 
hafll possessouris of their benefice'. ' 
This way of apportioning taxation matched the conception of society as 
separate estates, but it ignored one important species of propertyz the 
crown lands. In medieval times these had rarely been taxed, crown 
tenants being tenants like those of any other lord. 6 Their 
traditional exemption survived as late as 1588. But from the early 
sixteenth century crown land had increasingly been set in feu; and by 
the 1570s it was beginning to be recognized that feuars of crown land. 
1. Appendix 0, 
2. Donaldson, James Y- James PII, 132, 
3, Appendix D. 
4, Pitscottie, Historie, it, 322, 
5, Murray, 'Exchequer and crown revenue', 337, 
6, E. 9, C, A, Madden, ' The feuin3 of Ettrtck Forest', Ili 27 (1976)i 70-71, 
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being proprietors if not freeholders, should pay tax at the same rate 
as the barons and freeholders. ' This meant giving these lands old 
extent valuations; some crown lands may always have had such 
valuations, if they had been freehold in the past, for instance. By 
1587, Russell could describe the crown lands (with some exaggeration) 
as 'all extentit'; though he was not sure whether their taxation should 
be 'according to the new or auld extentis'. 2 There was an order to 
retour crown lands in 1597. -1 
At this point we can pause to gain an international perspective. The 
Scottish fiscal system as a whole evidently had much in common with 
England., ' Tax revenue came from the same combination of periodic 
direct taxes - effectively land taxes on fixed assessments - with 
permanent indirect taxes - customs - on international trade. Neither 
in Scotland nor England did the government tax the peasantry directly, 
as it did in France. For do we find in Scotland anything resembling 
the distinction between the taille rdelIe and taille personnelle. c The 
notorious Castilian alcabala, or domestic sales tax, was regarded in 
Scotland as the spark that had ignited the revolt of the Netherlands .6 
i, RPC, iii, 46; see also appendix D. 
2, John Russell, `ffor ansuer to sy lord clerk ragistaris braif`, 9 July 1587, SRO, 
PA7/1/36, 
3. APS, iv, 143, c, 48, 
4, Dowell, Tara tion ar7d taaws in fnglanai, i. 
5, Volfa, fiscil systas of Renaissance francs, app, 6, 
6, J. H. Elliott, Ia ria! Spahr, 140-1714F (Pelican adn  Hau wn worth, 1970), 266-86; Craig, lug female, 
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Both Spain and France had deeply-entrenched regional variations with 
no Scottish counterpart: the Highlands may have paid little tax, but 
this was through administrative weakness rather than administrative 
distinctiveness. 
Scotland, unlike England, had no separate assessment system for the 
nobility: land had a fixed and known valuation which did not change 
just because a noble acquired it. In England the nobles faced taxation 
with relative equanimity. ' Since in both countries the assessment 
system was based more on political influence than economic facts, 
Scottish nobles too probably had scope for under-assessment, but not 
on the lavish English scale which allowed Lord Burghley, say, to 
declare his income regularly at a laughable 200 marks sterling, or his 
son to pay tax of £63 on an income of £25,000 sterling .2 
Scotland also differed from England in the way it distinguished between 
church and lay lands. Since the Scottish clergy`s tax assessment had 
been forced up to a higher rate than that of the barons and 
freeholders, if former church land had been transferred (as in England) 
to a secular assessment, this would have threatened to cut tax revenue 
and capsize the traditional ratio between the two estates on which the 
whole system rested. Up to the end of the old regime, the government 
could never bring itself to upset this balance; lands which had once 
been church lands continued, whoever held them, to be treated as 
1, H. Miller, 'Subsidy : slesssents of the paarige in the sixteenth century', 
Bulletin of the Institute of Hißtoricil Research, 28 (1955), 15-34, 
2. Miller, 'Subsidy assessments', 22-23; L. Stone, family aml forlorn; ßtmiies !n 
aristocratic firrante in the sixteenth acrd servrrteenth centuries (Oxford, 1973), 
30. 
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benef ices for tax purposes. ' Old extent and Bagimond may have been 
clearer assessment methods than their English counterparts - but this, 
far from being a virtue, led to inflexibility. 
The late sixteenth century was a particularly bad time to be clinging 
to inflexible ideas about landed property. As the balance between 
church and lay lands was shifted from above, by the passing of the 
monasteries' superiorities into the hands of secular commendators and 
their successors the lords of erection, it was being simultaneously 
undermined from below. The problem was feuing. The feuing of church 
lands (and also of crown lands, already mentioned) was creating a new 
type of property which fitted uneasily into the feudal scheme of 
things 2 Nothing was clearer than that feuars had never been liable 
for tax, for they were not tenants in chief and rendered no services 
beyond their fixed feu duties. -' And yet it was feuars who were now 
coming to hold the property of most benefices, leaving the titular 
benefice-holders with increasingly empty superiorities which could not 
possibly bear the full weight of taxation. 
The problem was solved, more or less; but it was solved in a piecemeal 
and superficial fashion which caused endless trouble. Were superiors 
unable to meet their tax liabilities? Then let them have the power to 
charge their vassals - for feuars, powerful though they might be, were 
i, APS, iv, 143, c, 48; Thorson, Merin, 180. 
Sanderson, Scottish rural society, ch, b, For lose of the wider isplications of 
feuing, see chapter 9, 
3, Craig, Jai (mal#, 1,16.20, 
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still vassals - to relieve them of a just proportion of the tax. This 
would convert the feudal hierarchy itself into a tax-gathering machine, 
and was first done by statute in 1581. ' Mackie, in editing Thomson's 
Memorial, was unable to reach any conclusions about whether this began 
a new procedure or legitimized an existing one O2 in fact there is 
evidence of a commendator obtaining relief from his feuars in 1578, and 
it would be surprising if this was the earliest case. ' The problem 
also existed, on a smaller scale, for secular freeholders who had feued 
their lands. such a freeholder can be found pursuing his feuars for 
his share of a tax as early as 1558.1 Nevertheless, this was never 
achieved without friction. 
Once it was established that a superior could recoup some of his tax 
from his feuars, an equally important question was raised: at what 
rate? A memorandum which the clerk register commissioned from the 
advocate John Russell in 1587 pointed out the need 'to defyne quhat the 
fewar pro rata sail pay'; E but to say, as parliament began to do in 
1594, simply that feuars should pay 'pro rata' merely begged the 
question. E From 1597 onwards statutes required the superior to 
convene his vassals and reach an agreement with them, but this still 
i, A/'S, iii, 190, 
2, Thoason, Neo. rIal, 178n, 
3, über cartirur Sancta Crucis, ad, C. Inner (Bannatyne Club, 1840), p, cxvi, 
4, herum; of the sheriff curt of Oardeerrahire, 1,181-82, 
S. John Russell, 'ffor ansuar to ay lord Clark registoris breif', 9 July 1687, SRO, 
FA71t/36, it is perhaps its location in the parliasentary papers that has lied 
this docusent to be taken for a 'aeaorandua presented to the estates'; Vorsald, 
Court, kirk aid r4aaaarity, 161, 
£, APS, iv, 75, c, 45, 
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did not explain haw. ' Feuars' lands were going to have to be valued 
somehow. This posed an insidious threat to their superiors - for 
superiors, as we have seen, still paid by Bagimond's Roll. The 
weakness in Bagimond was its lack of any method of land assessment, 
for the valuation was only a single figure attached to both lands and 
teinds of a benefice. Once feuars had had to accept the principle of 
liability, it seemed to them only reasonable that this should be 
assessed by the only method they know of valuing lands: old extent. 
Church lands had long been given occasional old extent valuations, for 
reasons which have yet to be investigated. 2 A valuation might survive 
from a time when the lands had been in lay hands. In some estates, 
the valuation in poundlands or merklands might be used as a method of 
assessment by the landlord. " But if a feuar paid his tax on this 
basis, his burden would be far lighter: he could hardly be refused the 
right to pay at the same rate as the lay freeholders, which was lower 
than the church rate. The feuars of Scone abbey were allowed to pay 
by old extent in 1594: this meant paying under 480 instead of the 
£204 which the commendator, the earl of Gowrie, had demanded. 
Gowrie still had to pay 'as gif the samyn lands had nevir bens 
i, JPS, iv, 142-43, c, 48, 
2, There is a 1607 exaapte in V, B, Laaont, 'Old land dominations and 'old extent' 
in Way', Scottish Str liei, 2 (1958), 91, 
3, R, A, Dodgshon, 'Medieval rural Scotland', Q# historical 9*ography of Scotland, 
eds, 6. Whittington b I. D. Whyte (London, 1983), 49. However, Dodgshon's 
theory of 'assessed land' fails to distinguish between a public land ralrration 
like a serkland - which was not a 'fixed acount of land' - and a private land 
+ rwairiatiuy like a ploughgate or husbandland, if old extent asmssents were 
used by landlords, this could contribute to their survival over centuries: see 
A, Gibson, 'Territorial organization and settlesent in "edievat and early-Modern 
Sreadalbane', SattiesveRt and sociaty in SrvtianJ (papers for Association of 
Scottish Historical Studies conference, Glasgow, 1988), 112-14,120, 
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retourit`. 1 The feuare of Broughton (a barony held by Holyrood abbey), 
on the same basis, paid £90 instead of U08.2 
Kackie cited the similar case of Dunfermline abbey in the belief that 
it was highly exceptional .3 The tax decreets show that it was not. 
Other major benefices where the feuars in 1594 made successful demands 
to be taxed by old extent include Arbroath abbey, 4 St Andrews 
archbishopric {'it is nawyss reasonable that the said complenar sould 
be burdynit with pament of main for every pund land... nor is cravit of 
the haill remanent pund lands within this realms'), 11 Kelso abbey, 6 
Kelrose abbey' and Newbattle abbey. ' A later St Andrews 
archbishopric case refers to a 1588 exchequer decreet in favour of old 
extent for that benefice.! The Balmerino abbey lands were retoured in 
1597, explicitly to allow its feuars to pay tax 'according to the raith 
of other pund landis of auld extent within this realme', and similarly 
the Culross abbey lands in 1598.10 This list alone includes three of 
the top four benefices; bearing in mind that there is no evidence 
i, Tax dacraats, 1594, SRO, E6211, fo, 5r, 
2. Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/i, fo, 25v, 
3, &PC, iv, 542-44; Thoason, Metorlal, E5, 
4, Tax docraats, 1594, SRO, E62/i, fo, 52r, 
5. Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 34r, 
6. Tax dacreats, 1594, SRO, E62/1, N. M. 
7, Tax dacraats, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 77r, 
E, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 40v, 
9. Tax decre ts, 1597, SRO, E62/2, fo, 41r. 
10, l tewrs, tf, fnquisitiones valorus, nos, 3,4, 
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either way for many other benefices, it is clear that old extent was 
sweeping in like the tide to engulf benefice-holders. 
There is a little evidence that the tide was turned back. In 1597 the 
Broughton feuars, finding themselves charged once sore to pay at a rate 
set by the commendator, brought the same case before the 
commissioners - and lost: a decision which more than doubled t heir 
tax bill. ' There are other such cases; 2 but they are less nume rous 
than those favouring old extent, which can still be found in 1601 and 
1602.3 
The confusion into which taxation of benefices had fallen is shown by 
the cases in which feuars' liability was assessed by some quite 
different method. Feuing was known to be an innovation, and it was 
natural to seek for principles in the old days. People reasoned thus: 
before the feuar got his feu he was a tenant, and his rent payments 
discharged all his obligations to his lord; the lord could not seek to 
pass on his tax burden to him, but had to pay the tax out of the rents 
he received. Now that the tenant had become a feuar, the only reason 
for this to change would be if the feu duty was less than the old rent. 
In 1594, a number of feuars successfully claimed exemption on the 
grounds that their feu charter had not diminished their lord's rental. ' 
The system could not cope with the inflation that had been eating away 
i, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, E£212, fo, 20r, 
2. E, g. Tax decre ti, 1597, SRO, E£2/2, fo, ££r, 
3, RPC, vi, 239-40,392, 
4, Tax decreeti, 1594, SRO, E£2/1, fo . 41v,, 48y,, 90Y., 119v, 
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at the feu duties' real value, often for generations. 
Thomson pointed out that feuars had, in their feu duties, liabilities 
not owed by freeholders, and repeatedly argued that they must have been 
assessed on their current net income after deducting the feu duty. ' 
The 1597 taxation statute (the first to go into any kind of detail) did 
require each church vassal to be taxed 'according to the greit or small 
quantitie of his frie rent that he hes athair of his landie teindis or 
pensioun', and ordered the retouring of crown lands to be done with 
'ane speciall regaird to the frie rent that the feuaris and rentellaris 
hes of the same landis besyid thair few fermes and dewteis payit be 
thame'. 2 But did Thomson interpret the legislators' use of the phrase 
'frie rent' correctly? They may have had the idea of using net income 
for benefices, but in the case of the crown lands they were asking the 
ballivi ad extra to go easy in applying permanent old extent 
valuations, not laying down a flexible rule based on current rentals. 
It is a mistake to expect too much precision or consistency when 
legislators are trying to adapt a traditional system piecemeal. And 
even if the statute had laid down a consistent principle, the fact is 
that it was ignored. There is not a single case showing assessment 
on net income. The most that can be said is that the 1597 tax 
decreets have no more cases comparing the feu duty to the previous 
rental. 
Besides assessing feuars on the nominal value of their lands (old 
#, Thosson, Nowrial, 169. 
2, APS, iv, 143, c, 48, 
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extent), or by the difference between that and their feu duties Vfrie 
rent', i. e. net income), superiors could also use the feu duty alone. 
Relief equal to the feu duty was collected by St Andrews priory 
(probably the country's richest benefice) in 1594, and a similar 
principle was used to decide two 1597 cases. ' 
So far we have been looking at a fairly straightforward land tax. But 
one of the most important types of landed property was teinds, which 
by one estimate amounted to a quarter of the income of the landed 
class .2 Teinds were effectively a form of rent, usually by now set in 
tack, and the right to them had passed from the pre-Reformation parson, 
concerned only to 'ressave his teinds and spend then syne'3 to members 
of the local landed class with an entirely similar determination. 
Traditionally, teinds were exempt fron tax. This was implicitly 
confirmed as late as January 1594, and explicitly by a privy council 
ruling of March 1594.4 But it was soon after then that the 
government realized for the first time that a quarter of the country's 
income was escaping free of tax; a statute of June 1594 included 
tacksmen of teinds among those who were ordered to relieve their 
1, iax decre ts, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, lOOr,; Tax dacreats, 1697, SRO, E62/2, 
foß, 74y  77v, 
2, A, Sirnie, 9 short history of the Scottish teirwi (London, 1928), 27, 
3, Lindsay, 'Thrie estaitis', 261, 
4, JPS, iv, 63-64; RFC, v, 136-37, Mackie (Thomson, Meaorlal, 179n, ) erroneouily 
regarded the January act as "akin3 taind-holders liable; its purpose wall to 
allow benefice-holders who held only teinds to collect relief fro* the 
pensioners holding the temporality. 
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superiors (the benefice-holders). ' However, this act was not always 
enforced; the 1594 tax commissioners, who heard all but one of their 
117 cases after it was passed, never referred to it, and at least twice 
they let teind tacksmen off altogether on the basis of the Karch act of 
council. -- More commonly, they lent a sympathetic ear to teind-holders 
whose tacks had been set before 1558 at a tack duty which did not 
diminish the old rental (the same principle which we have seen in use 
for many feuars). The date of 1558 is not mentioned in the acts, but 
it no doubt implied that tacks set after that date were taxable - the 
religious revolution was legally held to have begun then, and people 
were supposed to have learned better than to set teinds in tack. In a 
typical case of July 1594, the commission decided in favour of a 
tacksman (the brother of one commissioner) for teinds set before 1558, 
but against him for teinds set at an unspecified but probably later 
date 
Yet other principles were at work in deciding teinds' liability for tax. 
In 1594 and 1597, the commissioners upheld clauses in tacks exempting 
the tacksman from paying tax in relief. ' Sub-tacksmen had automatic 
ezemption. s Benefice-holders themselves possibly preferred to seek 
relief from feuars rather than teind tacksmen, as an angry feuar of 
i, r? P$, iv, 75, c, 45, 
2. Tax dacreets, 1694, SRO, E62/1, fos, 5r,, 62r. 
3, Tax dzcreets, 1594, SRO, E62/I, fo, 32r, 
4. Tax dscreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fos, 14v,, 45r, 58r,; Tax dscrests, 1697, SRO, 
E62/2, fo, 38r, 
5. Tax decrasts, 1594, SRO, £6211, fa, 79v,; Tax dacrsats, 1697, SRO, E62/2, 
fus, 48r 73r. 
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Arbroath abbey claimed; ' the reason here may be that Arbroath, in 
common with other monastic superiorities, had lost control of 
presentation to its annexed churches, and so perhaps had less influence 
over their holders. -- 
As well as complete exemption for an unknown but clearly large 
proportion of teinds, there was wide variation in the rate paid by the 
remainder, and in the principle on which the rate was calculated. In 
1597, a number of cases had relief being demanded or paid at so much 
per boll of teinds in kind: lOs (reduced to 5s by the commissioners), 
6s 8d, 8s, and so on. -" Dunfermline abbey, however, demanded relief in 
2594 equal to a year's tack duty - in other words, it was assessing 
tacksmen on liabilities rather than income. 4 As with feu duties, there 
are no cases showing the use of 'frie rent', i. e. net income. 
As well as the feuars and teind tacksmen, benefice-holders had yet more 
types of vassals from whom they could collect relief. The most 
significant were the holders of pensions. As with tacksmen, if the 
contract to pay the pension had a tax exemption clause this would be 
upheld by the commissioners. S One pensioner successfully argued, in 
the face of crystal-clear statute evidence, that pensions were tax-free 
on the grounds that feuars paid relief on the lands from which the 
1, Tax decreats, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo, 52r, 
2, J, Kirk, 'The exercise of ecclesiastical patranap by the crave, 1560-1572', 
Rw wienre aJi Refuraation, eds, Cowin A Shaw, 107, 
3, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, £62/2, fos, 57v  75v,, 102v, 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fcs, 44r 66r, 
5, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo, 16v, 
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pension was paid. ' Apart from this aberration, the commissioners were 
mainly concerned to set rates of relief. With cash pensions, they 
upheld a demand for 19 per cent of a St Andrews priory pension in 
1594: the pensioner's claim that past taxes had seen relief at five 
per cent (probably referring to the 1588 tax, which had been at the 
same rate as that of 1594) was brushed aside .2 Another St Andrews 
priory pensioner, also offering five per cent, had his tax bill reduced 
from 28 to 16 per cent .3 Some pensions were paid in kind: in 1594 
one commendator's demand was cut from 16s 8d to Ile 8d per boll of 
pension, and another's in 1597 from a swingeing 40s to 6s 8d. 4 6s 8d 
per boll was the rate that the 1597 commissioners seem to have 
favoured for teind tacks - more evidence that gross rather than net 
income determined tax rates, for pensioners unlike tacksmen had to pay 
no tack duties from their income. Clearly rates of tax an pensions 
were almost random. The perpetrator of that huge 1597 demand, 
incidentally, was the oeconamus of Kelso abbey, Lord Newbattle - who 
was also collector in charge of the taxationt If he was concerned to 
maximize the revenue, we shall see that he had goad reason. 
The final problem with taxation of benefice-holders' vassals was how to 
collect from then. Benefice-holders varied in wealth and power from 
the commendators of the great abbeys to holders of remote vicarages; 
all had to collect their relief from feuars, tackssen and other 
1, Tax decrssts, 1594, SRO, f52/1, fo, 57v, 
2. Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 100r, 
3, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £6211, fo, 105r, 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 87r.; Tax decreets, 1697, SRO, £62/2, 
fo, £2v. 
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vassals. If the benefice-holder was small and the feuar powerful this 
could be difficult, as William Hamilton, parson of Cumnock, lamented to 
the commissioners in 1594: times were hard, his benefice was in tack, 
parsons no longer got pre-Reformation parish dues, the tax rolls were 
out of date and inequitable. The commissioners agreed that he was 
unable to collect from his tacksman, and ordered the collector of 
taxation to do so directly. ' The general assembly had similar 
complaints: ministers who held benefices, it said in 1598, should not 
have the job of collecting from their vassals as it was bad for their 
public relations. -- Larger benefices had other difficulties: unless 
they had the sympathy of the tax commissioners, they might be 
overwhelmed by a flood of suspensions purchased by small vassals, as 
the earl of Atholl claimed to have been by the vassals of Coupar 
abbey . 2' This is probably what happened to Gowrie in the Scone abbey 
case, already cited. ° And even the large benefices were not immune 
from the problem of the over-mighty vassal, as Lord Altrie found in 
1591 when he found himself charged to pay relief to the Earl Karischal 
for the abbey of Deer. Altrie indignantly protested that he was 
himself the superior of the abbey, now a temporal lordship, and should 
not have to relieve Xarischal who was its feuar; in fact, Karischal 
should have to pay bun's 
3, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £62/I, fo, 93v, 
2, Caldervo' , History, v, 685, 
3, Tax decrests, 1597, $RO, 66212, Io, IOOr. 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 5r, 
S, RPC, iv, £28-29, 
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So much for problems specific to church taxation. The heart of the 
land tax was old extent, and the time to look more closely at its 
workings on both church and lay lands can no longer be postponed. 
The history of old extent made unequal taxation highly likely; is 
there evidence showing how far the old extent valuations of people's 
lands reflected their ability to pay? 
There has been little study of this subject since the pioneering 
suggestion of Inns that 104 acres, eight oxgates or one ploughgate 
were equivalent to 40s land of old extent. ' He assumed that old 
extent reflected the land's actual value. (The same assumption, for 
the present purpose, is made here about denominations like oxgate, 
husbandland and ploughgate, though it is true that they had a customary 
element. ) Innes' evidence was a 1586 test case heard in the exchequer 
between the feuars of Broughton and their superior, the commendator of 
Holyrood, where 13 acres were equated with an oxgate and four oxgates 
with Li land of old extent .2 The exchequer allowed the feuars to 
relieve the commendator by old extent, and set this interim formula for 
giving these and other church lands an old extent valuation, while 
recommending that parliament should legislate on the subject (which it 
never did). The Broughton rate should in theory have reflected 
existing valuations of lay land, and have influenced new valuations of 
church land thereafter. Did it do either? 
i, C, Inner, Lectures on Scotch iel antiquities (Edinburgh, 1872), 281-83, 
Mackie usefully discusses some further evidence; Thomson, AWorial, 310-12, 
2, Thosson, Ni'wrial, appendix, Mackie`s notes on this decreet call for coseent, 
firstly, it relates not to the tax of 1583 but to that of 1585 WC, iii, 
741-42), Secondly, he puzzles over the reference to a case tight years 
earlier, but there vas such a case in 1578 (Libor cartarw Salycts Cruris, 
p. cxvi). 
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The second question is easily dealt with. The 1594 tax commissioners 
upheld the 1586 Broughton rate when the ever-litigious Broughton feuars 
themselves appeared before them. ' Dunfermline abbey had been valued 
at the same rate in 1590, expressed there as four oxgates to two 
husbandlands, and two husbandlands to ti land of old extent 2 
However, the 1594 commissioners also upheld another order (by which 
court was not specified) that for the St Andrews archbishopric lands, 
one ploughgate should be E1 land of old extent - half the Broughton 
rate. 3 The retouring of Arbroath abbey, apparently not long before 
1594, gave one of its feuars a valuation of only £5 of old extent for 
his eight ploughgates. a In 1597, the Scone abbey feuars claimed that 
their lands were retoured to 10s of old extent per ploughgate, which 
was accepted though their right to pay tax at this rate was not. ` The 
first-time retour of Balmerino had 60 acres equal to 41 land of old 
extent in 1597 (somewhat under the Broughton rate), and the similar 
retour of Culross in November 1598 had an example of 1 acre equal to 
is land of old extent (somewhat over it). G Not long before, in 
January 1598, the privy council had ordered that 'quhair the kirklandis 
is not retourit' their tax on that occasion should be at a rate 
equivalent to L1 of old extent per husbandland - which would come to 
i, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo, 25v, 
2. RFC, iv, 542- 44, 
3, Tax decre ts, 1594, SRO, £62/i, fa, 119v, 
4. Tax decreets, 1694, SRO, E62/1, fo, 62r, 
6, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, E62/2, fo, £6r, 
6. R tiwrs, ii, inquisitiones wiorus, nos, 3,4, 
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£4 of old extent per gloughgate. ' Clearly Inner' rule was far lees 
universal than he believed: even new assessments departed from it by a 
factor of two in one direction, and a factor of four in the other. 
In tho absence of detailed studies of rentals it is harder to determine 
what old extent meant in terms of lay land values, but what evidence 
there is points the sage way. Innes' rule was observed in 1507 in 
Islay, where a horsegang (equal to an oxgate) was valued at 5s land of 
old extent; -' but not in 1552 by the sheriff of Linlithgow, who equated 
16 oxgates with 40s land of old extent' Probably the traditional lay 
land assessments diverged frou one another at least as such as the 
newer assessments of church land, and the tax decreets provide one 
conclusive case of this. 4 The earldom of Errol consisted of two chief 
baronies, those of Slains and Errol. In a dispute over the share of 
tax payable from both baronies by the widowed countess, the following 
figures can be ascertained: 
Old extent Rent (chalders) Tax per chalder 
Slaias £100 280 £0.7 
Errol £80 64 t2.6 
Neither party questioned these figures, although they showed that one 
barony was liable for four times the other's tax. 
i . 'PC, v, 434-35. 
3, Lasont, 'Old land danosinations', 90, 
3, iho on, N rorial, 316, 
4, iix decreets, 1597, SRO, £6212, fa, 7v. 
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An analogy can be made with Shetland's merklands. These were not old 
extent (Shetland not having been part of the Scottish assessment 
system in its formative years), but they were also customary land 
assessments; and they were employed to set the rent. Rents typically 
varied between 4 and 12 'pennies in the merk'. Orkney saw the same 
divergence in the value of its customary peaayiands. ' 
A sheriffdom had its own old extent valuation, supposedly the total of 
all its lay lands, and these valuations may well have diverged 
regionally. The western sheriffdoms contended that 'their retoures are 
higher than in other shires' in the seventeenth century, and demanded 
to be taxed by valued rent instead .2 The reality behind the shire 
valuations may indeed have been tenuous. Perth was valued at £1,581 
15s of old extent, and in 1597, when the tax was 40s in the t, the 
sheriff was charged to pay £3,163 10s. =' But for the 1596 tax in lieu 
of military service, the lay lands of each sheriffdom had to pay at a 
specified rate (15s in the t of old extent for Perth), but no target 
figure was set and the resulting figures may be more realistic. ' 
Perth actually accounted for a payment of only £578 17s, less than half 
what would be expected from its retoured value. " Of the other 
sheriffdoms where comparison is possible, Kincardine and Linlithgow 
also paid less than their valuation would suggest - but Fife and 
Shan, h4, rther# and western island, 25, 
2, Mackenzie, Observations, 305, 
3, Tax roll, 1597, SRO, E5912, 
4. RK, v, 3 13, 
S. Ta accounts, 1596, SRO, £65/3. 
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Edinburgh actually paid more. The lower figures were not caused by 
collection failure, for we know that the accounts ignored this. they 
showed Forfar paying 2787 lOs, but the sheriff actually paid only £551 
10s, being let off the rest after submitting a list of non-payers. ' 
All but one of these sheriffs, incidentally, had to be put to the horn 
before they would pay at all 2 
Potentially the most fruitful method of analyzing old extent would be 
to compare it with the system of valued rent that replaced it as a tax 
assessment. To do this comprehensively would be a huge task 
requiring detailed studies of the valuation rolls; here is just one 
example, the 1657 valuation of Kincardineshire which can be compared 
with a 1669 tax roll and list of retours, both showing old extent. '-' 
The 13 lay lands which appear in the same form in both lists show a 
mean of 1,192 of valued rent for each pound of old extent, but the 
standard deviation from this mean is £174 (that is, one third of the 
values lie outside the range 192 plus or minus 174). The extreme 
cases are the lands of Allardice and Pittarrow, where the former would 
by old extent have been liable for over ten times the latter's tax. 
These figures would need to be confirmed by a local study, but they 
point in the same direction as all the other evidence. 
Within many of the burghs, incidence of taxation was shifting. Three 
effects of heavier taxation can be seen in 1580s( Edinburgh. The stent 
I. &C, V, 435, 
2, RPC, V. 420-21, 
'Papers relating to the valuation of Kincardintihirt', Papers fres the 
collection of Sir Viiliaa Fraser, ed, J, R, N, MacPhail (SHS, 1924), 
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rolls extended outwards to embrace more and poorer burgesses; 
merchants' sons had to pay (an innovation previously introduced 
temporarily in the 1550s); and the key decreet-arbitral of 1583 taxed 
the crafts individually, thus doubling and trebling the tax payable by 
the richer artisans. ' The scope for widening the tax net can be 
illustrated by the unconventional tax of 1565 imposed in Edinburgh, 
including a large number who were wealthy but not normally liable .2 
These developments, especially the decreet-arbitral (which was one of a 
series in other burghs), could be seen as modernizing concessions to 
the principle of ability to pay - remarkable in comparison with the 
stagnation of the land tax. Parliament in 1592 ordered that 'all 
maner of personis inhabitantis of burrowis exerceand any maner of 
traffique merchandice or having change within the same' were to pay 
tax, and to watch and ward, 'quhether thay be admittit frie burgess 
thairin or no'. - Ff the burghs welcomed this statutory backing for 
the trend towards taxing a wider spectrum of urban society, they must 
have borne in mind that it would ultimately be at the expense of the 
privileges conferred by burgess-ship. 
A final conspectus of the hit-and-miss nature of tax incidence can be 
gleaned from the tax decreets. There are 26 cases where the 
complainers admitted some liability and the commissioners were 
presented with a choice between a high and a low figure for assessment, 
and where the decision could have gone either way (in other similar 
1. Lynch, 'the crown and the burghs', 72-73, 
Lynch, Edlnburgh, appendix XI, 
3, r9PS, iii, 578-79, c, 75. 
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case,, it did go the other way). I On average the low figure was 36 
per cent of the high figure. Taking all the evidence together, we can 
conclude that it was quite normal for some taxpayers to be paying at 
least three or four times as much as others, and for some discrepancies 
to be even larger. 
If parliament was unable to remedy these glaring differences in tax 
rates, neither was it able to do much about the wealth which avoided 
tax altogether. Imposition of a tax was a welcome event for a few 
fortunate exemption-holders. One was Robert Melville of Kurdocairny, 
treasurer depute. Kelville's exemption, stated to be as an officer of 
state, did not stop him from charging his Dunfermline abbey vassals to 
relieve him of their share of the tax - and than pocketing the 
proceeds .2 
If some benefice-holders had their ability to collect relief from feuars 
undermined by old extent, others exercised their rights untrammelled. 
In theory they should have paid some of the tax from the feu and tack 
duties which made up their own income, but a barons' petition to 
parliament in 1606 complained that they 'in uplifting of thair 
taxationis fra thair vassellis and takismen of teyndis hes stentit them 
of befoir to the... mair nor that aught and suld haif peyd therfoir'. 3 
The pot may have been calling the kettle black, for we have seen the 
i, Tax dacreeti, 1594, SRO, £62/i, fai, 5r  25v,, 38,., 40v,, 4)v ,l 42y ,j 48r 52r,, 53r,, 87r,, 106r., 119v,; Tax decreats, 1597, SRO, £62/2, fos, 20r 36Y., 
41r,, 67Y., 62Y., 65r, (2 caiei), 7)r,, 74Y., 77v,, 79r,, Div,, &5r,, 104r, 
2. RPC, i y, 642-44. 
3, 'The dasyr of the barronis... anent the stenting of this present taxatioun that 
the sasyn sty be devlie uptakin but abuss`, 1606, SRO, PA7/23/1, 
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statutes' comments, and in 1584 it was said flatly that 'lords, lards 
and prelats exacts twyse sa mikle from thair pure tenants' as they were 
liable for. ' Cases of benefice-holders avoiding any tax on their own 
income can indeed be found in the 1612 taxation papers, which include 
the earliest 'particular tax rolls' showing the relief payable by 
vassals of individual benefices. To take one example, £24 16s tax was 
due from the chantory of Aberdeen, but its holder charged his tacksmen 
of teinds to pay relief totalling t26.2 
Based as it was on the medieval conceptions of estates and tenants in 
chief, the tax system was unable to take account of the income of new 
social groups. Would the Protestant ministers pay tax? The question 
was never even raised at first. The tax of 1581 laid tax liability on 
the thirds of benefices, including ministers whose stipends came from 
these thirds; but ministers obtained special exemption in the 
remaining three taxes which required payment from thirds, making the 
requirement largely redundant and probably contributing to its demise. " 
By the 1590s and probably before, ministers with benefices did have to 
pay, much to their resentment ,6 but those who received stipends were 
not liable. E Ministers were more likely to hold the smaller benefices, 
and the general assembly demanded tax exemption for these in 1591 and 
i, Melville, Diary, 193. 
2, Particular tax rolls, 1612, SRO, E60/l/t, 
3,4PS, iii, 189-90, 
4,4PS, iii, 328-30; eec, iii, 741-42; #'S, tai, 424-26, 
6, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/i, fo, 17v, 
6, Tax decreetä, 1697, SRO, E62/2, fo, 43r, 
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1598, on the latter occasion asking for a cut-off point of 300 merks; 
all benefices below this value had gone to ministers since 1588. ' 
Comparison of the 1594 tax roll with the 1595 valuation of benefices in 
the diocese of Moray by the collector general of thirds suggests that 
the tax rolls included benefices down to a value of roughly U0.2 
Another major new sixteenth-century profession was law. Lawyers were 
urban, and it was up to the burghs, especially Edinburgh, to draw then 
into the net. They failed in all attempts to tax lawyers' wealth until 
the 1630s, when the increasing pressure of taxation was to be a factor 
in the collapse of the whole system 3 Members of the college of 
justice (which could include leading ministers of state, camouflaged as 
extraordinary lords of session) were exempt from tax on their lands as 
well - even after their deaths. 4 This exemption extended to embrace 
commissaries and advocates. 6* 
There were various entrenched exemptions, such as that of the Lyon king 
of arms .6 Craig recorded one curious and uncorroborated exemption: 
all people who had had 12 children living. ' Parliament in 1490 had 
banned new exemption grants, but the well-connected could still get 
I, Caldervoo , Nisiury, v, 134-35,685, 
2. Tax roll, 1594, SRO, E5911; Collector general's accounts, 1595, SRO, E45/24, 
3, Lynch (ed, ), Early re : rn taw17,17, 
4, AN, i, 55-56; Tax accounts, 1594, SRO, E£5/2, fo, 4v, 
5, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, E6212, fos, 15r,, 45v, 
6, RFC, vi, 320, 
7, Craig, 1u fecrdalo, 1,16,20, 
ý. wa. r., ý,... wýr. 
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round this. The feuars of crown lands in Fife talked themselves out 
of payment in 1589 on the grounds that they did the king special 
service at Falkland -2 The earl of Argyll was ordered to pay up for 
his sheriffdom of Tarbert in 1582, despite protesting that he could 
never collect from those disobedient Highlanders; but John Carswell, 
bishop of the Isles, used an identical argument with success. * 
Argyll's successor, probably because he was a useful political 
counterweight to the Catholic earls, was let off payment of 11,200 for 
the sheriffdoms of Tarbert and Argyll in January 1596.4 The vagaries 
of political influence would also decide the fate of creditors of the 
crown: a promise of future exemption seems to have been a common 
inducement to leaders, but would such a promise be honoured despite the 
1490 statute and similar provisions in most taxation acts? The burgh 
of Ayr had its exemption upheld in 1594 and 1597, on one occasion 
having to spend 1.40 on sending an envoy to Edinburgh; " but in 1597 
the unfortunate Adam Erskine, with £10,000 due to him from his period 
as collector of thirds, had £1,148 in tax extracted from him although 
he held a life exemption under the privy seal. r- 
Some exemptions may have made sense in social policy terns, such as 
1, APS, ii, 318, c, 4, 
2, RPC, iv, 41f-17, 
3, RPC, iii, 451-53,517-18, 
4. Tax decrssts, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo. 8ir. 
S, Tax decreeti, 1694, SRO, £62/I, fa, 12r,; Tax decreed, 1597, SRO, £6212, fo, 9v; 
'ayr accounts, 180, The praise is in RPC, iv, 222,309-10, 
6, Tax decrests, 1597, SRO, f62/2, fo, 68v, 
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those for feuars of salt pans, ' for the burgh of Dundee while building 
a parish church ,2 for Perth while building a new Tay bridge, ' or for 
Flemish cloth workers brought in to improve the Scottish textile 
industry. 4 Higher education and charitable foundations were a major 
exemption category, including benefices annexed to hospitals and 
universities, and chaplainries and other benefices allocated as 
bursaries for students. s None of the friaries, in theory earmarked 
for such purposes, appeared in the tax rolls. The city of Edinburgh 
did have to pay tax for Haddington priory in 1597, although claiming 
that it held it for college students; perhaps this was merely a 
temporary assignation of the fruits of the benefice .6 And 
chaplainries were usually too small to attract the tax-collectors' 
notice anyway - those of the diocese of Moray averaged under £12 in 
1595 7 These exemptions were all very well, but they went hand in 
hand with others, such as for monks' portions, that 
had no obvious rationale .8 The preceptory of Torphichen had a long- 
standing exemption - it did not pay thirds of benefices 
1, Tax decreets, 1534, SRO, E62/1, fd, 35v, 
2. RPC, iii, 520-21, 
3, v, 531. The burgh was protesting two years later at being charged to pay 
despite this: Perth council sinutes, i, Sandesan Library, Perth, fo, 10v, 
4, APS, iii, 506, c, 119, pars S. 
S, Tax decraets, 1597, SRO, E62/2, fos, 27r 29v, 
6, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, E6212, fo, 29v, Maitland of Thirlestane Possessed the 
benefice in 1594: 6, Donaldson, 'The Cistercian nunnery of St Mary, 
Haddington', East Lothian Trans 5 (1962), 23, 
7, Collector gene ral's accounts, 1595, SRO, E45/24, 
E, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo, 101r, 
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either. ' On one occasion an exceptional tax payment of X500 was 
gouged out from its holder, but this was less than the £689 to which it 
was assessed in the tax rolls and may have been a semi-voluntary 
contribution2 This case shows how far tax liability was a fluid and 
negotiable matter. Far too many exemptions were merely surrenders to 
vested interests, pointing up the underlying weakness of the state's tax 
machine. 
A final type of exemption dwarfs all others on occasion: entire 
estates were exempt from some taxes. Taxes were periodically imposed 
as payments in lieu of military service, the advantage being that the 
crown could do this without consulting parliament; technically it was 
not taxation at all, for the lieges could not deny their military 
obligations and it was made clear that they could still serve in 
person. But when they saw nationwide tax machinery being set in 
motion, assessments by old extent, appointment of collectors and so 
forth, they can hardly have appreciated the difference from 
parliamentary taxation - except that church lands were not taxed. The 
church's medieval exemption from knight service thus continued relevant 
as late as 1596 (and the crown lands escaped this tax too). 2 There 
was a tax in 1598 for a military expedition to Dumfries where church 
lands were included; ' this may represent a rethink by the government 
(more antiquarian-minded since the Octavians? ) and a decision to rely 
i, Tax dacreets, 1694, SRO, E62/1, fo, 64v,; RPC, iii, 671-72, 
2, Tax accounts, 1597, SRO, £6514; Tax roll, 1697, SRO, E5912, 
3, RiPC, v, 306-08; Tax accounts, 1596, SRO, E65/3, 
4, RPC, v, 434-35. 
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on common army service from which the church had no exemption. ' 
This does not seem to have established a precedent, probably because of 
growing resistance to all unorthodox tax demands. 
The burghs too were exempted from the 1598 tax; but they might also 
find themselves bearing the sole burden of taxation. Mostly this 
belongs to the story of indirect taxes, or of the general way in which 
the government's most reliable instinct when short of cash was to turn 
to the burghs, which cannot be told here; but there may have been 
formally-asse sed taxes which the royal burghs found themselves having 
to pay at crown behest. One fairly clear case is in 1593, when £1,000 
had to be found by a tax on all the burghs to reimburse Edinburgh for 
providing the king with troops .2 
So far we have been examining taxation as it fell due. How was it 
collected, and with what success? Each tax being a one-off event, a 
special collector had to be appointed to take overall responsibility$ 
he was a separate financial officer accounting independently to the 
exchequer. He and his deputies issued individual payment demands to 
414 church benefice-holders and to each sheriff for lay lands. He 
received payment from the burghs, sometimes individually, but at other 
times via the convention of royal burghs which kept a vigilant eye on 
burgh taxation. -" There was a different collector almost every time, 
1,6, Y, S, ßarrov, Kinship amii tinily; Stola , F00-/X6 (London, 198)), 46, 
2, RCRB, i, 392-93,407, 
3. RCMB, i 309,498, 
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but administrative continuity was provided by Archibald Primrose, 
writer to the signet. He never took on the task of collector, which 
carried personal financial liability, but he ran the tax bureaucracy 
from the early 1580s. The collectors of the small barons' tax in 1588 
were the master of Glamis and Robert Melville of Murdocairny, 
respectively treasurer and treasurer depute; ' but the money was 
actually paid to Melville (as treasurer depute, not as collector) by 
Primrose i2 In 1590 there was a vacancy for a collector: Richard 
Cockburn of Clarkington applied to take on the Job, 'as I may easelye, 
having Archie Prymrose and the rest of the officeris'. 01 Primrose was 
always in the background of the tax commissions of 1594 and 1597: 
those disputing their liability had typically to consign the disputed 
sum to him. In 1586 a dispute between him and the then collector, 
John Arnott, paralyzed the collection proce s. 4 
The workings of Primrose's empire can be glimpsed in the 1594 tax 
decreets. He seems to have parcelled out responsibility for the 
benefice-holders on a regional basis, for instance to a deputy collector 
for south of the Forth, Thomas Lindsay, Snowdon herald, whose deputy in 
turn was David Lindsay of the Xount, lyon king of arms. ', ' The heralds 
are often mentioned, and reference to action by David Lindsay and his 
'brother heraldic' suggests that they were a kind of collection 
i, RPC, iv, 245-46,361-£3, 
2, TA, 158E-90, E21/67, fo. 92r. 
3, Cockburn tos Maitland of 7hirleutans, 11 August 1690, CSP Sc, f,, x, 377, 
4, RFC, iv, 119-20, 
5, Tax decreets, 3594, SRO, £6211, fo, 64 , 
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agency. ' But other individuals were also involved in this, such as 
Walter Stewart, commendator of Blantyre 2 As well as the tax roll in 
the official archives, another surviving 1594 tax roll also includes 
rough notes on the grouping of benefices. -"' Once partial collection 
had been achieved in an area, there might be a separate assignment of 
the arrears collection to someone else; one benefice-holder in 1596 
was charged to pay his unpaid 1594 tax to Andrew Melville of Garvock, 
master of the household, and his 1588 tax to Primrose himself. ' 
It would have been too such to expect this system to be trouble-free. 
There were embarrassing moments when benefice-holders were charged to 
pay by one sub-collector, having already paid to another. " Things 
should have been simpler for lay lands, for everyone knew the 
boundaries of sheriffdoms. Or did they? Not the sheriffs of 
Roxburgh and Selkirk, to take one example, who both tried to collect 
the 1597 tax from Walter Scott of Buccleuch G Selkirk lost but was 
allowed to reduce his sheriffdoa's tax roll by 1.100 of old extent (it 
was only £14? to start with). The crown lands paid separately, but 
crown lands which had long been held by feuars were not easily 
distinguished from lay freehold lands: the estates of the earldom of 
March, for instance, were almost inextricably tangled with the lay 
1. Tax decreeta, 1594, SRO, E£2/1, fo, 10£r, 
2. Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, f£2/i, fo, 59v, 
3, 'Concernyng the chekker and the kingis rentis', NLS, Aviv, MS 34,2,17, 
foi, £0v, -£1r, 
4. Tax decreeti, 1594, SRO, £6211, fo, 93v, 
5, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E£2/1, foi, £7r 68Y., £9v, 
£, Tax decreets, 1597, SRO, E£2/2, fo, 92r, 
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lands of the sheriffdom of Berwick. ' And there were plenty of other 
things to go wrong, as some taxpayers in 1594 found to their cost. 
James Durham of Duntarvie not only had to pay at an exorbitant rate, 
but was then put to the horn for non-payment as the result of a feud; 
feuds must have played havoc with tax collection .2 Robert Haig of 
Besersyde paid to Timothy Frank, agent of the bailie of Lauderdale, but 
when charged to pay a second time failed to prove that Frank had been 
an accredited agent. ' Robert Douglas of Easthogill paid direct to 
Thomas Kirkpatrick of Closeburn, sheriff depute of Dumfries, not 
realizing that only freeholders were supposed to do so, and had to pay 
again to his feudal superior, James Douglas of Drumlanrig. " Perhaps 
this kind of thing was why part of the Dumfries sheriffdom's taxation 
was transferred to Patrick Leslie, commendator of Lindores; but this 
did not stop Kirkpatrick (who had also caused trouble in 15916) from 
trying to collect it. E 
The first stage in collecting a tax was to compile a tax roll. This 
was a temple of tradition, highly stereotyped and full of somewhat 
bogus precision. The officials were so reluctant to tamper with them 
that even a benefice known to be exempt, like Torphichen, was still 
1, Copies of papers of a parliamentary cosaission for revising tax rolls, 1613, 
NLS, Adv. MS 22,2,16, pp . 132-37, 
2. Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 24v, 
3, Tax decrests, 1594,, SRO, E62/1, fo, 110v, 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, £6211, fo, 111r, 
6, liPC, iv, 583, 
6. Tax decre ts, 1594, SRO, 662/1, fos, 95r 120v, 
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included time and again. ' But even the few surviving tax rolls show 
traces of flux in liability. The crown lands were omitted from the 
1594 tax roll, and also from the accounts of the tax , -2 the privy 
council's order to tax crown lands (the statute had 'negligentlie left 
his Besteis awne propir landis untaxt') was not carried out. 8 This 
failure was not repeated in 1597, the tax roll listing them in detail.,, 
One interesting feature of the list is the assessment of the lordship 
of the Isles, where the tax officials, seemingly not without doubts, 
held that a pennyland was to be treated as a merkland of old extent. 
Where they can be compared, the old extent valuations of the Isles 
diverged from the 'merklands' listed in a contemporary report (written 
probably for English eyes), but not so much as to make it certain that 
this was not old extent. E Startlingly, that report included Rathlin 
(30 merks), which the English were well aware was one of theirs;, " it 
would be interesting to know if it ever paid tax to Scotland. 
This growing interest in the Isles can be paralleled in the Borders: 
taxation was a key instrument of the extension of the government 
machine into all parts of the country. The stewartry of Annandale and 
lordships of Liddesdale, Eskdale and Vauchopedale appeared in the tax 
i, Tax decrasts, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 64v,; Tax roll, 1597, SRO, E59/2; Tax roll, 
1601, SRO, E59/3, 
2, Tax roll, 1594, SRO, E59/1; Tax accounts, 1594, E65/2, 
3, RPC, v, 131-32, 
4, Tax roll, 1597, SRO, 65912; Tax accounts, 1597, (6S/4, 
S. V. F. Skene, Celtic Scotland, fii (2nd edn,, Edinburgh, 1890), appendix 3, 
There is a sisitsr report in CSP Scot,, xi, 253, 
6, V, C, Mackenzie, The Higfrlam acrd Isles of Scotlafld (Edinburgh, 1937), 167-68. 
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rolls for the first time in 1597.1 The independent taxation of these 
lordships did not diminish the liability of the Border sheriffs; in 
fact, while the old extent of a sheriffdom might normally have been 
graven on tablets of stone, Roxburgh saw its assessment hoisted from 
£1,243 in 1594 to £2,596 l is 8d in 1597 2 This was the sequel to a 
case in which the sheriff, James Douglas of Cavers, was forced in 1596 
to pay tax arrears back to 1588; his contention that the sheriffdom 
should be only £1,000 and not £1,243 of old extent was dismissed. 3 
Not surprisingly he is next found at the horn in 1599 for non-payment 
of the 1597 tax at the greatly increased rate, though the privy council 
claimed that he had actually collected the £5,193 3s 4d that he owed. ' 
Meanwhile Liddesdale had to be let off payment of its 11,000 on the 
tame grounds that it had never paid before. E` These ructions could 
only be explained by a local study, but it may be that the tax- 
collectors were trying to break down traditional exemptions in lieu of 
military service on the Borders. No Border sheriffdom was called upon 
to pay the 1596 tax in lieu of service for the Kintyre expedition, for 
instance. E The English Borders were exempt from lay subsidies until 
1603 for the same reason. ' 
1, Tax roll, 1597, SRO, £59/2, 
2. Tax roll, 1594, SRO, E59/1; Tax roll, 1597, SRO, E59/2, 
3, Tax decreata, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 86r, 
4. RPC, vi, 23, 
5, Tax accounts, 1597, SRO, E65/4, fo, 14r, 
6, SPC, v, 306-08; Tax accounts, 1596, SRO, E65/3, 
7, A, B, Appleby, Fume irr ? 'r im! Stuart Eaglald (Liverpool, 1978), 67-68. 
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Taxation gave additional powers (or rather, additional duties) to 
sheriffs, but otherwise it was a centralizing force. Pegalities appear 
to have had no role in tax collection; no lord of regality is ever 
mentioned in the tax decreets as a collector. Parliament at one point 
complained that lords of regality were reluctant to put people to the 
horn for non-payment, which is what we would expect if sheriffs and 
central agents were elbowing their way in. ' One tax may have 
undermined the sheriffs too: that of 1588-89 on the small barons for 
their place in parliament, where they were to elect their own collectors 
for each sheriffdom. -- Some of the successful candidates were sheriffs 
(and one was a noble, the earl of Morton who dominated Kinross); " but 
others were local activists of various kinds, some of whom were also 
wapinshawings commissioners in 1575 or 'national commissioners' in 
1588.4 The mere fact of electing officers to run local tax machinery 
must have Jolted the hereditary sheriffs, and the effect was permanent 
since small barons were thereafter taxed regularly for their 
commissioners' parliamentary expenses. 6 
The commissions to hear tax disputes were an important feature of the 
collection system. It might have been impossible to collect the 
really big taxes with which the century closed without such bodies to 
reassure sceptical taxpayers. They were independent of the collector's 
i, PS, iv, 14£, c, 48, 
2. RPC, iv, 245-46, 
3, RFC, iv, 361-62, 
4, PS, iii, 91-92; lc'C, iv, 300-02, For Mora on thaw and other cossissions, 
see chapter 3, 
S. E. g, RFC, vi, 668,686, 
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bureaucracy, the vagaries of which they frequently curbed, as we have 
seen; though there is one ominous case where the king's advocates 'for 
thair entres' associated themselves with the defender, the commendator 
of Xelrose, to defeat the abbey feuars' attempt to be assessed by old 
extents The commissions of 1594 and 1597 operated for periods of 
over two years each. A case would be initiated by the purchase of 
letters of suspension of the collection, in one case from the court of 
session .2 One statute banned session and privy council from issuing 
suspensions, and although this was probably not observed it implies 
that the commissions (and perhaps the exchequer) may have been able to 
issue their own letters. 3 Commissions were judicial bodies, capable of 
establishing their own 'ardour and custume' as a basis for future 
decisions. ' 
Coaaissions' records only survive from 1594, but there was a 
commission for the 1588 marriage tax. & There may have been others 
before: although the privy council took responsibility for complaints 
about the 1581 tar, E it referred one complainer to a commission, 
probably that which parliament had just appointed to consider a number 
of issues including taxation. ' Many tax cases must lie buried in the 
1, Tax decrsats, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo. 42v, 
2, Tax decrsets, 1697, SRO, E62/2, fo, 12r, 
3, AP,, iv, 52, 
4, Tax decreets, 1594, SRO, E62/1, fo, 79r, 
5. RPC, iv, 269, 
6, E. g. RFC, iii, 409-10,422,444, 
7, RPC, iii, 448; 4P8, iii, 214-16, c, 9, 
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acts and decreets of the court of session; one is mentioned in July 
1597, when no commission was in being, and there were at least two 
more in 1594-97. ' The Broughton feuars, whose untiring efforts have 
contributed so much to our understanding of tax assessments, sought 
redress from an unknown body in 1578, from the privy council in 
1581, from the exchequer in 1586,4 and from the commissions in 1594 
and 1597.6 In the seventeenth century, all tax cases went before the 
court of session. 6 
All taxation was assessed in monetary terms. This is remarkable in 
an economy which was far from fully monetized: many rents were still 
in kind, as were other large transactions. How did the taxpayers - 
the earl of Errol, for instance, whose income was expressed entirely in 
kind - obtain the cash? This is a question on which the official 
records are silent, and any information would have to be gleaned from 
family archives. Probably the conversion was done locally; if so, 
taxation may have helped to stimulate the growth in local market 
centres which began at this time .7 The sheriff or his agents would 
then have had to transport the cash to Edinburgh: in England, this 
i, Tax decreets, 1597,6Rß, E62/2, fo, 20r,; Tax accounts, 1594, SRO, E65/2, fo, Ev, 
2, Libor rariarrri Barale Crgcis, pp, cxvi-cxviii, 
3, RPC, iii, 406-09, 
t, Thorson, M aortal, appendix, 
Tax decrscts, 1594, SRO, £62/1, fo, 25v,; Tax decraats, 1697, SRO, E62/2, 
fo, 20r. 
6, E, g, APS, iv, 450, c. 13, 
7, I. D. Jhyte, 'The growth of periodic sarket centre' in Scotland, 1600-1707', 
S6#95 (1979), 33-26, 
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could be an expensive business. ' 
Such expenses may account for some of the identifiable costs of 
collection, though no distinction was made between expenses and fees. 
The accounts for the 1597 tax show costs of 1.14,120, including a 15,000 
fee to the collector, Lord Newbattle, and £1,000 to Archibald Primrose-2 
£7,820 went to sub-collectors (stated to be 12d in the t of what they 
had collected), ß20O to the clerk register and 2100 to the exchequer 
clerks. As this tax raised 1157,603 (a somewhat nominal figure as we 
shall see), the costs on this occasion amounted to just under ten per 
cent of gross revenue. The much smaller tax of 1586 was similar: 
gross revenue £16,361, collection costs t, 1,450. '-4 This is impressive 
compared with France, where collection costs could amount to a third 
but we would expect Scotland, relying so heavily on its unpaid feudal 
hierarchy, to have a cheaper service than France with its armies of 
bureaucrats. 
Of course, this is not the full story. Financial accounts of this kind 
have to be treated with extreme caution. The previous collector, 
Thomas Erskine of Gogar, got his accounts to balance nicely in 1504 
without mention of collection costs. s Yet the 1597 statute complained 
i, Stone, Crisis of the aristocracy, 612-13, 
2. Tax accounts, 1697, SRO, E6514, fo. 16r, 
3. 'Concernyng the chekker and the kfngfs rentis', NLS, Acv, HS 34,2,17, fos, 34v  
39r, 
4, Saison, Society Iii crisis, 76, 
6, iax accounts, 1594, SRO, £6512. 
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that the 1594 collection officers 'hes bens in use of allouing to thame 
self is of greit and extraardiner feil for thair service, quhilk was ane 
greit imparing of the formar taxatioun, thair being ane greit pairt 
thairof bestouit upoun the chairges in ingetting of the sanyn'. ' 
Presumably the expenditure was concealed in the accounts or taken from 
some other source: as it could equally have been in 1597, though 
perhaps Newbattle had to be more careful about how he did it. 
Furthermore, local collectors demanded fees from taxpayers despite a 
statutory ban an this. The sheriff depute of Haddington, in collecting 
£60 from one complainer, also exacted a collection fee of 35e. This 
was queried neither by the complainer (who merely wanted to avoid 
paying his tax a second time to the bailie of Lauderdale) nor by the 
commission? 
One of the penalties of using the feudal hierarchy for collection was 
that it was slow and painful. The 1594 taxation accounts were 
submitted in 1600, the 1597 accounts in 1601 (they had been demanded 
unsuccessfully in 1599), and the 1596 accounts not until 1607.1' But 
perhaps most of the money was paid in the early stages? Half the 
1594 tax, voted in January, was supposed to be paid before Easter, the 
rest before midsummer. " Aberdeen paid bath instalments, totalling 
£1,338, on 11 April, stating that this was because the burgh had 
been. put to the horn - it is puzzling that this could be done so 
1, º? PS, iv, 14£, c. 48, 
2. Tax dacreeta, 1597, SRO, E£3/2, fo, 64r, 
3. Tax accounts, 1594,1596,1697, SRO, E£5/2-4; rV'S, iv, 180, 
4. WS, iv, S1, 
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early. ' But 12,373 was due from the sheriffdoa of Perth, 2 and the 
dates when the sheriff depute paid up are also recorded. " in the 
first half of 1594 he paid a total of 050, in the second £538; in the 
first half of 1595 £8, in the second £55; then nothing until July 1596 
when he paid £81; two undated further payments of £89 and £45 were 
perhaps made after the sheriff and sheriff clerk were put to the horn 
in November 1596.4 After some chivvying by Peter Young to whom the 
arrears collection had been assigned, he seems to have come up with a 
final £519 in January 1603. At this point the privy council gave up, 
tacitly abandoning some £286 -a 12 per cent shortfall after nine 
years. 
And yet the 1594 tax was not distinguished for its difficulty in 
collection. Far worse seems to have been endured by John Colville of 
Strarudy, collector in 1588, whose tale of woe was poured out in 1591.15 
The burghs had paid - they were the 'suireet payment', as the Aberdeen 
example above also suggests - but direct to the king, not to him. 'As 
to the rest of the said taxatioun, quhilk is to be payit be the clergie 
and baronis, albeit all maner of diligence his bene usit, yit the said 
Mr Johnne can gett na payment of the same. ' Kyriads of suspensions 
of payment had been purchased to torment his, of which many had been 
upheld by the commission; the 'new erectionis' were notable offenders 
1, . 0ordeen council ie! lers, i, 67, 
2. Tax toll, 1594, SRO, E59/I, 
3, RFC, iv, 516, 
4, TA, 1596-97, SRO, £31/71, fa, 90t, 
5. RPC, iv, 684-66, 
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here, no doubt through conflict over the rate payable by feuars. He 
had been lavish in denouncing non-payers, and there was a 'cathol ogue 
of their names affixt upoun the tolbuith wallas', to no avail. The 
privy council cancelled some of the decisions against him, but 
otherwise could do little to help him - certainly not reduce his own 
liability. 
The 1588 collection failure was probably caused by the country's 
economic problems and by the unfamiliarity of heavy taxation. This 
was, after all, the first of the really large taxes (1,100,000), with the 
small barons in the same year having to find a further £40,000. And 
it came at the end of several years of widespread famine and plague. ' 
Things were not always this bad; Alexander Clark, collector of the 
1583 and 1585 taxes, finished the Job satisfactorily by October 1586 .2 
But in 1575 the 1566 tax was still unpaid by three sheriffs, a steward 
and two bailies, who must have been greatly surprised when the 
government remembered them. ' And when Lord Ruthven, provost of 
Perth, was collector of the 1578 tax for repairing the Tay bridge, the 
burgh later noted sadly in its guildry book 'for our memoriall to 
reaan' that he had been 'noway ernist and cairfull for obtening 
thairof'. '' 
The country suffered renewed economic disasters in the late 1590s, with 
i, M. Flinn (ed. ), Scottish pWWIitiir history (Caabridga, 1977), 109, 
2. VC, iv, 109,112, 
3. RPC, ii, 436; M, xiii, p, xvi, 
4. Earth guiWry book, Perth Pusaus A Art Gallery, p, 449, 
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repercussions an collection of the taxation of 200,000 merke of 
November 1597. There was 'grit slaknes' in April 1598; non-payers 
were being put to the horn but then (complained the council) allowed to 
purchase their own escheats. ' English envoys reported 'great 
grudging' in larch, and in June claimed extravagantly that practically 
no money had yet come in .2 These assertions, unlike those of 1588, 
can be checked against the accounts; there was £441 'dependand be 
suspensiounis' and £21,927 owed by non-payers at the horn. ' There 
were also many exemptions (some traditional, some granted by the 
crown, and some adverse commissioners' decisions) totalling 111,692.4 
This is a shortfall of over 14 per cent, or 22 per cent with exemptions 
included. Suspensions and hornings in the 1594 accounts were only 
£773. s But the smallness of this figure is also a reminder of every 
tax account's limitations, for it clearly ignores payment made at the 
leisurely pace of Perth's sheriff depute. The 1598 accounts, as we 
have seen, recorded a payment from the sheriff of Forfar which included 
a number of people from whom collection had not actually been made. 
All accounts implied payment an the nail unless enforcement action was 
being taken (and sometimes, it seems, even if it was). Probably the 
true level of non-payment was far higher than the accounts suggest. 
i, RPC, v, 451-52, 
2, Nicolson to Burghley, 15 March 1596, CSP Sru!  xiii, 17A; Aston to Ctcil, 12 June 1536, CSP Scut,, xiii, 217, 
3, Tax accounts, 1697, SRO, E65/I, f01,17r 23r, 
4, Tax accounts, 1597, SRO, E65/4, fos, 10r, -15v, 
S. Tax accounts, 1594, SRO, £6512, fos, 12v  13r, 
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So the tax system was inequitable and inefficient; it was nevertheless 
widely cherished. Let us return to where we began, with the 
government's 1556 reform scheme scuppered by strong, well-organized 
opposition. The rebels of 1559-60 publicly denounced 'unaccustomed 
and exorbitant' taxation as they swept to power. ' An obscure medieval 
alternative to parliamentary taxation, the military 'tax of spears', had 
probably been discredited by its use in 1552 and 1555, and was never 
mentioned again .2 All this ushered in two decades of cheap government 
in which taxation faded from public concern. A tax of £6,000 was 
proposed in the 1560 parliament, but apparently dropped. -` Queen Nary 
and her advisers were in no hurry to court the unpopularity that her 
mother had suffered; besides, she had her French dowry. Her personal 
rule saw only one tax, with no assessment innovations. 
This was the time, however, when there was one practical success in 
imposing a new kind of tax. The religious revolution and the urgent 
need to find some cash for the new church meant that rules had to be 
broken; at the same time, the political influence of the benefice- 
holders was at its nadir. The upshot was logical - 'thirds of 
benefices' became a new tax, based on actual rentals, and so related to 
ability to pay., ' The crown as well as the ministers reaped the 
benefit. Then a 1563 statute an church repairs led to a privy council 
i, Knox, Xistury, i, 221, 
2, Murray, 'Exchequer and croon revenue', 324-26; Sheriff court bo, k of We, 
293-94, Cf. the English 'tax for archers': Dovell, History of taxation, 1, 
121-29, 
3, Randolph to Cecil, 19 August 15£0, CSP Scot,, 1,467; Randolph to Cecil, 25 
August 1560, CSP Scot,, 1,470, 
4, Third, pp, x-xi and passiv. 
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order for a parish-based tax, with sheriffs in hac paarte supervising 
locally-elected assessors; nothing had been done on this by 1573, when 
the scheme was ratified, and it disappears from eight thereafter. ' 
There was thus still a chance in the 1560s that parliaientary taxation 
might be superseded. It may not be possible to calculate the odds on 
its survival, but at any rate it did survive. After all, it had the 
sanction of tradition. But it also had the limitations of tradition, 
and saw no revolutionary changes in its assessment. Cheap government 
continued into the 1570s. The explanation of how the civil war was 
financed will have to await a full study of the period, since at present 
evidence is available only for Edinburgh .2 But there were few 
parliamentary taxes, and the traditional assessment was fully adequate 
to cope with the small sums involved. 
In the 1580s and onwards, government was more expensive - for the 
first time in peacetime. This raises a constitutional question 
familiar in English history: for what non-military purposes could the 
government legitimately levy taxes? This was the principal question 
on which in 1587 the clerk register sought legal advice from John 
Russell. Russell was disturbed by his own conclusions: 'I find na 
resolute conclusioun nor suretie quhilk may bind the prince... 
nochtwithstanding quhatsumevir statute can be maid, the prince will 
appoint tasationes sa oft as he pleissis upoun cullorit causais'. The 
only remedy was an 'ordinance to be said that na taxatioun salbe input 
i, APS, ii, 839-40; RPC, i, 247-48; cf, APS, iii, 763-77,06, 
2, Lynch, Edinburgh, 204-05. 
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upoun the lieges without the speciale avise of the thrie estaitis athir 
convenit in parliament or in publict conventioun, ffor ane waist 
necessar and publict taus tryit and knawin to the saidis estaitis'. ' 
The paucity of constitutional precedent, which Russell as a man of his 
time interpreted as an absence of constraints on the crown, is clear. 
Though theory was vague, in practice an explicit reason of some kind 
had to be given for a tax. A convention of April 1583 granted a tax 
of £20,000 for the stated purposes of paying off worrying crown debts, 
preparing for the king's marriage, and for 'utheris his malst neidfull 
and wechtie effairis'2 As even the royal nuptials were in the 
indefinite future, this collection of vague justifications was a slender 
thread from which to hang a demand for ßs 8d in the t of old extent. 
But the original request had been for as much as 1100,000; this had to 
be scaled down, after protests led by Lord Newbattle, with the argument 
that 'the chargis requisite heiranent cravis the presence of a greittar 
nowmer of the estaittis', and that taxation for crown debts was a 
dangerous precedent. - No doubt this was why the royal marriage was 
made to serve as an excuse - not for the last time. A parliament was 
summoned for later in the year to discuss the rest of the £100,000, but 
it never met. ' 
i, John Russell, `Ffor ansuer to ay lord clerk rs+Jistaris brsif`, 9 July 1587, SRO, 
PA7lll36, 
2, r4PS, iii, 328-30, 
3, Astaa to Leicester, 19 April 1583, CSP Scot,, vi, 400; Boves to Ilalsinghaa, 23 
April 1583, CSP Scot,, vi, 404, 
4, Boves to Vatsimpas, 28 Septesber 1583, CSP Scot,, vi, 623, 
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The customary view that a tax was a one-off, extraordinary expedient 
never disappeared. ' But theory, as in England, diverged from 
practice .2 The right of the Estates to sanction 
taxes grew because 
they continued to be asked; but why would this continue to be 
necessary if it were once admitted that the government needed taxation 
constantly for its ordinary expenses? Far better not to let go of the 
reins, even if they had to be loosened enough to allow the levying of 
vast sums intended nominally for the baptism of royal infants, for 
expeditions to the Isles that might never take place, and other such 
'cullorit caussis'. Even if the reasons were as specious As the 
promise to pay on a modern banknote, the effect would prove to be the 
opposite of Russell's fears: the Estates retained control. And the 
opposition found the theory of more direct use on occasion, as in 1597 
when tax money was being lavished on the entertainment of a drunken 
Danish duke. 3 
Most taxes were granted by conventions rather than parliaments. 4 
While this is not of major significance, it does suggest -a reluctance to 
expose the government's financial necessities to a possibly 
unsympathetic assembly. Conventions' membership was smaller and 
probably contained a higher proportion of government supporters. 
1, Jaaas VI, 83silirun dorm, i, 158-59, 
2, fi, l, Harries, 'Theory and practice in royal taxation: sole observations', 
OR 97 (1982), 811-19, this article is part of a debate in which I have no 
wish to becose eabroiled, but it offers the best parallel to developaents in 
Scotland, Cf. J, D, Alsop, 'the theory and practice of Tudor taxation', £Hf'97 
(1982), 1-30, for a useful survey of the debate, 
3. Nicolson to Cecil, 9 June 1598, CSP Scot,, xiii, 215, 
4, Appendix D, 
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Still, the largest tax of the whole period (200,000 merks in 1597) was 
granted in a parliament. 
Was there ever taxation outside parliament or convention? This is not 
the place to discuss the government's other financial shifts, though 
their occasional importance can be illustrated by comparing the 500 
marks which Edinburgh paid for the duly-assessed tax of 1566 with the 
previous year's exactions, not recorded as normal taxation: £1,000 
composition for absence from the queen's army, and a loan of 10,000 
marks for the superiority of Leith. ' But there were moments when the 
link between normal taxation and the estates might have become 
tangential. In 1578, a tax was imposed by a self-styled convention, 
little more than an enlarged privy council: protests followed, and a 
promise had to be made that it would not be a precedent .2 Even as 
early as this, the Estates were jealous of their rights over taxation. 
The tax of 1585, imposed by the privy council, may have been agreed in 
principle in a convention two years earlier, though the Xaxwell 
rebellion which the tax was to suppress had only just happened. - 
Overall, extra-parliamentary taxation never got far. 
This allowed parliamentary opposition to taxation to take root and 
flourish. Parliament was not the only forum for discussion of 
political affairs, as we saw in Chapter 3: even indirect taxation might 
be decided by negotiation between the government and the convention of 
i, fd17, R c,,, iii, 202-03; for sore on this, see chapter t. 
iii, 46; (din, lilts iv, 91-93,96-98; RPC, iii, 56-57, 
3, RPC, iii, 743-43; APS, iii, 328-30; Brown, `Makin' of a po! }tiq , 157, 
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royal burghs; but no other bodies rivalled the Estates for settling 
questions of direct taxation, and there are frequent if often unspecific 
references to the opposition. What do they mean? In some cases, no 
doubt, the parliament house was merely the scene for desultory 
exchanges between an indecisive government and an unwilling but 
passive assembly: if no decision to tax resulted, this was in some 
senses an opposition victory, but it does not betaken a self-confident 
or organized opposition. Again, some proposed taxes died an 
cancellation of the parliament which was to have debated them, showing 
that some of the most successful opposition was still exercised by 
personal contact at court. But when we begin to see organized 
resistance with named leaders, or evidence of systematic lobbying by 
the burghs, we know that we are dealing with something much more 
concrete. Much opposition was always that of a passive majority; but 
when that majority allowed itself to be swayed by the arguments of 
outspoken critics of taxation, in the face of strong government 
pressure, then clearly that opposition was central to the political 
process in parliament. 
When taxation came under strong pressure to grow, this must surely 
have highlighted the inequalities in traditional assessment levels, 
providing a focus for the opposition? - after all, for every person who 
was under taxed, someone else was increasingly aware of being over- 
taxed. But no. It was for that very reason that the critics of 
taxation articulated the desire of the propertied classes to retain the 
outdated assessments; the very unfairness of the old system provided 
an automatic limit on tax revenue. As the tax burden grew, some would 
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very soon be squeezed until the pips squeaked; and so long as the 
political system worked properly, that would be the limit. It was 
necessary that a few should be over-taxed for the general good rather 
than that all should be over-taxed, for that was the alternative. It 
was the government that wanted to reform taxation, and its reform 
efforts came at a time when revision of tax assessments was clearly 
seen to imply, for most people, upward revision. 
The first organized opposition to a tax since the 1550s is identifiable 
in 1578, when the unrepresentative way it was imposed (already 
mentioned) led not just to criticism within the convention itself but 
to systematic lobbying from the burghs, led by Edinburgh. ' A non- 
payment campaign was proposed, and though this was ruled out, it was 
complained that the tax was 'contrair the act of parliament', no doubt 
that of 1563 which had guaranteed burghs a voice in conventions voting 
taxation .2 In 1583 we 
have seen that constitutional doubts were used 
successfully to cut a tax from £100,000 to ß2O, 000. The burghs' 
chorus of criticism continued through the 1580s, and their right to be 
taxed separately (at one sixth of the total) was ratified by parliament 
in 1587.3 Yet they had to pay x, 20,000, or one fifth, of the marriage 
tax imposed the very next year; nor do they seem to have received a 
promised allowance for an advance payment of £8,000.4 
1, Edirr, Rea,, iv, 91-93,96-98, 
2.4P$, ii, 543, c, 20, 
3. RCRE, i, 167,214,305; 4FS, 111,498-99, c, 109, 
1, Appendix D. 
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Official doubts about Bagimond in the early 1580s are suggested by 
some papers of Richard Maitland of Lethington on the benefices' 
contributions to the senators of the college of justice, hitherto 
assessed using the tax rolls. ' Interpretation of these is difficult, 
as it is not clear which, if any, represents the actual situation and 
which is a reform proposal, but it seems that Bagimond survived. 
Then, in 158?, parliament appointed a commission explicitly to reform 
taxation - particularly to deal with the endless problems over the 
benefice-holders, their vassals and the illegal taxation of the 'puir 
laubouraris of the ground', which John Russell had highlighted; the 
commission, indeed, may have been prompted by his memorandum .2 
Nothing more was heard of it as a reform body, though it was given a 
role in administering the following year's marriage tax, and reform 
hopes from it were not abandoned. - 
The paradoxical phenomenon of voluntary taxation first arose from a 
1586 convention which met to counter the threat of Xary's execution. 
The government tried to harness the general outcry, arguing that it 
could not save her without money. The 'fewnes of their nowmer' 
(echoes of 1578 and 1583) made a formal tax impossible, the convention 
stated, but all those present would give 'freelie', earls £344, lords 
x, 200, bishops £40 or more, and others were enjoined to follow their 
3, 'The sonne of the contributiouna grantit be the hallt prelatic vithin thiii 
realaa,,, to the fyftene ordinar lordis of sassiouna yeirlie', Richard Maitland 
of Lethington, 2 April 1586,8. ain tyre NI, ila#y, ii, eda, t, Thomson I
0, Laing (1836), 51-64, 
2,4PS, iii, 517, c, 124, 
3. APS, iii, 623; 524, 
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example. ' The burghs were not there, so the statement that they too 
would think about giving something lacks conviction. The advantage 
for the government was the prospect of escaping from the traditional 
assessment. There was some support for the idea in Lothian at least, 
where the 'haill barronis, frehaldaris and fewaris' promised 10,000 
merks 2 The tax survived Nary's execution, as attempts were being 
made to collect it in Kay and June 1587, 'payment being maid be sum, 
and the malst parte refusing, at the islet delaying'' Disappointing; 
but the potential gains of the policy were great, and there were 
further semi-voluntary taxes. One was imposed in 1590 for 
entertaining some Danish ambassadors, for which James Wood of 
Lambeletham was charged to pay £200. He got it reduced to £100, 
grumbling that 'this contributioun is na wayis voluntarie'. When 
people were being put to the horn for non-payment, he had a point-4 
The final semi-voluntary tax was for the royal guard in 1593; it used 
presbyteries as collectors, knowing that they were committed to tough 
military action against the Catholic earls. It does not seem to have 
been a success. 5 
In the 1590s, taxation soared to new heights. While this is 
remarkable, so is the consistent success of the opposition in reducing 
or preventing many proposed taxes. In 1589, the burghs allegedly 
i. AN, iv, 129. 
2, RPC, iv, 135-37, 
3, RPC, iv, 174-75, 
4, liC'C, iv, 634-35, 
5, RPC, v, 55-56; flacQuaen, 'fieneral asseably`, i21-22, 
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stymied a tax by pointed absence from a convention., The January 
1594 baptism tax of £100,000 was originally, in December 1593, to have 
been accompanied by a further ß50, O00 for the queen's needs .2 Yet 
another tax, planned for November 1594, was also abandoned. ' The 
semi-voluntary taxes had also failed for the time being, but another 
approach was to revamp crown feudal rights, as with the taxes of 1598 
and 1598 in lieu of military service, bypassing the Estates. 
Meanwhile the king wooed the burgess estate - an embassy to France was 
needed on customs rates, and would the burghs raise a tax for it? The 
burghs, sensing that the king wanted the embassy for quite other 
reasons, declined. ' 
In June 1594, parliament ordered all annexed church lands to be 
retoured. 66 This seems to signal a government plan to rid themselves 
of Bagimond by taking advantage of the trend which we have seen 
developing towards using old extent for the feuars of church land. 
Once old extent was in place on all the church lands, they could have 
equalized the church and lay assessments by revising or abandoning the 
rule that church lands paid half of all taxes. However, there had 
been a change of plan by April 1558 when the Broughton feuars were 
deprived of the right to pay by old extent (or rather of the right to 
pay at the same old extent rate as the barons and freeholders), thus 
i, Asheby to Burghley, 16 August 1589, CSP Scot,, x, 139; Ashby to ValsinQhas, 26 
August 1589, CSP Scot,, x, 146, 
2, Coves to Burghley, 22 Dece. ber 1593, CSP Scot,, xi, 246, 
3, Aston to Caves, 29 November 1594, CSP Scot,, xi, 483, 
4, Boves to Burghley, 2 June 1596, CS? Scot,, x11,237, 
5, QPS, iv, 75, c, 46, 
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reinforcing the commitment to taxing church lands more heavily. ' 
This key decision might simply have implied an intention to stick to 
tradition, but the sequel suggests that it in fact heralded something 
more radical. The 1594 plan would have killed off Baginond, but at 
the price of entrenching old extent - scarcely ideal. In 1598, it 
looks as though the government was already planning to escape from 
both strait-jackets at once. The story unfolds in four remarkable 
conventions of July and December 1599, April and June 1600. The last 
major parliamentary tax had been in 1597, another was surely on the 
way, and the government had determined that it should not use the old 
assessments. 
They proceeded at first with the utmost caution, hoping to obtain 
agreement by little and little. The convention of July 1599 passed a 
velvet-gloved measure agreeing that the desperate state of crown 
finance had caused poor government and a breakdown in law and order, 
but admitting what critics had long charged, that past taxation had 
been 'grevous' to the lieges and 'litill proffitable ather to the supplie 
of the foirsaidis defectis or any other his majesties necessar 
services'. So - what joy! - the king would make all future taxes 
voluntary: 'never to impone any taxatioun heirefter upoun his pepill, 
bot rather to expect at thair handis sum favourable releiff of thair 
benevolence without any grudge'. Sceptics must have recalled previous 
semi-voluntary taxes, and the heart of the proposal was clearly the 
assessment system rather than the voluntary principle, but the act 
1, Tix decreiti, 1597, SRO, E62I2, fo, 20r, 
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could hardly be refused since it committed the convention to nothing: 
the numbers present, stated the act, were insufficient (another 
sweetener, remembering past concerns about representation), and an 
actual tax on these lines would only be imposed at the next, better 
attended, convention. ' 
The next convention, in December, seems not to have been so well 
frequented as to prevent the opposition from playing the representation 
card again. The question was deferred, though in the meantime there 
was another novel proposal for an excise on grain, cattle and sheep .2 
This failed, and the government persevered with its original plan, 
reminding the next convention, in Perth in April 1600, that its two 
predecessors had accepted the 'voluntary' taxation scheme in principle. 
This time the king was able to force things a stage further, and an act 
was passed outlining some of the features of the new system. ' The 
whole country was to be divided as it were int o 1,000 persons - 
seemingly 1,000 areas, each to bear an equal burden. Within each area 
each man's substance would be assessed by the sheriff and four 
assessors, and a report would be made to a central commission. The 
burghs would be taxed as before, but old extent and Bagimond were 
clearly to be buried. The act discreetly omitted any mention of the 
sum to be imposed or details of the collection mechanism, leaving these 
questions to the next convention. Even so, the barons and burghs 
fought the measure doggedly. The mood of the Lothian barons, so 
#, APS, 1v, %&S-E6, 
3, Chapter 4, 
3, CSP Scot,, xiii, 633-34, 
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generous in 1587, had altered; an 'infamous pasquell' circulated on 'our 
new impoist' when they met in March to elect their commissioners. ' 
Resistance at the convention was organized by John Vemyss of Wester 
Vemyss and John Robertson, merchant of Edinburgh. They were only 
defeated by gerrymandering the convention's voting procedure: the king 
had them vote by estates and got the officers of state counted as an 
estate, thus carrying the measure by three estates to two -2 
It was a fragile success, and all now turned on the June convention. 
Here at last it emerged that the king was bent on a vast tax of 
100,000 crowns (1,333,333 Scots at 1598 exchange rates3) to be prepared 
to fight for his English inheritance. ' In the debate, the opposition 
focused on the futility of Scotland trying to conquer England by force 
of arms, government supporters countering that the king's place in the 
English succession would make war inevitable if some other claimant 
were to succeed Elizabeth. But after three days of batting such 
arguments back and forth, all saw that the question turned less an 
their logical merits than on the plain fact that the barons and burghs 
were grimly unwilling to pay more tax. They offered a paltry £40,000 
for their share - and only on the impossible condition that they should 
receive exemption for the rest of the reign. The king protested that 
he had been promised this tax and new assessment in April, and 
demanded that all present should declare on oath whether this was so. 
1, RPC, vi, 856-56, 
2. Nicolson to Cecil, 20 April 1600, CSP Scot., xiii, 633-34, 
3, Coinage proclasation, 18 8acaaber 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, 3356-57. 
4, Nicolson to Cecil, 29 June 1600, CSP Scot xiii, 661-64, 
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He was rebuked by John Learmonth of Balcomie, who declared that the 
convention was free and could not be forced to answer. Soon it was 
all over; barons and burghs had killed the scheme, and an angry king 
was threatening reprisals. Vhen he fumed about revoking the barons' 
place in parliament, however, Vemyss rejoined that they had bought 
their place and could not be deprived of it. Out of pique James 
ordered an expedition to Kintyre, which would have required another 
tax, but nobody took it seriously. He sent the nobles away with kind 
words. 
Since most nobles supported the government or at least failed to align 
themselves with the opposition, the motives of the few noble dissenters 
are worth examining. ' Alexander Seton, lord president, former 
Octavian and future earl of Dunfermline, had had enough of being a 
whipping-boy for unpopular measures .2 His brother, Lord Satan, had 
been a member of the 1594 tax commission which had been notably 
lenient to taxpayers. ' The earl of Cassillis had been expensively 
swindled by the king over his appointment as treasurer in 1599.4 
Finally, the enigmatic earl of Gowrie was owed vast sums by the king, 
which makes his opposition to improving crown finances seem Quixotic - 
interestingly, one of his own creditors was John Robertson, activist in 
April; 5 but he probably felt that he would see little of the money, and 
i, Dennis Caapball, dean of Liserick, to Nicolson, July 1600, CSP Scot,, xiii, 670, 
2, tee, 'King Jaaes's popish chancellor', 176, 
3, AFS, iv, 61, 
4, Chapter 4. 
S. APS, iv, 245, c, 47, 
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we have seen his past tax troubles as commendator of Scone. 
So the opposition had won in the end. The fact that a tax of 100,000 
merks was voted in February 1601 underlines their victory; for this 
was a tax an the traditional assessment system, for ambassadors, a 
traditionally-acceptable purpose. ' The collectors of this tax are 
interesting: one was the earl of liar, a supporter of the June 1600 
tax, but the other, the duke of Lennox, had been the largest single tax 
defaulter in 159? 13 An epilogue to the story comes in 1613, when a 
parliamentary commission took up the only form of tax revision left to 
the government: searching for lands omitted from the sheriffs' tax 
rolls. They spent endless wearisome hours sifting through retours and 
other evidents, but while they made some discoveries - the marquis of 
Huntly had been evading tax on his lordship of Strathbogie, for 
instance - the impact on tax revenue was minimal. Some sheriffdoms 
even got their assessments reduced. ' Old extent and Bagimond were to 
remain unchallenged for another forty years of heavy but unequal 
taxation. E 
1, Nicoison to Cecil, 14 February 1601, CSP SCO!  xiii, 773; Tax roll, 1601, SRO, E59/3, 
2, RPC, vi, 359, 
3, Tax accounts, 1697, SRO, EE65/4, fos, 17v, -23r, 
4. Copies of papers of a partitsentary cossisston for revising tax rolls, 1613, 
NLS, Aviv, HS 22,2,16, For a stellar local effort in 1621, sea APS, iv, 630, 
c, 35, 
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The clearest conclusion to be drawn must be that Scotland's taxation 
before the revolution was unequivocally feudal. It was based on a 
feudal hierarchy, starting with the tenants in chief - freeholders, 
benefice-holders and royal burghs. Indeed, in the way that all 
freeholders and benefice-holders were treated alike, the tax system 
conformed better to feudal theory than did parliamentary 
representation, which singled out nobles and prelates for special 
treatment. When parliamentary taxation was as rare and low-key as it 
had been for the centuries before the 1580s. it was more important to 
apportion it in harmony with parliament's overall view of the social 
status hierarchy than to ask awkward questions about the distribution 
of national resources and individual ability to pay. 
Not only was it feudal; it was also customary, based on a collection 
of centuries-old assessment systems, which produced hopelessly unequal 
levels of taxation. There were inequalities within old extent itself, 
the basis of taxation for lay lands. Similar inequalities doubtless 
existed within Bagimond's Roll, though the complicated distribution of 
income between feuars, tacksmen and superiors makes this hard to prove. 
Old extent and Bagimond themselves represented taxation at different 
levels, and the apportionment of taxes between the estates varied (as 
when some estates escaped paying). Within church lands, some feuars 
were taxed by old extent, while others suffered from a variety of 
heavier assessment principles. Some teind-holders avoided payment, 
others again had to pay at different rates. There was differential 
collection failure, with the more powerful finding it easier to avoid 
paying. And there were many exemptions for reasons good, bad and 
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indifferent. Only within the burghs was there institutional 
flexibility enough to allow revision of the assessments. Otherwise, 
the random nature of so auch multiple variation in tax incidence 
suggests that all the different variables would overlap and reinforce 
each other to produce a yet wider spectrum within which tax rates 
would fall. 
It was on this crazily-patched structure, inherited from a low-pressure 
fiscal tradition which had concealed its defects, that regular 
parliamentary taxation was imposed in the 1580s and 1590s. This 
success in establishing high-pressure taxation is important, but 
underlying it is the fact that social changes had made it necessary. 
Government needed increased income for increased activities, and 
traditional revenues from sources like crown lands were stagnant or 
declining. Moreover its new-found income from taxation was never 
enough, thanks to successful resistance, to pay for new-style 
government. 
As well as boasting the overall level of taxation, there were some 
changes in the way it was distributed: in particular the taxation for 
the first time of feuars and teind tacksmen. But this innovation 
becomes less impressive when we remember that this was the age which 
had created feuars and teind tacksmen. Parliament was not leading, 
but trailing behind, social change. The end result was to create a 
hybrid system in which the incidence of taxation was still as 
uneven as ever - indeed, perhaps more so - for both the new and the 
old social groups. 
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Another aspect of government failure is familiar from English history: 
the failure to detach control of taxation from the Estates. Parliament 
and conventions remained at the centre of the system, and the 
opposition was able to use them successfully to defeat the government's 
aspirations - for heavier taxation, and for assessment reforms which 
would allow taxation to become heavier still. 
Sealy-erected in the 1580s, but relying wholly on medieval foundations 
laid down with no such structure in mind, such a fiscal system was 
inevitably short-lived. The durability of old extent, stretching over 
five centuries and more, makes it easy to forget how multi-faceted its 
history was, and in particular that it was only in use for regular 
taxation for a tenth of that time. The reason is plain: it was 
unable in the long run to fulfil the fiscal function for which it had 
long ceased to be fitted. 
The fiscal structure was at the heart of the early modern state. ' 
Thus, a 'stent and retour' of the middle march and Liddesdale was 
ordered in 1581. not for tax purposes but to establish lords' 
responsibility for criminals 2 But when the Scottish tax system was 
so inequitable and unpopular, the resultant stresses may have impeded 
the process of state-building. There was no professional bureaucracy 
with direct access to taxpayers, already found at this time in France; 
instead, feudal superiors were forced to become tax-collectors. The 
i, 6, Ardant, 'Financial policy and econoaic infrastructure of node n states and 
nations', foraativn of nulloral ifates, ed, Tilly, 166 and paitla, 
2, mac, iii, 346. 
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endless disputes between superiors and vassals can scarcely have 
strengthened feudal ties, and the sheer irrelevance of many of these 
feudal relationships is underlined by episodes like the absurd squabble 
between Altrie and Xarischal about which was the other's feudal 
superior. After half a century of regular taxation based on 
assessments essentially unrelated to people's ability to pay, and 
institutional structures increasingly unrelated to contemporary society, 
the time would come when people would opt for a more modern fiscal 
system - even if it meant paying more tax. 
As, indeed, it did. For it was revolution and civil war which finally 
overturned the rickety old structure. As in the 1550s, the need for 
troops was paramount. But unlike Mary of Guise, the Covenanters were 
successful in bursting through the built-in limitations of the medieval 
assessments, and imposing by force a system based on valued rent. Of 
course, at the Restoration there were calls for the revival of the old 
system, and a lengthy encomium on it by Mackenzie unintentionally 
highlighted its defects: 
As to the pretence of inequality in the old way, it is to be considered, that 
though an arithaeticat proportion and exactness is not to be expected in any 
way; yet there is sore reason to prasuse for the Justice and equity of a legal 
way, venerable for antiquity, warranted by express laws and issesoriai custos,,, 
than for a way contriv'd and hatch'd in the heat and fury of trouble and 
distespers, ' 
Suffice to say that the first tax for a generation by the 'venerable' 
old system, in 1665, was also the last .: 2 
t, Mackenzie, Obßarratlarf, 304-09. 
2, Rift, Parliaments, 499-500, 
